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Abstract 
The goal of this thesis is to make an intervention in the debates surrounding the 
political significance of British theatre, and specifically playwriting, during the New 
Labour government. In an environment of austerity under the Coalition government, 
journalistic commentary has tended towards a nostalgic conception of the Blair era 
as a 'Golden Age' of the arts marked by abundant funding and artistic freedom for 
practitioners. I examine the flaws of such claims, asking whether the importance 
placed on social and economic value during this time may in fact have had a 
detrimental effect on the political efficacy of the form, and how the discursive 
closures created by the rhetoric of Third Way democracy can best be disrupted in 
order to make a reimagining of political theatre possible.  
My central question is as follows: 
What effect did New Labour, and particularly the influence of Third Way social 
democracy, have on the relationship between plays and the political? 
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Introduction 
Genesis 
The departure point for this project was furnished by my experiences in 2006-7 of 
working as Marketing and Press Manager at Hampstead Theatre. I came to this role 
fresh from a similar position with a commercial concert promoter that put on 
hundreds of high-profile events each year and where a failure to meet sales targets 
meant placing one’s own job, and that of one’s colleagues, in real and immediate 
jeopardy. There was no social or political mission here, only financial imperative. I 
moved to subsidised theatre, therefore, in a spirit of somewhat naive excitement, 
expecting to find myself in an atmosphere of unbridled artistic courage and curiosity 
where risk-taking and dissidence were welcomed and where drama was understood 
as public good rather than pure commodity. Reality soon bit, however, as I arrived at 
Hampstead Theatre in a tense atmosphere of threatened funding cuts and struggling 
sales. My assumption that funding in subsidised theatre provided any kind of 
guaranteed security in which to take artistic risks was immediately called into 
question.  
During this time I was also beginning an MA in Cultural and Critical Studies at 
Birkbeck College, University of London and enjoying my first encounters with the 
work of Adorno, Benjamin and Lukács. As I collated audience data for Arts Council 
England funding applications and attended meetings with potential corporate 
sponsors by day and discovered critical theory by night, I could not help asking 
certain questions. Did my current working environment have any more artistic or 
political integrity than my previous one? Was it any less beholden to late capitalism 
and neoliberal ideology? How closely was what happened on our state-funded stage 
tied to the professed aims of the cultural policy of the time, and was there any room 
for autonomy? Given the proliferation of definitions of ‘autonomy’, which - if any - 
are appropriate and helpful when reading theatre policy? Most importantly, how had 
I come to form the erroneous assumptions with which I had first joined the staff at 
Hampstead? These questions prompted me to cast a more critical eye over the 
cultural policy documents that reached my desk and over the suggestions and 
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prescriptions that governed our interactions with our funders. Over the next year 
these questions claimed more and more of my attention and eventually I left the 
theatre’s staff in order to concentrate on developing my research. In the summer of 
2008 I used Sir Brian McMaster’s review Supporting Excellence In the Arts: From 
Measurement To Judgement as the backbone of my MA dissertation, in which I first 
began to interrogate the contradictions and inconsistencies of New Labour’s cultural 
policy from my newly-acquired academic and professional perspective, and to 
prepare my initial thoughts on how this might develop into a doctoral thesis. Looking 
at the increasingly turbulent relationship between theatre-makers and arts funders, as 
exemplified by Equity’s vote of no confidence in Arts Council England (hereafter 
ACE) in January 2008 and the peril in which the Bush Theatre found itself in the same 
week, the claims of a continuing theatre-friendly arts policy appeared increasingly 
problematic.  
As I began my PhD in 2009, the likelihood of a change in government was already 
apparent, and one of the earliest questions I found myself fielding was how I would 
handle this. One possibility was to embrace an entirely historical methodology, using 
the imminent departure of New Labour from the government benches as the cut-off 
point and examining only the specificities of ‘Blairism’ and its relationship with the 
vicissitudes of theatre funding that I had already observed. This avenue had certain 
attractions; as New Labour borrowed so much of its rhetoric from its previous 
incarnations, mapping this rhetoric onto the difficulties of the British Left and its 
reflections in political theatre had an obvious appeal. The second option, of course, 
was to wait and see what the incoming government’s cultural policy would offer to 
the British stage, whether a change of direction would be forthcoming, and how the 
stage would respond. After much consideration, I decided against the first option. 
There was already a wealth of thorough critique and analysis of New Labour policy, 
ideology and doxa, and the same was true of the theatre of that period (specifically 
the work of Aleks Sierz  and Jen Harvie  on British theatre, national identity and 1 2
neoliberalism). This body of work on New Labour merited development and 
continuation, and has been of tremendous use throughout this project, but does not 
need to be duplicated. This is not to say that appraisal and re-examination of the 
existing work on New Labour has not proved to be necessary in the light of Coalition 
government policy; in fact, I hope to demonstrate the continuing relevance of points 
made by the critics of New Labour in relation to Third Way politics and governance.  
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In rejecting the route of historical excavation, I was committing to keeping up with 
and analysing theatre policy decisions as they happened and seeing what new 
directions, if any, emerged. I was also committing to observing changing perceptions 
of New Labour’s legacy in theatre once the Conservative-led Coalition began to 
make its mark. The British Theatre Consortium’s report, Writ Large: New Writing On 
The English Stage 2003-2009, provided a rigorously-researched snapshot of 
playwrights‘ and new writing theatres‘ extremely positive (although not uncritical) 
perceptions of the success of ACE’s Theatre Writing Strategy (2003). Elsewhere, 
however, criticisms of New Labour’s arts policy abounded as its perceived 
instrumentalism was attacked by commentators on both the right and the Left. The 
McMaster Review was hailed by some as a vital move forward to new and more 
effective methods of assessing cultural value and deplored by others as elitist, 
retrogressive and unrealistic. Journalists and critics had freely published their fears 
for the future of smaller theatre companies in the wake of cuts announced in March 
2007, fears which in 2009 seemed likely to come to fruition. The diversion of Lottery 
money to the London 2012 Olympics caused alarm, with Lyn Gardner calling it ‘a 
smash and grab raid’  on the funds that would otherwise have sustained small theatre 3
companies, and the Conservatives, then in opposition, were quick to capitalise on 
this with a claim that arts had never genuinely been a priority for New Labour 
(Future of the Arts 1). The years during which my own research came together were 
likely to be the years in which historical perspectives on these events would start to 
form. Both Brian McMaster (in the foreword to the McMaster Review) and Tony Blair 
(in a 2007 speech) had dubbed the New Labour government a ‘Golden Age’ for the 
arts, and I suspected that whether this period would be seen later through critical 
eyes or through rose-tinted glasses would depend at least partially on which aspects 
of the New Labour arts legacy were developed and rejected by the incoming 
Coalition. Both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat manifestos had advocated a 
move towards greater dependence on philanthropy and corporate sponsorship in the 
arts and radical restructuring of funding streams. Some right-wing think tanks, as I 
discuss in Chapter 2, proposed extreme solutions and even agitated for the 
demolition of ACE, claiming that it was unfit for purpose. Artistic excellence was still 
cited as a priority, and a thriving arts scene was still regarded as highly desirable, but 
that scene’s funding was to be ‘based on the mixed economy and the arm’s length 
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principle’ (Future of the Arts, 1), with less intervention (both financial and, allegedly, 
ideological) from the state. 
If these changes were to come into effect to the detriment of the theatres’ 
government subsidies, it seemed likely that nostalgic memories of the relative 
abundance of state funding under New Labour might compromise any furtherance of 
the existing critiques. As I continued to familiarise myself with the work of the many 
thinkers who had contributed to the intense academic debates on New Labour, the 
importance of preserving the relevance of this work to cultural policy became 
increasingly evident to me. The problems unpacked by Janet Newman, Ruth Levitas, 
Luke Martell and other leading critics of Blairism had not lost their relevance 
following the change of government and still needed to be extended into cultural 
policy, a field in which many of the tropes observed by these scholars were so 
frequently invoked. The development of Third Way cultural policy throughout the 
New Labour years still deserved and required scrutiny if the ideological background 
and undertones of Coalition cultural policy were to be understood. As I had 
predicted, the nostalgic journalism soon began to appear. 2011’s round of funding 
cuts, covered most comprehensively by The Guardian, saw leading BAME  and 4
disabled-led theatre companies and access organisations lose significant amounts,  5
and commentators were quick to respond. Polly Toynbee, attacking the cuts, referred 
to the previous government having ‘brought a golden era to the arts’ . ‘Golden Age’ 6
rhetoric began to be questioned within the academy, as the phrase and its 
implications sparked a conference and special double issue of the journal Cultural 
Trends. The keynote speech at this conference, later published in Cultural Trends, 
was made by Robert Hewison and afforded a glimpse of the potential of reevaluating 
what Hewison explicitly refers to as a mythology, that of ‘“Creative Britain”, that 
democratic space of egalitarian cultural consumerism where the tension between 
“access” and “excellence” would be comfortably resolved’ (241). As Hewison, in 
this tantalisingly brief article, reviewed the trajectory of New Labour arts policy 
through changing terms like ‘excellence’, ‘access’ and ‘cultural value’ (this last 
pioneered by Demos in 2004), he began to open up some of the difficulties I had 
also noted in a policy area that offset relative financial generosity with ideological 
straitjacketing while claiming to heal social and conceptual divisions which in reality 
still gaped wide.  
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Development 
Many of the questions with which I began this project have remained in play 
throughout the development of the thesis, the simplest and most important being that 
of how well political theatre was served by New Labour. In a recent speech opening 
the 2013 Edinburgh Fringe Festival, Mark Ravenhill offered a nuanced and 
provocative critique  of the effect of the Blair government on British art and 7
specifically the same rhetoric of the ‘creative industries’ that Hewison also identifies 
as being particular to the conjunction of New Labour and Third Way politics. 
Ravenhill’s reminiscences are of a theatre that became ‘safe and well-behaved’ under 
New Labour and failed to identify the problems inherent in an ideologically-
constructed alliance between art and industry:  
When New Labour came to power there was [...] for a few years a 
modest but real-terms increase in government funding for the arts. 
And we artists were so grateful for that relatively modest bit of 
attention and money that we changed substantially what and who we 
were as artists. Suddenly, we were talking about working in the 
creative industries, about the parts that the arts could play in urban 
renewal, about business plans and strategic thinking, about 
sponsorship relationships with the corporate sector that would allow 
us to fund educational work with our developing audiences, about 
the role that the arts could play in social inclusion [...] I think the arts 
sector as a whole went astray during the last couple of decades. Just 
as the Titanic was heading towards the iceberg, we were attending 
seminars and workshops, learning how to facilitate more effective 
refrigeration in our sector of the cultural industry when we could 
have been looking through the telescope and plotting an entirely 
different course. The bankers and the politicians weren't looking 
ahead to spot the approaching iceberg. But neither were we: we were 
entertaining the same bankers and politicians at our latest gala, 
corporate sector friendly, socially inclusive performance evening. As 
we were heading towards systemic collapse, the arts sector were 
teaching themselves to think and talk and act the language of the 
problem and not the solution. 
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Quoting at such length from Ravenhill’s speech here is useful because of the number 
of problematic issues he manages to pinpoint in this dense paragraph: the need for 
funding and the propensity for securing it by whatever means necessary, the 
uncomfortably close relationship between art’s social utility and its commodification, 
and the possibility of an unknown ‘different course’ that was missed by an arts scene 
consumed by the need to play the game or miss out on necessary funds. It is also 
interesting to note that Ravenhill was reported by the BBC as having attacked state 
subsidy and applauded cuts to the arts, despite explicitly stating the need to come up 
with ‘a full-blooded, concerted defense of public money for the arts’, which suggests 
the continuing presence of a knee-jerk reaction against any criticism of the terms on 
which the arts acquired their increased funding. Ravenhill’s speech goes on to ask 
what position the imagined figure of ‘the artist’ might take up in the future, having 
been obliged to construct herself as both ally of the socially excluded and friend of 
the free market. Given the deepening social and economic divisions in Britain 
(Ravenhill goes so far as to use the term ‘class war’), will the artist ultimately be 
forced to do that most un-Third Way of things, ‘choose what side she is on’? For 
Ravenhill the subjectivity of ‘the artist‘ is ultimately a political and a civic one and, in 
light of this, he makes a compelling argument against the use of ‘the artist’ and art 
itself as an agent of consensus between the privileged and the excluded. In response 
to Ravenhill, I ask what the ideological implications were of the purposes ascribed to 
art under New Labour, placing those purposes alongside existing discussions of other 
New Labour policy areas, and how some of the staged work of the period responded 
to those ascriptions.  
Following directly on from Ravenhill’s implied question of whether art (and theatre in 
particular) can flourish when the political subjectivity of ‘the artist‘ is not sufficiently 
challenged and complicated by the policies that govern her, the question arises of 
how the autonomy of ‘the artist’ - of, for my purposes, the playwright - or that of her 
plays may be constructed. Is her autonomy to be purely oppositional, a state of 
refusal, or is something more nuanced that requires a fresh reading of the term and 
its various definitions? If, like Ravenhill, we accept the wholehearted commitment of 
New Labour cultural policy to an allegiance with the market and with 
philanthrocapitalism , we also have to accept the elements of contingency he 8
introduces regarding the artist’s position. Even if she were complicit in the 
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hypocrisies cited by Ravenhill, appeasing the market in the name of fighting 
inequality through her art and thus compromising herself both as an artist and as a 
political subject, could she have perceived herself as having any alternative? 
Government subsidy was available and, after all, those holding the purse strings 
claimed many of the same social goals as the theatres and artists themselves. 
Ravenhill’s suggestion is that British theatre, financially beholden to the generosity of 
the New Labour government and needing to speak its language in order to secure its 
future, got caught in a familiar stalemate between the social efficacy advocated by 
cultural policy (that was tied to economic imperatives) and the political efficacy that 
could, he posits, have come from ‘plotting an entirely different course’. I ask what 
the role the aesthetic, political and financial autonomies of playwright, play and 
theatre took during this period, and whether the diagnosis of a stalemate is accurate 
or helpful.   
The notion of ‘cultural value’ has gained a great deal of traction in recent years. First 
brought into wide use in 2003-4 by the think tank Demos, the term derived from a 
perceived need to move beyond the binaries of intrinsic and instrumental value and 
of high and low art, and introduce a more rigorous methodology to the study of what 
constitutes ‘culture’ and what it does for those who participate in it. The values under 
discussion were both financial and more abstract, seeking also to criticise the 
primacy of monetary benefit and the meeting of financial targets in the battle for 
government funding. As John Holden writes in the 2004 Demos pamphlet, ‘the 
identifiable measures and ‘ancillary benefits’ that flow from culture have become 
more important than the cultural activity itself: the tail is wagging the dog’ (14). Due 
largely to the work of the pioneering Centre for Cultural Policy Studies at Warwick 
University, discussion of cultural value has blossomed over the last ten years, and at 
the time of writing Warwick University has just launched the Commission on the 
Future of Cultural Value, an initiative which will bring academics and practitioners 
into close contact with the policy-making process and will lead to the publication of 
a report in 2015.  Work in this vein is what drives the third of my central questions: 
what role does academic research have in the future of theatre policy? By unpacking 
the manifestations of long-standing questions of political aesthetics in existing policy 
and seeking to set new terms for the interaction of theory and practice in this field, 
does ‘the academic’ (to borrow Ravenhill’s device of the imagined archetype) have 
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the power to make a meaningful intervention in policy or is she more likely to fall 
into Ravenhill’s stalemate?   
Chapter breakdown and methodology 
My approach to tackling these questions brings together accounts of theatrical 
practice, criticisms of sociological methodology and critical theory.  
Chapter 1: Dissenting voices: Howard Barker, Edward Bond and the role of political 
theatre 
In order to introduce the key concepts with which I will be dealing in the subsequent 
chapters, and their position within the recent history of British theatre, I begin with a 
discussion of Howard Barker and Edward Bond’s proposals for the future of theatre. 
Barker’s Scenes From An Execution, which stages the relationship between rebellious 
artist and tyrannical patron, was revived at the National Theatre in 2012, reopening 
the debate on what his work sets out to do and the thought behind his stance against 
the apparatus of the state. Similarly, the staging at the Lyric Hammersmith in 2011 of 
Bond’s Saved and of his three one-act works The Chair Plays at the same theatre the 
following year prompts us to look again at Bond’s remarks in the late 1990s 
regarding the corruption and trivialisation of drama present in British theatre.  The 
extremely different (sometimes directly opposed) accounts set out by these two 
writers of their growing dislike of and estrangement from the British theatrical 
establishment provide a surprisingly - even worryingly - pertinent way in to the 
concerns I address myself; the conflicts between political efficacy and artistic 
integrity, the problematics of setting out deliberately to create accessible art, the role 
of theatre in creating community and consensus, and, of course, how to define 
autonomy. At this stage, I sketch in three possible types of autonomy - the economic, 
the social and the aesthetic - and prepare for a full exploration in Chapter 3 of the 
complex relations (following Adorno) between them.  
During the Blair government, Mark Ravenhill and Dennis Kelly both used Third Way 
discourse as an index of ethical disintegration in their characters (in Some Explicit 
Polaroids and Taking Care Of Baby respectively) but have since spoken of a need to 
adjust their expectations of what political theatre can and should do, an issue central 
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to this project. I discuss Kelly’s changing position in Chapter 3, but Ravenhill’s 
Edinburgh speech also invites a mapping of his discontents onto those of Barker and 
Bond, particularly Barker’s antipathy towards a British theatre that he saw as having 
been watered down and stripped of its radicalism as it sought to produce unity (as 
distinct from solidarity) and consensus. As Ravenhill talks of the need for theatre to 
start ‘plotting a different course’ which diverges from that favoured by the prevailing 
political and economic conditions, Barker’s influence on Ravenhill’s generation of 
playwrights is worth recalling.  
Chapter 2: Contested terms and muddled methodologies: impact research and its 
critics 
In this chapter I undertake a reading of the relevance to political theatre of impact 
studies and the criticism and interventions those studies provoked within the 
academy.  I begin with Brian McMaster’s controversial review Supporting Excellence 
in the Arts; From Measurement to Judgement (2008)  and his project of reclaiming 9
the term ‘excellence’ as one able to serve as a descriptor for socially relevant art as 
well as forms more traditionally regarded as ‘high culture’. My contention here is 
that McMaster’s formulations around the term ‘excellence’ seek to construct a 
consensus between the competing demands of high-minded aesthetic ideals (as per 
Matthew Arnold’s use of the word) and the social impact sought by cultural policy, 
and here I introduce the centrality of consensus to Third Way politics which I go on 
to explore in Chapter 4.  
The body of work interrogating the flawed methodologies used in impact studies is 
substantial, and I give particular emphasis in this chapter to the publication Cultural 
Trends and its mission, particularly under the leadership of Sara Selwood, to provide 
an empirically rigorous approach to the analysis, be it quantitative or qualitative, of 
the role played by the arts in constructing and changing the lives of communities and 
individuals. The importance of this publication to my thesis recurs in subsequent 
chapters, most particularly Chapter 4 as will shortly become apparent. I am also 
greatly indebted at this point to the International Journal of Cultural Policy, in which 
debates set up in Cultural Trends continue to be developed and extended; I refer 
particularly to the work of Belfiore, Merli and Galloway & Dunlop.  
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As a counterpoint to these accounts, I touch on some of the centre-right perspectives 
that emerged during this time, including those that militate against the continuing 
existence of ACE. I consider to what extent, if any, the ‘art for art’s sake’ argument 
can be considered the property of the centre-right and, as some of these perspectives 
invoke versions of ‘autonomy’, I reiterate the need for the reexamination of the term 
that follows in Chapter 3.  
Chapter 3: Community, autonomy, utopia: theoretical perspectives 
Appeals to the concept of community featured heavily in many New Labour policy 
areas. The work of Ruth Levitas has been particularly useful in clarifying how this 
influenced cultural policy and discussion of art and, vitally, how this rhetoric also 
implied strains of utopian discourse. I discuss the problematic conjunction of 
utopian and communitarian rhetoric in this policy area and in Third Way rhetoric in 
general, and prepare the reader for my use in Chapter 3 of the different utopian 
formulations of Adorno, Bloch and Marcuse as a way into the difficulties of locating 
art within the political and the pitfalls of New Labour constructions of the social and 
the civic. In view of the instrumental approach taken by New Labour cultural policy, 
which attaches the idea of a healthy arts scene to an uplift in other areas related to 
community-building such as education, crime prevention and health, I look at how 
the utopian element in the communitarian claims identified by Levitas are subverted 
by readings of these Frankfurt School thinkers whose work posits both art and utopia 
as something fundamentally negative and unrealisable and thus troubles attempts at 
locating utopian imagination in policy while at the same time demonstrating the 
importance of such a project.  
There is an abundance of critiques of New Labour’s communitarian claims, and I will 
focus on Levitas with some reference to Stephen Driver & Luke Martell and Sarah 
Hale. All of the above discuss the philosophical and theoretical roots of New Labour 
communitarianism, but Levitas provides the clearest focus on the tensions it contains 
between the ideological and the utopian and how these pertain to cultural policy. 
Driver & Martell’s criticisms, along with those of Janet Newman, take a more 
prominent role in subsequent chapters as I develop the challenges their accounts of 
New Labour issue to both the theatre policy of that time and some of the drama that 
emerged in response. My aim, as I move from the second to the third chapter, is to 
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set up links between the stated mission of New Labour cultural policy, Levitas’ 
challenges and the Frankfurt School’s different constructions of utopia and its relation 
to art.  
Autonomy is a necessary consideration for this project because of the pivotal 
position it holds in how we consider aesthetics and in how we construct cultural 
value. Any discussion of the history and the future of arts funding in Britain will at 
some stage introduce some version of this concept; the tension between financial 
intervention, whether by the state or another arm of the mixed economy, and artistic 
independence is a constant presence. It lies at the root of the Arts Council’s founding 
‘arm’s length’ principles precisely because the economic and aesthetic histories of 
the arts are inextricably linked and, as I shall argue in Chapter 5 with recourse to the 
work of Tracy C. Davis, this is particularly pertinent in the case of theatre. In these 
discussions, a false elision of ‘autonomy’ (a term with many definitions and 
functions) and intrinsic value (and similarly of heteronomy and social value) 
frequently takes place, positing instrumental systems of cultural value as antithetical 
to autonomy and vice versa. As I will demonstrate, this fallacious binary (much like 
the popular culture/high art binary) is now regularly set up as a straw man in cultural 
policy debates but never seems to be entirely demolished.  
In the chapter I will continue the discussion begun in Chapter 1 regarding the 
unpacking of art and autonomy, primarily using Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory and his 
essays on the culture industry as well as Adorno & Horkheimer’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment and some interventions from Marcuse, Jameson and Bloch. While 
presenting early versions of this chapter at conferences, I have frequently been asked 
by Adorno scholars why I insist that his work (and Aesthetic Theory in particular) can 
be read productively in the context of cultural policy when other readings would 
construct it as militating against the mere existence of such a policy area. I certainly 
acknowledge such readings and believe that question to be an important one. My 
response is that my arguments, and the arguments of leading contemporary cultural 
policy scholars, have at their heart a belief in the necessity of a theoretical approach 
to deconstructing the familiar false binaries I mention above (see in particular the 
debate between Tony Bennett and Jim McGuigan, towards which I gesture in Chapter 
6) and it is the work of Adorno that is best positioned to enable that approach. 
Aesthetic Theory, a complex and apparently contradictory text, is particularly useful 
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here because of the subtlety of its formulations on the dialectical opposition between 
art’s commodification and its autonomy. Reading it in this context opens up the 
cultural policy debate to the specificities of Adorno’s development of Marxian 
dialectics, in which the tension between art as socially determined product of labour 
and as autonomous and lacking in social function creates the ‘double character’ of 
art as ‘autonomous and fait social’ (Aesthetic Theory, 5). 
British theatre’s position in a mixed economy, and once in which the market and the 
state have become close allies, makes Adorno’s thought even more pertinent. As 
theatre depends - and is increasingly encouraged by successive governments to 
depend - on corporate sponsorship and philanthropic donation as well as public 
subsidy and ticket sales, it is viewed simultaneously as a public good, an agent of 
direct social change and an economic investment. ACE-funded research into the 
social impact of theatre during the Blair years attempted (with varying degrees of 
success, as discussed in Chapter 2) to locate its direct social function within a New 
Labour agenda of social inclusion and community-building, while - as per 
Ravenhill’s speech - also tying it to a culture of social and economic division. This 
research and its findings have already been found to be vulnerable to attack on 
methodological grounds, but my aim in engaging with Aesthetic Theory is to mount a 
theoretical critique that uses the complexities of Adorno’s version of autonomy to 
disrupt the dichotomy of intrinsic and instrumental value. Following on from the 
criticisms of New Labour cultural policy from academics, journalists, theatre 
practitioners and political advisors that I have laid out in Chapter 2, I explain the 
ideological implications of the various social purposes ascribed to theatre and art by 
this government and reframe, via Adorno’s formulations on autonomy, the social 
character of art and by extension that of political theatre.  
Chapter 4: Culture, capital and cultural capital 
In the fourth chapter I make use of the recent popularity of Bourdieu’s sociology of 
aesthetics as an initial way in to challenging and refining current constructions of the 
relationship between art and social mobility. I do this by charting the adventures of 
one particular term, ‘cultural capital’, which has entered the lexis of British cultural 
policy and enjoyed a convoluted journey as a result. My decision to use Bourdieu 
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here was prompted by the problematics, well-expressed by Levitas, of the Third Way 
normative assumption that class-based politics are now irrelevant. Levitas 
demonstrates (as I discuss in Chapter 3) the ways in which class, however buried in 
post-political terminology, remained at the root of the social problems that Blair’s 
government sought to solve and that those solutions remained beyond its reach 
because of an unwillingness to recognise the continuing relevance of class-based 
politics. Here, again, I am indebted to Selwood and to Cultural Trends for devoting a 
special issue  to the then-growing relevance of Bourdieu and cultural capital to the 10
analysis of cultural policy.  
As I have already mentioned, the dichotomy of high and low art forms is still strongly 
in play even while being contested by new theories such as that of the ‘cultural 
omnivore’, and thus habitus still forms a large part (whether explicitly or implicitly) 
in discussions of who attends or consumes which art forms and why. I argue that the 
co-opting of the term ‘cultural capital’ in post-1997 cultural policy constitutes a 
misappropriation of Bourdieu’s term not only in its conflation of cultural capital and 
the financial capital that derives from the marketisation of creativity, but also in its 
use as an index of social mobility. If the thesis of recent cultural policy is that in 
making a journey to the theatre people accrue more ‘cultural capital’, and should 
thus be encouraged to do so in the service of social mobility, this demonstrates in 
turn a co-opting of theatre to erode and disempower class positions - a long way 
from Bourdieu’s use of the term as an index of precisely those positions. For the sake 
of clarity, I separate the original, Bourdieusian term from its Third Way cultural policy 
incarnation by laying out a definition of each.  
Given that I insist on the relevance of class to a discussion of British theatre policy, I 
have been asked how I reconcile this with a later use of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto 
Laclau’s versions of discourse theory in which the organising of popular identities 
around a class core is dismissed. This is a fair question, especially when I discuss 
areas of British theatre history (namely the early history of documentary theatre) in 
which working-class identity emerged as a driving force. In answer, while my use of 
discourse theory draws on Mouffe and Laclau it is used largely in a descriptive 
capacity, as a way of clarifying how the rhetoric of Third Way social democracy uses 
certain discursive elements to constitute what it later presents as objective reality and 
how this has been reflected in the verbatim stagings of moments within that 
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democracy. I follow Driver & Martell in this use of discourse theory, and 
acknowledge that it is open to critique from other established scholars of theories of 
agonistic democracy. I also direct the reader to Sean Phelan’s essay ‘The Media as the 
Neoliberalized Sediment: Articulating Laclau’s Discourse Theory with Bourdieu’s 
Field Theory’ in which he identifies some philosophical affinities between the two 
and makes a compelling argument against the dismissal of either in favour of the 
other. 
Chapter 5: Staging the Third Way 
In the fifth chapter, I return to the plays themselves in an attempt to locate the British 
stage and its playwrights within - or outside - the Third Way ideological landscape. 
Following Ravenhill’s formulation on the necessity of artists taking sides, I discuss the 
difficulties of creating space for opposition in a post-political climate where the 
dominant rhetoric in policy is that of objective reality and pragmatism, a ‘common 
sense’ position that seeks to render appeals to Left and Right irrelevant and 
anachronistic. I begin by looking at the rise of verbatim theatre as a political form 
and the claims made by its creators, correctly or incorrectly, that verbatim theatre 
presents an objectively truthful account of the events it performs and uses this 
objectivity to undermine mendacious narratives created by the government and mass 
media. Reading this truth claim alongside Third Way thinking’s own claims to 
objectivity, using Mouffe and Laclau’s formulations on discourse theory to explain 
how the truth claims of Third Way discourse function, opens up both to a parallel 
critique: can theatre really effect political agitation and the disruption of the state’s 
narrative if it uses the same forms of discourse as the state it seeks to expose?  
I then move on to discuss some examples of the utopian and dystopian in post-New 
Labour theatre, with reference to the work of Jill Dolan. Dolan’s argument , in brief, 11
is that performance can create a space of community in which all participants 
(including the audience) may glimpse the utopian through a moment of collective 
imagination, and that this can constitute part of the practice of materialist politics 
rather than an escape from it. This provides a productive disruption of the discursive 
elements common to Frankfurt School thinking on the utopian in art as an expression 
of that which is unrealisable through political praxis.   
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Chapter 6: The Value of Theatre 
As I have already mentioned, the term ‘cultural value’ and the cluster of ideas and 
formulations surrounding it take a prominent position in the final chapter where I 
discuss some of the current academic projects attempting to make sense of it. For a 
comprehensive review of these projects, I would direct the reader to the website of 
the Warwick Commission on the Future of Cultural Value and specifically to the 
mapping document ‘Initiatives in Cultural Value’.  12
In order to situate these projects within my own work and, in particular, my use of 
the Frankfurt School, I follow two of the foremost scholars of cultural value, Eleonora 
Belfiore and Oliver Bennett, in attaching the problematics of the value debate to the 
legacy of the Enlightenment. In Belfiore and Bennett’s writing , the schism between 13
instrumental and intrinsic systems of value and its roots in Enlightenment thought is 
explored through Stephen Toulmin’s work. Following Toulmin’s narrative of the 
Enlightenment as both a scientific and a philosophical revolution that first began to 
construct the sciences and the humanities as two discrete and even opposed 
disciplines requiring incompatible forms of reason, Belfiore & Bennett postulate a 
link between the post-Enlightenment primacy of the sciences and the need for the 
makers of cultural policy to be able to produce empirical evidence of the value of 
the arts. This resonates in turn with Belfiore’s concept of ‘defensive 
instrumentalism’ , a term which captures the extent to which the arts and 14
humanities are constantly placed (and placing themselves) in a defensive position in 
relation to both the natural and social sciences.  As the post-Enlightenment hierarchy 
of forms of reason - which has become hegemonic - prioritises empirical evidence, 
advocates for the value of culture have (as discussed more fully in Chapter 2) been 
required to use the rhetoric and methodologies of the social sciences to quantify 
impact.  
My reading of the relationship between the problematics of cultural value and the 
Enlightenment develops this line of thinking, exploring the relevance of the work of 
Adorno and Horkheimer to the critique set up by Belfiore and Bennett and reframing 
it within Western Marxism. While there is a wealth of emerging scholarship tackling 
the cultural value debate, most of it does little to disrupt the systems of knowledge 
demanded by the legacy of the Enlightenment. Where accepted forms of knowledge 
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are restricted to those that can be supported by empirical proof, dialogue and dissent 
become less potent against the universalising force of factual evidence. This in turn 
resonates with the criticisms of neoliberalism and Third Way government I introduce 
in Chapter 3, where the ‘common sense’ character of New Labour and Coalition 
disquisition render it a post-political ideology rather than a genuine set of political 
positions. If political efficacy is still to be a possibility for British theatre then, as 
Mark Ravenhill argues, the terms of the argument need to change and move away 
from the need to use post-Enlightenment, easily-depoliticised systems of knowledge 
to define art’s social and political potential. 
Arts and government during the Blair decade- an overview  
In order to prepare the reader for the moments within cultural policy to which I refer 
throughout, a few words are necessary on the changes and developments that took 
place within and around the Arts Council during this time. The decade between 
1997 and 2007 was a turbulent one in terms of the structure of arts administration, as 
the apparatus of arts funding and management adjusted to a new government with a 
new vision for the relationship between art and society. Although the expectation of 
a period of financial growth for subsidised arts was met, the road was 
understandably not a straightforward one. The structural changes in both government 
and quangos that were deemed necessary before these expectations could be met 
were not universally approved, and their effects continued to draw criticism right up 
to the end of the New Labour government.  
Three years prior to the beginning of the Blair administration, the Arts Council (until 
then the Arts Council of Great Britain) experienced what has been described by 
cultural historian Robert Hewison as ‘the most humiliating (year) in its 
history’ (264).  Since the publication of the Wilding Report in 1989 claiming the 15
persistence of underfunding in the regions, the Council calculated that attempts at 
the report’s implementation had cost up to £6 million in restructuring, redundancy 
and relocation costs and consultation exercises intended to assist the Council in 
presenting a coherent vision for its own future. Added to this, the appointment of 
Michael Portillo as Chief Secretary to the Treasury in 1992 signalled a political 
direction that resulted in a significant cut to the Arts Council's grant in 1993-4 and, 
although the 1993 National Lottery Act had created a new source of funds, the 
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Council was still under pressure to create a plausible future for itself. The year 
leading up to the dissolution of the Arts Council of Great Britain into its post-
devolution parts – with the Scottish Arts Council and the Arts Council of Wales being 
funded directly by the Scottish and Welsh Offices – was marked by attempts to 
reallocate funding and reprioritise spending, leading to unrest and board-level 
resignations among those arts organisations who seemed likely to lose out. The 
National Lottery, as well as supplying a new funding stream, also rapidly became a 
source of public controversy as this funding was directed largely into capital 
campaigns.   
  
The Arts Council that was inherited by the newly-formed Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport and its Secretary of State Chris Smith and by ACE's incoming Chief 
Executive Peter Hewitt in 1997 was structurally entirely different from that which had 
existed in the mid-Thatcher years. Apart from the obvious changes to the major 
panels (the old photography advisory group having been subsumed into Visual Arts, 
and the creation of full panels rather than advisory committees for education, touring 
and combined arts), there was substantial growth in terms of diversity. An Ethnic 
Minority Monitoring Committee had existed during the 1980s, but by the mid-1990s 
there were three committees and advisory boards dedicated to fostering greater 
diversity in the arts: the Cultural Diversity Advisory Board, the Arts and Disability 
Monitoring Committee and the Women in the Arts Monitoring Committee.  
    
In Lord Gowrie's final Chairman's Statement (Annual Report 1996-7) after a four-year 
tenure, he celebrated the fruits of his turbulent time in the post, particularly the 
introduction of the National Lottery and the devolution of the Scottish and Welsh 
Councils. He remained unequivocally positive about the future of the Arts Council 
and of the arts in England, refuting claims made by the press that underfunding 
persisted away from the prestigious London venues: 
Whoever would have thought that the Arts Council would in the 1990s be a 
major economic force in the regeneration of cities? Or that jobs related to 
the arts should be growing so rapidly - and they grew, let it be said, during 
the recession now behind us. Areas like Gateshead, Salford, Stoke-on-Trent 
and Sheffield are seeing growth and development as a result of £804m. we 
have already allocated to more than 1,500 capital projects. There have been 
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criticisms that awards are weighted too heavily in favour of London. 
Ironically it is the national press, located exclusively in London, that is more 
vociferous in its criticism of imbalances than the regional press, which has 
given over 90% approval ratings to our awards.  16
Significantly, the directors of the ten Regional Arts Boards (RABs) had for the first 
time become full members of the Arts Council – and, as such, these posts were now 
government appointments controlled by the DCMS although still subject to 
consultation at local government level. The position of the RABs in the cultural 
policy landscape was to remain as much of a pivotal issue going into the new 
millenium as it had been from the inception of CEMA and particularly throughout 
the 1980s.  
Similarly, the need for a spending review of National Lottery money had already 
been recognised by the previous National Heritage Secretary, Virginia Bottomley, and 
plans had been released in early 1997 to extend the influence of the Lottery beyond 
the high-profile funding applications with which the Council had been inundated 
since the unveiling of the Lottery capital programme in November 1994. The illusion 
of additionality created by Lottery money was dispelled over the first year of the 
Labour government, as it became clear that the money was intended to replace 
rather than boost direct grants and that funding from the DCMS was to be cut.    
It is apparent from the 1996-7 Annual Report that the focus of Lottery spending had 
stayed on capital grants during that financial year, and that the amount of money 
given to London venues and projects still accounted for nearly half of the total 
committed spend for the year ending 31 March 1997. This is almost the same 
proportion, interestingly, as the following year , although by that time a great deal of 17
the spend had been allocated away from capital funding and channelled into new 
projects, namely Art for Everyone and a stabilisation grant scheme piloted in fifteen 
venues during the 1997-8 financial year.  
The problems of the mid-1990s were not resolved instantly, and the first eighteen 
months of the Blair government remained difficult for the Arts Council. Hewitt and 
Chairman Gerry Robinson began to threaten reforms and staffing cuts, as well as a 
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shake-up of core funding. The Arts Council's unpopularity increased, particularly in 
the theatre world and among actors; the amount of money being spent on salaries 
and expensive consultation exercises rather than funding struggling theatre was 
unacceptable to many. In 1999 the entire Drama panel resigned and had to be 
replaced, and regional theatre was felt to be in worse trouble than ever. Actress 
Miriam Karlin is quoted by British Theatre Guide as having told the 1999 Equity 
Conference that the Arts Council should be scrapped: ‘It isn't funny any more. Our 
regional theatres are dying.’  Shortly after Karlin's statement, huge staffing cuts at 18
the Council were announced and a painful process of reform began to create a 
leaner organisation and a stronger chance of increased state funding.  
The Arts Council, in public documents at least, retained an optimistic attitude to the 
Labour government, which it saw as being committed both to the arts themselves 
and to their cultural and geographical diversity, and in 2001 Hewitt was finally able 
to announce an increase of £100 million to the Council's grant-in-aid over the next 
three years as well as “the most radical structural changes in the arts funding and 
support system for decades” . The extra £100 million was to be divided between the 19
new ‘Creative Partnerships’ scheme (an initiative enabling arts organisations and 
schools to work together), extra core funding, and boosting British theatre. Although 
the 2001 report remains cryptic about what these radical structural changes might 
be, with Hewitt's statement mentioning only “a new, single organisation”, the 
implications of these remarks became clearer the following year. 
On 1 April 2002, the RABs were officially merged with the Arts Council (now 
renamed Arts Council England). The intention, according to Chairman Gerry 
Robinson, was to streamline bureaucracy and create a more cohesive organisation 
that would be able to make a stronger case for funding in the future. In November of 
that year, ACE held the first national summit with local government in order to draw 
up partnership strategies. Opinion among previous council members and cultural 
historians had been divided in the mid-1990s as to whether the RABs would be 
better off without the Arts Council or vice versa. While former Minister Tim Renton 
and Robert Hewison had both openly attacked ACE in the press, claiming that it 
should be dissolved and government funding handed directly to the RABs, the story 
according to Richard Witts in consultation with clients and even employees of the 
RABs was that they had been hiding their own problems between the higher-profile 
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difficulties of ACE: 
The high-profile problems besieging the Arts Council have hidden from 
public view the workaday weaknesses of the Regional Arts Boards, who are 
merely a third layer of bureaucracy and, as such, the most expensive with 
the least return. They employ in total twice as many employees as the Arts 
Council. Their staff and overhead charges amount to £11 million a year, or 
17% of their public income. Yet as they sit in their provincial dugouts, the 
RAB directors can delight in the bashing the Council gets from the mass 
media... (525)  20
British Theatre News reported that ACE received little or no cooperation from the 
RABs, which were largely opposed to the merge .  21
The boundaries of the regions were also redefined, with the number of regional 
offices being reduced from ten to nine by merging the South-East and Southern Arts 
Boards into one. The changes were completed in 2004, as Sir Christopher Frayling 
took over as Chairman, and by 2005 ACE was ready to report on the financial savings 
it had made since the announcement of the scheme. As a result of the creation of the 
new South-East region key administrative posts had been cut, and both offices were 
closed and relocated to Brighton. Shared services for finance, IT and human 
resources were introduced, and delegating responsibility for managing relationships 
with funded organisations to the appropriate regional office made it possible to cut 
staff in the central ACE office. The vast majority of staffing in the regional offices 
continued to consist of relationship officers and their clerical staff.  
However, in the climate which led to the highly critical McIntosh Report in 2008 it 
was inevitable that arts funding would continue to be contested beyond the end of 
the Blair era. Following the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review, 185 Regularly 
Funded Organisations had their funding terminated entirely while 27 further 
organisations had their funding reduced despite the DCMS meeting the projected 
rise in the grant-in-aid for that period. The decision-making process was regarded by 
the organisations that lost funding as being as opaque. John Pick, criticising the Arts 
Council back in 1988, maintained that because of their institutional design quangos 
would always be regarded as having limited capacity for transparency: ‘A body 
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which is accountable only to itself meets in secret to decide between applicants 
(who meet the published criteria) according to its own unpublished notions of 
priority (112).’  22
The restructuring of ACE and the increased presence of cultural policy in both 
Westminster and Whitehall during the Blair decade, although effective in terms of 
the streamlining of bureaucracy and the prioritisation of cultural and geographical 
diversity, had not succeeded in entirely ridding ACE of its credibility problems. The 
criticisms made by McIntosh would be raised again, as I will discuss in Chapter 2; 
accusations of wastefulness, lack of accountability and an insular perspective were 
set to continue.  
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Chapter 1: 
Dissenting voices: Howard Barker, Edward Bond and the role of political 
theatre 
In preparation for later discussions of the political purposes ascribed by scholars, 
practitioners and theorists under the New Labour and Coalition governments to 
British theatre, I therefore begin with a concise account of the ideas of two major 
dramatists who first came to prominence in the 1960s: Howard Barker’s writings on 
theatre’s unique potential as personal and political expression, and Edward Bond’s 
accounts of staging democracy.  These two dramatists lay out different claims 23
regarding what political theatre should set out to do and how to go about it. In 
moving through some readings of Barker’s quasi-manifesto Arguments for a Theatre 
(1989)  and subsequently initiating a dialogue between this and Bond’s volume of 24
notes and correspondence The Hidden Plot: notes on theatre and the state (2000) , 25
I demonstrate some early and particularly brutal manifestations of the discords 
between the politics of theatre as it is thought and practised by two renowned 
dramatists and as it is defined by its managers, funding bodies and policy. 
Subsequent chapters of the thesis will explore and theorise the development of these 
discords in the light of recent policy and developments on stage; this first chapter, 
however, by examining the ideological problematics indicated by Barker and Bond’s 
very different propositions, serves to introduce the difficulties inherent in the central 
research question and the concepts that I bring into play to address those difficulties. 
Both Barker and Bond present perspectives on questions that have regularly troubled 
both critical theory and cultural policy. Does theatre have a duty to educate and raise 
consciousness? How hard should the audience have to work? What is the 
importance of aesthetic autonomy for the field of theatre, the theatre-maker and the 
performance itself, and how is that autonomy to be defined?    26
It will be helpful to set out the reasons for beginning here, with Barker and Bond and 
their formulations on theatre, the civic and the social. While it is true to say, as is 
stated in the Introduction, that both dramatists open up discussions that will be 
immediately familiar to readers of cultural policy, this is not sufficient grounds for 
beginning at an ideological and chronological distance that may prove disorientating 
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to the reader.  
  
My contention throughout this thesis is that Third Way discourse closes down the 
imagining of alternatives to itself by positing itself as an objective reality (subsequent 
chapters will demonstrate this with particular recourse to Mouffe and Laclau ), and 27
that the effects of this discursive closure are made apparent not only in cultural 
policy but on the stage itself. If this project is also to address how one might disrupt 
this process, rather than simply accepting and defining it, it has to look outside the 
usual academic territory. The juxtaposition of Barker and Bond’s differing but equally 
uncompromising propositions for political theatre with those of New Labour cultural 
policy is useful in that it serves to recontextualise said policy, decoupling it from the 
context of pervasive Third Way discourse and thus opening it up to different modes 
of critical intervention.  
The modes of thought likely to create the widest openings in the discursive closure of 
Third Way post-political discourse will seem at first sight to be confusingly far away 
from the fields they ultimately address. These distances - the distances between 
Bond, Barker and Blair, for example, or between Tracy C. Davis and the cultural 
policy canon (with which I bring the thesis to a close) - are deliberately invoked in 
the service of disruptive recontextualisation.  In the case of Barker, we are asked to 28
imagine a political theatre that rejects the primacy of post-Enlightenment rationalism. 
Bond invites theatre to embrace the rational in order to more convincingly reject the 
systems of normative morality and its underlying power relations in which political 
theatre can too easily become embroiled. These disparate invitations have in 
common a drive to disrupt norms and assumptions and reconfigure political 
consciousness in the spectator, and a recognition - if not an outright acceptance - of 
those invitations has the potential to force a reimagining of how a political theatre 
might operate.   
While it is entirely unsurprising that Barker and Bond should have a radically 
different approach to political theatre from that espoused by Blairite cultural policy, 
the necessity of including them in this piece of research nevertheless consists in 
examining the mechanics of this seemingly obvious difference. Acknowledging the 
impossibility of any accord between Barker and Blair on the one hand and Bond and 
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Blair on the other in turn begs the question of how such an accord becomes 
impossible. To move this question beyond its most simple form, that of the relative 
political positions of these discourses, we need to ask how Third Way thinking - a 
mode of thinking predicated on the primacy of consensus and the erasure of 
oppositional dissent - has worked to exclude and proscribe the participation in that 
consensus of certain theoretical elements. The contention of this thesis is that such an 
exclusion has indeed taken place, and that it is illustrated within the recent history of 
British theatre and theatre policy.  In order cogently to examine the relationship 29
between Third Way thought and the British stage, my intention is not only to identify 
modes of thinking that lie beyond the consensus but also to discuss how and why 
they are inimical to it, and therefore how they might open up a space in which new 
relationships between state, culture and theatre can become imaginable.   
Howard Barker: conscience, consensus and Catastrophe 
I begin this chapter with one of the most influential British playwrights of the post-
War era, Howard Barker. As my central project in this thesis is to locate sites of 
disruption and resistance to the consensus created through Third Way discourse, I 
invoke Barker not only as a figurehead of the British political theatre tradition but as 
a bitter enemy of consensus and common sense. By working through his 
propositions for a Theatre of Catastrophe, I intend to demonstrate the productivity of 
of opposing some of the indices of value active in theatre policy in the Blair era: 
objectivity, accessibility and clarity.  
The well-intentioned children of the Welfare State have grown into cultural 
producers of social critiques for both mass and minority audiences. Behind 
their spectacular or routine dramatic methods lies the spectacle of relentless 
harmony [...] We swim a tepid bath of humanistic accord, writer, actor,  
audience, an alliance of foregone conclusions which diminishes the  
possibility of innovative practice. (Arguments, 92) 
Barker’s status as a prominent enemy of the British arts establishment is predicated 
on statements such as the quotation above, which not only question but openly 
attack what he constructs as a toxic ideology that works against the imaginative 
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potential of theatre. Reacting against accusations of pretension and elitism, Barker’s 
writings here identify paternalistic impulses in the desire for accessibility , clarity of 30
meaning and moral consensus. His response to truisms regarding the educative 
purpose of theatre and its duty to communicate a meaning and a moral position is a 
countercharge of ‘social hygiene’, described in terms of the morally-enlightened 
artist handing down wisdom to the unenlightened masses and turning theatre into a 
‘sticking plaster for the wounds of social alienation’ (72). For Barker, clarity is an 
index of contempt: 
assuming that the audience requires the simplifications, recognitions and 
disciplines that constitute ‘communication skills’ in art forms. The infantile 
desire to ‘communicate’ conceals arrogance and patronage, I am thinking of 
imperatives to clarify, to elucidate, to enlighten, the prejudice that audiences 
are recruitable, molten masses in search of order and form which can be 
bestowed upon them by their intellectual masters. (136) 
In Barker’s view, a play that presents a clear, coherent ‘meaning’ demeans drama on 
the one hand and its audience on the other. Barker’s account of drama with a clear 
message (especially a political one) is firstly that it constructs the relationship 
between dramatist and spectator as one of wisdom addressing ignorance, and 
secondly that it gives the spectator a position of primary importance that Barker 
refutes. The primary relationship in Barker’s theatre is between ‘the dramatist and the 
world’ with actor and spectator as presenter of and witness to the resulting 
‘collision’, and the spectator bears the responsibility of finding a way to receive this 
unfamiliar, painful and obscure dramatic experience. Tension, misunderstanding and 
hostility should be central to the dramatic encounter, which otherwise degrades into 
entertainment (a word always used in a pejorative sense by Barker).  An absence of 
clarity and consensus is at the heart of Barker’s response to the theatrical and 
political climate of the 1980s: his ‘Theatre of Catastrophe’.  While Barker’s ideas 31
have shifted over time to more extreme positions, this early iteration of 
Catastrophism is presented most succinctly in the poetic manifesto ‘The Humanist 
Theatre/The Catastrophic Theatre’ (71). Where ‘Humanist Theatre’ promotes unity, 
agreement and enlightenment, the ‘Catastrophic Theatre’ is divisive, disturbing, 
riddled with misunderstanding, and demands that the spectator find her own way of 
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receiving the play rather than being granted access by dramatist, actors and text. 
Indeed, Barker is particularly scathing of what he calls ‘the cult of accessibility’ (85), 
devoting one essay to denouncing the ‘sham democracy’  invoked by accessible 32
drama and defending the political potential of an obscurity which acts as a radical, 
empowering challenge rather than a barrier. Such a challenge would ‘honour the 
audience’ (45-7), triggering argument and dissent rather than directing the spectator 
to assume a clearly-determined moral position.  
Barker identifies as ‘a moralist’, which he defines idiosyncratically as ‘one who is 
tough with morality, who exposes it to risk’ (76), rather than one who claims moral 
authority and seeks to bring that authority to bear in the dramatic encounter. The 
theatre, for Barker, is not a space of morality but one that needs to remain external to 
it in order to maintain the audacity that is necessary to theatre’s political potential. As 
such, he agitates for a ‘theatre without a conscience’ (72), that is to say without a 
conscience that acts as a restraint placed on daring and exploration. This renders this 
conscience incompatible with Barker’s vision of tragedy, a form which demands a 
temporary rejection of social order and selfhood in favour of an atavistic moment of 
relief and release during which concepts such as consensus and redemption lose all 
relevance. He reserves much of his most trenchant criticism for the rhetoric of theatre 
as a means of education and ‘social correction’ (73), where playwrights and other 
theatre-makers set out explicitly to enhance public awareness and understanding of a 
particular political situation or stance and beckon the audience towards an 
enlightened moral consensus.  
This is particularly relevant to a form that was to become one of the most dominant 
of the Blair era - topical documentary theatre. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, the 
relationship between these performances and the political landscape that produced 
them has its own specific problematics in the context of New Labour, and Barker’s 
critique of such works is prescient as well as particular to the time of writing:   
We have had for some decades now the spectacle of dramatists who haunt 
the newspapers for their inspiration, indeed are wholly dependent on it, as 
well as theatre companies of some distinction whose most significant activity 
is what they call 'researching material', an activity closely related to the 
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business of 'dramatising' things. The verb 'to dramatise' is part of the kitsch 
vocabulary of the theatre of issues, in which actors are employed as a means 
to a didactic end, the education of the ignorant audience, and by 'research' 
we are threatened with the spurious legitimacy of so-called facts. 'It's all 
right,' the actors seem to tell you in researched plays, 'everything we 
demonstrate has occurred', is in effect 'true'. (73) 
In this reading of theatre (verbatim or otherwise) that draws on a meticulously-
researched version of current events, theatrical performance is reduced to a 
meretricious form of pedagogy which uses claims of veracity to force a consensus 
between dramaturge, actors and audience, and in Chapter 4 I will explore the 
political implications of extending these specific truth claims to some of the many 
verbatim plays of the Blair era, particularly the Tricycle Tribunal plays. Barker here 
attacks the use of factual research as a means of asserting moral superiority over the 
audience, bringing the spectators to a greater knowledge and understanding of the 
issues at stake while ensuring that said knowledge results in a prescribed moral 
conclusion. This echoes his formulations on the dangers of ‘clarity’ of meaning in 
theatre, where the work demeans the audience by performing intellectual authority; 
here, that clarity is enacted through the assumed primacy of facts over the free play 
of imagination. He goes on to dismiss any claims of heightened political efficacy 
made by practitioners of researched theatre: 
But the theatre is not true, it is not a true action, its very power, its whole 
authority comes from the fact that it is not true, and the idea of accuracy, or 
reference to a source outside the theatre walls, is fatal to its particular 
unsettling and revolutionary power. The moment that an action on the stage 
asserts its veracity by reference to known and proved action elsewhere, 
theatre is overwhelmed by the world, the world reclaims it. It is a symptom 
of the lost faith in theatre as an art form that its practitioners require the 
credentials of authenticity. The audience of the theatre comes for what it 
cannot obtain elsewhere in any other forum. In other words, it comes for the 
false, it comes for the speculative and the unproven. The researched theatre 
says, the informative theatre says, 'we have demonstrated such and such a 
fact, and it will make you better to know it', a sham democracy behind 
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which lies a repugnant arrogance. (73) 
Theatre as imagined by Barker would not attempt to perform the political by enacting 
the empirically provable. The deployment of factual credentials only serves to bring 
the theatrical performance, which Barker claims as a law unto itself, into the domain 
of the external world with all its attendant ideological and moral constraints. The 
invocation of an objective reality by means of factual evidence, far from enhancing 
the revolutionary potency of a piece of political theatre, deadens that potency by 
closing down the very space of speculation that Barker’s theatre seeks to open. This 
in turn denies the audience the promised escape from orthodoxy into the uncharted 
moral terrains of tragic theatre, instead affirming theatre’s subservience to the 
ideological climate which produces it while at the same time reinforcing the 
perceived link between this ideology and an objective, empirical reality.  
If this reality is accepted as unassailable, Barker implies, then so is the ‘meaning’ and 
message being set out on stage - which is in turn implicitly subsumed into the 
ideology it claims to criticise. In later chapters I will introduce some discussions from 
the last twenty years (beginning with Stuart Hall) that explore the exact mechanics 
and wider implications of this phenomenon in terms of the mutability of New 
Labour’s particular brand of neoliberalism and discuss its presence both in cultural 
policy and on the stage. A common theme among critics of Blairite politics is its 
post-political character and its propensity for co-opting and engulfing oppositional 
elements: Barker offers a compellingly prescient account of how this propensity 
might be staged, an account which I take up in my discussion of the relevance of 
post-political Third Way thinking to the meteoric rise in popularity of documentary 
forms during the period of Blair’s government. Barker’s central claim here is that 
attempting to bring an unmediated, empirically accurate, objective account of 
contemporary events to the stage closes down discussion that political theatre ought 
to open up. Even where the intention (as I discuss in Chapter 4 with recourse to the 
Tricycle Tribunal plays) is to speak truth to power, postulating a single objective truth 
is a problematic exercise. Political theatre, according to Barker, needs to engender a 
disruptive doubt and confusion in the audience, and forms of documentary theatre 
that claim to avoid the subjectivity inherent in political antagonism simply replace 
one monolithic truth claim with another. This closure of the space for doubt and 
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dissent maps on to a similar closure I will discuss in Chapter 3 which arises within 
Third Way thinking, whereby the discursive articulation of a post-political locus of 
government rhetoric beyond the divisions of Left and Right creates its own truth 
claim - an objective analysis of social realities that transcends political partiality. My 
claim is that this mapping of one truth claim (that of early twenty-first-century 
verbatim theatre) onto the other (that of Third Way discourse) enables a criticism of 
both. Where state and the stage use the same tools to create a discourse that is 
constitutive of objective reality, theatre’s claim to disrupt the state is mitigated by the 
unacknowledged presence of that discourse.   
Chris Megson, in the essay ‘’England brings you down at last’: Politics and Passion in 
Barker’s ‘State of England’ Drama’, gives a lucid reading of Barker’s political 
prescience by revisiting the ‘State of England’ plays written between 1975 and 1985, 
a body of work which Megson believes to be worthy of more widespread critical and 
scholarly attention than it has as yet received.  Placing these works, and the 1983 33
play A Passion in Six Days in particular, in the context of contemporary developments 
in parliamentary politics, Megson ties Barker’s shift away from the doctrines of 
realism and towards ‘more metaphoric and poetic performance registers’ (126) to the 
Labour Party’s ‘irrevocable and controversial long march rightwards […] in its 
indefatigable quest for wider electoral appeal’ (124) under the leadership of Neil 
Kinnock. He makes a particular point of reminding the reader that David Blunkett, 
later to become a key figure in the continuation of the rightwards march that 
culminated in New Labour, was present at the premiere of A Passion in Six Days and 
walked out of the performance.  For Megson, Blunkett’s action provides the crucial 34
link between the trajectories of the Labour Party and of Barker’s theatre. As Labour 
courted the electorate with a dogmatic and pragmatic move away from Leftist 
orthodoxy and towards the neoliberal hegemony spearheaded by Thatcher’s 
government, Barker’s plays began to deploy excess, passion and moral speculation in 
the performance of a conviction that Britain’s political debate was in the process of 
rendering itself banal and irrelevant and that social realism was no longer adequate 
to the task of destabilising it. 
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Barker and Adorno: arguments on aesthetic autonomy 
In taking up this liminal space that evades the moral, the dogmatic (in the form of 
social realism) and the ideological, Barker agitates for a theatre which is not devoid 
of usefulness but is autonomous in the ideological and aesthetic senses of the word. 
Where this autonomy is absent, so is the unique political potential of theatre that 
relies on ambiguity, dissent and, as Barker puts it, ‘the false’. Theatre which has at its 
heart a clear, explicit mission to diagnose and stage specific social and political 
issues cannot inhabit the territory of ‘the false’ and instead falls into an artistic 
aporia, adrift between the factual and the imaginative and thus unable to unlock the 
potential of either domain. This is one possible reading of the ‘lost faith’ in theatre 
Barker goes on to mention. A loss of confidence in the political relevance of 
dramatic imagination leads to a desire to reach out to the world as a source of 
inspiration, beginning the vicious cycle of ‘spurious legitimacy’ and deepening bad 
faith that Barker describes. 
Karoline Gritzner argues persuasively for reading an aesthetic of the sublime in 
Barker’s plays, bringing Barker into a productive dialogue with Adorno as well as 
Kant and Burke that brings deeper nuances to Barker’s Arguments.  She goes so far 35
as to say that  
[Barker’s] art of theatre is Adornian in the sense that it places emphasis on 
the notion of aesthetic autonomy and its interrelated concept of subjective 
freedom. Precisely because it does not accommodate to the conventional 
tastes of the majority and refuses to communicate unambiguous moral 
messages, Barker’s theatre can be considered as political and subversive. 
(85)  
In Gritzner’s reading, Barker’s Theatre of Catastrophe intersects with Adorno in 
resisting the subsuming of theatre into a ‘culture industry’ in which entertainment, 
populism, economic viability and humanistic (in Barker’s sense) social aspirations 
render art hostile to the individual subject. As the sublime is invoked through 
moments of physical and linguistic disintegration and the negation of the Eros/
Thanatos binary (the fate of Helen in The Bite of the Night (1988) being a powerful 
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example), the simultaneous horror and ecstasy performed by the central characters 
wrenches Barker’s theatrical project free of any illusion of a communal experience.  36
Sex and death, Gritzner postulates, are constructed as profoundly solitary encounters 
that not only evade reason and clarity but also trouble and galvanise the individual 
imagination and, as Barker puts it, ‘return the individual to himself’ (Arguments, 23). 
If Catastrophism is political and subversive, this is the site of its potency: in 
engineering an experience, not of togetherness, but of deep division and separation 
where the individual has no recourse but to her own imaginative faculties. The 
resultant state of autonomy is one of fragility, poised between affirmation and 
fragmentation and compromised - albeit, for Barker and Adorno, productively so - by 
the impossibility of resolution through the social.  
Although Adorno draws on the principle of ‘art for art’s sake‘, this is not to say that 
his account of the aesthetic autonomy of the artwork accords primacy to aesthetic 
value over all other forms thereof or divorces art from the social. Rather, once 
something is designated as an artwork it retains, despite the separation conferred by 
this designation, a position within the social which in turn causes it to partake of 
forms of value other than the aesthetic, such as the social and the political. 
Moreover, once art becomes a commodity it gains an autonomy from what Adorno 
scholar Andy Hamilton terms ‘direct function’ but at the same time exchanges those 
constraints for the constraints of capitalism. As Hamilton puts it, referring to the link 
Adorno makes between the rise of bourgeois culture and decline of aristocratic and 
religious patronage in the eighteenth century and the emancipation of art from its 
direct functions:  
If artists no longer work for specific patrons in church or court, and offer 
their work for sale to those whose identities are not fully specified in 
advance – that is, they begin to function within the market – it becomes 
easier for them to produce works that embody their own values rather than 
those of their patrons, thus increasing their autonomy. Growing autonomy 
therefore goes hand in hand with the commodification of artworks [...] It is 
not such a paradox that capitalism emancipates, as Marx of course 
recognized. It emancipates from feudalism, but forges new chains of its own. 
(254)  37
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Even where the artwork is oppositional to society and rejects its moral and aesthetic 
norms, the dialectical relationship between artwork and society persists. This is not 
simply as a result of the context and means of its production, but more importantly, 
for Adorno in Aesthetic Theory : 38
art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position 
only as autonomous art. By crystallizing in itself as something unique to 
itself, rather than complying with existing social norms and qualifying as 
‘socially useful,’ it criticises society by merely existing […] Art’s asociality is 
the determinate negation of a determinate society. (226) 
In other words, the artwork’s resistance to society is both determined by and 
constitutive of that society, hence the dynamic and precarious nature of the aesthetic 
autonomy perceived by Gritzner in her Adornian reading of Barker. That said, 
whether aesthetic and social autonomy are different forms or are too closely 
interpenetrating to be considered as discrete is an important consideration which I 
will address in Chapter 3, where I pick up the discussion of autonomy in terms of the 
ways in which it has been deployed by critics of New Labour cultural policy.   
It is worth remarking at this juncture that Barker’s perspective on the autonomy of the 
aesthetic and the social diverge greatly from the thinking, not only of Bond, but of 
another theatre scholar who occupies an important position in Chapter 5: Jill Dolan. 
While Dolan, as we will see later, is also open to the liminal and the dissonant, she 
prioritises the very element of communal experience that is denied by Barker. 
Dolan’s writing on the utopian potential of performance makes the claim that the 
moments of temporary community within an audience may in fact be sustainable 
beyond the fall of the curtain.  If the community experienced within the 39
performance space has a utopian dimension (which, for Dolan, it certainly may), it 
can provide the impetus to recreate an affectively similar community in other public 
sites.  For Dolan, then, the border between the dramatic and the social, the 40
‘false’ (in Barker’s term) and the factual, is far more porous than for Barker as her 
affective experience in the theatre is a function of momentary togetherness rather 
than unmitigated solitude. The utility of this dialogue - and the dialogue with Adorno 
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- to my project is in the discussion it allows of what political theatre can or should 
seek to achieve beyond the boundaries of the performance itself, and whether it has 
a direct role to play in effecting social change. My readings of cultural policy  in 
Chapter 2 also address this question by examining issues of social and economic 
impact and the existing research in this area. 
What lies at the heart of the rhetoric of social utility and moral guardianship is, 
according to Barker, an unconsciously defensive attitude towards one’s own practice 
and status as a creator of drama: 
I must admit that for many years when people asked me why I wrote, I 
resorted to such dismal platitudes myself [...] I had a sense that art was a 
luxury and needed to be defended against charges of indulgence or 
privilege. In fact, I wrote because I needed to. I wrote for myself. But that 
seemed unforgivable. Only more recently did I understand that in writing for 
myself I also served others, and that, in not serving myself, I could not serve 
others. The more self-limiting an artist is, the less useful to his fellow human 
beings (76) 
Here Barker identifies an issue that will take up many of the following pages: that of 
the need for artists to defend themselves against charges of social irrelevance by 
turning to instrumentalism. Instrumentalist defences, whether monetary or social, are 
the standard response to accusations of financial unsustainability of an arts 
organisation or artwork; the arts have value over and above the intrinsic qualities of 
any individual artwork, and it is on the strength of that value that any defence of state 
subsidy for the arts has to rest. Barker’s text here sets up a Gordian knot that cultural 
policy has spent the next several decades attempting to unpick: if art is to have 
sufficient integrity and ingenuousness to be politically meaningful it needs to 
distance itself from any sense of political obligation, and the only effective response 
to an accusation of social and political irrelevance is a refusal to engage with that 
accusation. In order to serve, artist and artwork must be socially and aesthetically 
autonomous and reject any perceived imperative towards service. It is precisely this 
set of paradoxes that invites the dialectical approach I will be introducing in Chapter 
3, where I also introduce the question of financial autonomy, and what ramifications 
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it might have for the ideological and aesthetic readings of the term. As a closer 
reading of will reveal, Adorno’s configurations of autonomy do not permit different 
definitions of the term to exist discretely.  
Barker, Bond and ‘sham democracy’ 
Barker makes more than one use of the term ‘sham democracy’ in Arguments, 
inviting the question of what a democratic theatre would look like and whether it is 
even a viable or appropriate goal. Discussions of democracy and theatre frequently 
begin with an invocation of an earlier ‘Golden Age’, fifth-century Athens. David 
Edgar, in an article published in 2014 in The Guardian, suggested that theatre might 
still be ‘as the Greeks thought, a fundamental part of the democratic process, as vital 
as voting’,  and defences of political theatre often demonstrate an underlying 41
cultural assumption that theatre - particularly tragedy - and democracy are 
symbiotic.  42
While many different definitions and models of democracy are available to theorists, 
in the context of discussions of British theatre it is generally used in a figurative sense 
rather than referring directly to the formal institutions and apparatus of British 
representative democracy. There are also a number of examples of British theatre 
which can be said to blur the distinction between literal and figurative readings of 
‘democratic theatre’: 
i) the process of creating the work reflects a democratic process by including 
participation from, or the directly-related experiences of, citizens who are 
not theatre practitioners themselves. Examples of this might include Alecky 
Blythe’s The Girlfriend Experience (2008) or the documentary theatre of 
Rony Robinson, where the textual presence of the interviewees could be 
said to disrupt the power relations between actors and audience. 
ii) the work itself sets out to raise political consciousness in such a way as to 
explicitly encourage democratic participation from the audience members 
once they have left the theatre. Examples could include Tanika Gupta’s 
Gladiator Games (2005), which dramatises a recent event with the aim of 
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encouraging audience members to take action against the political system 
that instigated or permitted those events.  
iii) a recognised democratic process is either portrayed on stage or replicated 
in some other fashion during the performance (such as the audience being 
invited to vote). Look Left Look Right’s verbatim play Counted? (2010), for 
example, was devised using interviews in which citizens discussed their 
thoughts and motivations regarding the voting process, and Tim Price’s 
Demos (2012) juxtaposed two forms of democracy by staging a meeting of 
the General Assembly for Occupy London Stock Exchange followed by the 
next day’s Prime Minister’s Questions. 
While Barker is scathing about the figurative use of the word ‘democracy’ by the 
dramatic establishment, his writings certainly do not indicate any intention to use 
theatre as a direct means to legislative reform; on the contrary, using dramatic 
performance to influence the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy (as 
potentially exemplified above) would certainly fall into the category of allowing 
theatre to be ‘overwhelmed by the world’. If the democracy of democratic theatre is 
to be taken neither literally nor figuratively, and instead remains at best a nebulous 
ideal and at worst an empty cliche, how seriously are we to take its continuing 
presence in the field?  
  
Both Barker and Edward Bond imply the possibility of a category of ‘democratic’ 
theatre, figurative rather than literal in character, which in their writings is notable by 
its absence from the British stage.  While the work criticised by Barker enacts a 43
‘sham democracy’ whereby audience members are offered an illusion of 
empowerment by being passively led into consensus, Bond states categorically that 
British theatre has been caught up in a more widespread corruption of democracy. 
Our democracy sustains itself by systematically de-democratizing its people. 
[...] Consumer democracy saturates us in drama because it must coerce 
imagination into creating its fake reality. Once all stories allowed some 
freedom; consumerism allows less and less. Our drama - our theatre - is part 
of this corruption, deeply involved in the work of de-democratizing. It takes 
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the great questions and trivializes them. (Hidden Plot, 4-5) 
Barker and Bond understand and present ‘democracy’ very differently. Barker’s 
theatrical democracy is more absolute than Bond’s, something that can be either 
‘sham’ or genuine and which he only defines negatively as something that becomes 
impossible as soon as a form of authority is assumed by theatrical practitioners. As 
discussed above, this is part of the process identified by Barker whereby a 
performance addresses a political issue in such a way that meaning is predetermined 
and dissensus precluded by the invocation of factual research or moral authority. The 
trappings of the political and the democratic are present in the subject matter 
addressed by the performance, but the authority assumed over the audience renders 
the politics of the performance inauthentic.  
Bond also invokes classical Athens when discussing the relationship between 
democracy and theatre, but makes a compelling argument against that relationship 
having retained any integrity in late twentieth-century Britain. The democratic 
character of Greek tragedy lies, for Bond, in its ability to comprehend the paradoxes 
inherent in human individuals and societies as they attempt to imagine and effect 
justice only to find that imagined justice, once actualised, is corrupted by the very 
institutions of power required to sustain it: 
The first society to understand this was Greece. It created the foundations of 
our drama and our democracy. The two go together, and the state of a 
democracy is shown by its drama [...] We live in crisis. We have weapons to 
destroy the world, and even when we are at peace we destroy it; that is the 
logic of the power that rules our economy. Faced with this crisis it seems 
fatuous to talk of drama and the Greeks [...] Greek drama was innocent, ours 
is corrupt. (67-8) 
Bond argues for the possibility of a return to a drama that can restore theatre’s 
democratic potential by reclaiming the ‘radical innocence’ (68) of the imagination 
and not only subverting but rejecting power. In a moment of intersection with Barker, 
Bond questions the usefulness of morality to the political and, by extension, the 
dramatic or tragic, as the moral becomes so easily intertwined with the elements of 
 45
power at work in economics and social justice. For both dramatists, the mechanisms 
of power and normative morality are deleterious to both the radical and the 
democratic potential of drama, and Bond links this explicitly to the capitalist 
economy and the state: 
The state seeks to penetrate the site of drama (as religion, law, and so on). It 
does so not only to repress the self so that it fits into the historically 
inevitable unjust structures that have administered society; it does so also to 
create its own justification [...] The state abhors a vacuum because 
opposition may shelter in it. (49) 
Thus for even a social democracy to attempt directly to intervene in its own 
dramatisation is to impede the ‘radical innocence’ that might lead to the destabilising 
of its own power structures and normative moral constructs. This is an important 
consideration to bear in mind when dealing with cultural policy, and one which I 
will approach later when dealing with questions of autonomy and the staging of 
radical politics. If, as the impact studies I deal with in the following chapter claim, 
theatre has been successful in drawing marginalised groups into the mainstream of 
society, is this a success for the politicisation of theatre or an index of its demise?  
Bond: theatre, reason and Utopia 
Bond’s discussions of the search for justice and the corruption of democracy centre 
on ideas of community and Utopia as functions of both the social and the imaginary, 
and - as I will discuss in Chapter 3 - these are both terms that have been extensively 
deployed in research into New Labour cultural policy and rhetoric.  
Bond reads constructions of justice, community and drama as part of a network of 
ideas that are driven by an utopian impulse, and community is understood as  
the relationships between people which enable each of them to pursue their 
aim humanely. Community is founded on trust, friendship, and ‘getting on 
together’ and sharing a common life [...] In a community the poor and rich 
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may be equally pleasant and equally generous within their means. (60) 
This places community at variance with a free market economy, which Bond 
describes as enforcing harsh differentiations of power between different customs, 
vocations, and social and political positions. While the community and its members 
may support justice in a spirit of radical innocence, the economy undermines that 
spirit as it ‘does not depend on human virtues [...] It has a life and force of its 
own’ (60) and that life and force are inherently divisive. For Bond, such an economy 
is entirely incompatible with equality, prohibiting it with laws of its own independent 
creation.  
One of the central elements in Bond’s understanding of drama and the social is one 
that places him at odds with Barker: that of reason. As Bond does not embrace the 
idea of theatre as an expression of something dark, primal and beyond the realms of 
the rational his formulations are immediately closer to Marxist - and of course 
Brechtian, although Bond’s association with Brecht is an uneasy one - orthodoxy and 
the construction of a ‘scientific’ Socialism. Bond makes his dissonances with Brecht 
with regard to Utopia and reason known more clearly towards the end of the 
volume: 
Brechtism’s Utopia - the site of its value - is in the future. Brechtism: ‘Do not 
feel when you think’ - as if action could be pure thought. This is the cause of 
Brechtism’s reversals, recantations, contradictions. They are not expediency 
but attempts to find a value to act on instead of one to reach for […] (184) 
He goes on to argue that Utopia and justice in the work of art must be implicit rather 
than described, as imagination is impossible without a symbiosis of emotion and 
reason. Utopia in drama, therefore, cannot be purely rational; it must have an 
affective dimension. This is the source of the political power of the utopian in theatre 
- as he continues, ‘Marx decried the notion of Utopia: a politician must. A dramatist 
or poet cannot.’ (ibid.) The affective nature of the utopian performative and its 
political potential is an area I will address in Chapter 4, again with recourse to Jill 
Dolan, and I will also return several times throughout this text to the usefulness of 
various determinants of value (of which utopian vision may be one). 
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The search for justice (which Bond regards as the driving force of the creation of 
drama and, indeed, all human language) has at its root the capacity for imagining 
Utopia, whether that Utopia is explicitly staged/spoken or not, as ‘a time when the 
mind could speak justice without the corruptions and distortions that come from 
adapting to authority’. (7) As such, Bond’s Utopia resists the laws imposed by 
capitalism and by a social democracy, such as that of Blair’s Britain, that seeks to 
embrace the market. This is the claim that lies at the heart of Bond’s acrimonious 
relationship with the British theatrical establishment: where the state is in thrall to a 
capitalist economy, that state’s intervention in drama can only exacerbate the 
corruption already trickling down from a compromised democracy. Although Bond’s 
community, with its emphasis on ‘getting on together’, implies a reliance on 
consensus, this consensus is not contrived or coerced but a direct result of shared 
‘radical innocence’. In subsequent chapters I will discuss the co-optation of the 
rhetoric of communitarianism and the utopian by the Blair government, with 
particular reference to cultural policy.  
Bond’s thesis, while lacking in the historical background of communitarian thought 
and its utopian dimension, still has considerable academic traction when read 
alongside current scholars of utopianism and New Labour policy such as Ruth 
Levitas and Luke Martell respectively. Where the market is the prime mover in the 
creation of community, the divisions it enforces inhibit any utopian impulse those 
communities might have enjoyed. The utopian gives way to the ideological in 
cultural policy, and communities that are created through this policy area will be 
unable to assume any role in the healing of the rifts produced by the economy from 
which the policies derive. For Bond and for Barker too the role played by the state in 
the workings, ideals and economics of theatre runs a risk of adversely affecting both 
what takes place on the stage and what takes place between stage and audience, and 
the aim of this thesis is to examine the questions and objections they raise. 
In summary, while Barker’s central claims about the nature and role of political 
theatre are rooted in an opposition to social norms and a need to disrupt moral logic 
on an individual level, Bond’s are deeply inflected by the Enlightenment tradition 
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and invoke community, justice and the rational. Both, however, postulate a toxic 
relationship between political theatre and the state, reading the state as a site of 
ideologically-enforced consensus that is hostile to individual consciousness and 
dissent (Barker) or a corrupt, divisive power that is inimical to community and justice 
(Bond).  
Reading Barker and Bond alongside the cultural policy of the New Labour years 
presents some productive challenges. In the case of Barker, his rejection of the 
primacy of the audience member clashes violently with a social democratic model of 
cultural policy in which the character of the arts as a public good is a primary driver 
of advocacy and subsidy. Where funding for theatre is largely dependent on 
establishing social impact, advocacy-driven research (as I will demonstrate in the 
next chapter) relies heavily on analytical assessment of the effect of theatre on 
audiences and their communities, not to mention the relationship between those 
audiences/communities and the wider civic and social goals of their government. 
Continuing education, employment figures, social inclusion and community all 
figure prominently in New Labour cultural policy and its accompanying body of 
research; there can be little room for the unmeasurable alienation and confusion of 
Barker’s Theatre of Catastrophe which is inimical to normativity and cohesion. In the 
case of Bond, the greatest opposition is between the ideal of ‘radical innocence’ - 
which is eroded by ‘adapting to authority’ in any form - and any intervention of the 
state in the workings of the theatre. One of his chief claims is that where a 
democracy is compromised, so is the drama produced by and within it, and that 
where the state (read by Bond as a site of inequality and injustice) intervenes even 
indirectly in the conditions of the production of dramatic works it inhibits the radical 
impulses and imagination that constitute the political potential of theatre.  
The impossibility of imagining a cultural policy which either Barker or Bond might 
find congenial to their aims is what necessitates the dialogue (or at any rate the 
juxtaposition) I construct between the two. Even where theatre opposes the existence 
of policy that seeks to govern and mediate it, recent works of scholarship on theatre 
and neoliberalism indicate that cultural policy in toto does not necessarily forestall 
the potential of political theatre. Most notably, two leading scholars - Jen Harvie  44
and Dragan Klaic  - have made important interventions that investigate a 45
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reconciliation between the fields of theatre and social democracy in a climate of 
neoliberalism, and Harvie in particular points towards the necessity of locating 
cultural practices and policies that can genuinely enhance social welfare. My 
intention throughout this thesis is to speak primarily to the problematics of that 
potential reconciliation, and ask what political theatre sought to do under New 
Labour, whether a consensus between stage and state was possible or desirable, and 
finally whether the dramatists of the time achieved their aims or whether the political 
efficacy of their work was hampered by the economic necessity - as Mark Ravenhill 
suggests - of ideological compromise.  
In the next chapter I will revisit the problematics of consensus I have introduced 
above with regard to the McMaster Review, a text which I read as attempting to 
create consensus between aesthetic and social priorities ascribed to the arts in 
cultural policy and, albeit implicitly, between intrinsic and instrumental value 
systems. While McMaster’s claim is that artists require creative independence from 
the state in order to engage and inspire their audiences, he keeps the New Labour 
priorities of community cohesion and social inclusion firmly in view. By opening 
with the arguments of two major post-war playwrights who would, in their different 
ways, contest these goals, I aim to problematise and disrupt the familiar discussion of 
art as social good by having already allowed the dissenting voices of Barker and 
Bond each to identify a locus of political potential for theatre that is distant and 
distinct from those laid out in cultural policy and impact research.     
  
 For a comprehensive discussion of the perceived opposition between Barker’s Theatre of 23
Catastrophe and Bond’s Brechtian emphasis on Reason see Charles Lamb. The Theatre of Howard 
Barker. London: Routledge, 2005 
 Hereafter Arguments24
 Hereafter Hidden Plot25
 I use this term in its Bourdieusian sense, as will become clear in the third chapter26
 Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso. 198527
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 See Chapter 5 28
 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of how this exclusion has been examined elsewhere by Blair’s critics 29
and how it operates beyond the field of theatre and performance. 
   An ‘accessible play’ is defined by Barker as one ‘whose narrative is simple, whose characters are 30
rapidly absorbed, identified and classified as ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and whose momentum can be 
contained within the ‘issue’’ (85). 
 See Charles Lamb, The Theatre of Howard Barker, London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 5-23 for a succinct 31
account of Barker’s changing relationship to the British dramatic establishment throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
   Barker uses this phrase numerous times throughout Arguments32
   Megson, Chris. “‘England brings you down at last’: Politics and Passion in Barker’s ‘State of 33
England’ Drama.” Theatre of Catastrophe: New Essays on Howard Barker. Ed. Karoline Gritzner and 
David Ian Rabey. London: Oberon Books, 2006
   Blunkett allegedly left in protest at the brief nudity of the actors, a claim Megson finds baffling 34
(125) given that Blunkett is blind. 
 Gritzner, Karoline. “Towards an Aesthetic of the Sublime in Howard Baker’s Theatre.” Theatre of  35
Catastrophe: New Essays on Howard Barker.  Ed. Karoline Gritzner and David Ian Rabey. London:  
Oberon Books. 2006
 Barker, Howard. The Bite of the Night. London: Calder. 199836
 Hamilton, Andy. “Adorno and the autonomy of art”. Nostalgia for a Redeemed Future: Critical 37
Theory. Ed. Stefano Giacchetti Ludovisi & G. Agostini Saavedra. University of Delaware, 2009
 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory. London: Athlone. 199738
 Dolan, Jill. Utopia in Performance: Finding Hope at the Theatre. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 39
Press. 2005
 I shall return later to Dolan’s formulations on the utopian performative as a site of rehearsal of                                 40
participatory democracy, having further clarified the relevance of theories of radical democracy to the 
topic of political theatre.  
   Edgar, David. “If we want theatre for the masses, we need grants to target audiences”. Guardian 41
Comment is Free. 12 July 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/12/theatre-
grants-audiences-children-david-edgar>
   See Peter Burian’s defence of this position and a review of challenges to it in ‘Athenian Tragedy and 42
Democratic Discourse’. Why Athens?A Reappraisal of Tragic Politics. Ed. D.M. Carter. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 2011. 95-117
   Jill Dolan, with whose work I will engage in Chapter 4, develops this putative fourth term via 43
Mouffe and Laclau to locate, in strategies of direct address to the audience, a site for the rehearsal of 
participatory democracy.
 Harvie, Jen. Fair Play: Art, Performance and Neoliberalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 201344
 Klaic, Dragan. Resetting the Stage: Public Theatre Between the Market and Social Democracy. 45
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2012
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Chapter 2 
Contested terms and muddled methodologies: impact research and its critics 
In my opening chapter we have heard from two key figures of post-war British 
political theatre who reject the primacy of the audience (Barker) and theatre which 
succumbs in any way to the authority of the state (Bond), and asked whether it is 
possible for stage and state to be reconciled in a way that allows space for politically 
meaningful theatre. Throughout this thesis I make several moves between stage and 
state, while recognising possible sites of reconciliation and resistance within the 
academy, and in this chapter I turn to the issue of state subsidy and its advocates. At 
the close of the first chapter I made reference to the need for subsidised theatre to 
demonstrate its credentials as a social good in order to continue to secure 
government funding. Here, I look at how that need has been met through research 
driven by the advocacy of state subsidy and at the criticism that research has 
received within the academy.  I also open the discussion which will be pursued in 
Chapters 4 and 5 regarding the potential dangers of Third Way politics, its 
managerialism and emphasis on consensus, to political theatre, by looking at the 
slippage of terminology within the cultural policy sector as discussed by a range of 
scholars.  
Advocacy of state subsidy for the arts under the Blair government was bolstered by a 
substantial body of work that set out to substantiate the positive social and economic 
impacts of the arts and, in the early years, a move away from ‘art for art’s sake’ 
rhetoric. This raft of impact studies, following the seminal research of Francois 
Matarasso, supported an instrumentalist justification of state subsidy, in terms of both 
economic and social impact, and attempts to substantiate claims that state-funded art 
can lower crime rates, raise school attendance, create pathways to employment and 
improve the physical and mental health of participants and audiences, as well as 
feeding money back into the local and national economy.  
Towards the end of the Blair government ACE and DCMS discourse, as exemplified 
by publications like the McMaster Review  and ACE’s ten-year plan 'Achieving 46
Great Art For Everyone' , attempted to reconcile instrumentalist advocacy with the 47
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‘art for art's sake’ approach in which art stands or falls by a system of intrinsic value. 
Much criticism had been directed at the instrumentalist agenda from within the 
sector itself, as well as from the academy where debate flourished regarding the 
efficacy of instrumentalist defences of arts funding. The enterprise culture of the 
1980s had seen a shift in cultural policy and its commentators towards justifying arts 
funding in terms of how it might boost economic prosperity. After John Myerscough’s 
1988 book, The Economic Importance of The Arts in Britain,  laid out the 48
instrumentalist case in full, the backlash from the academy was rapid . Although 49
Myerscough’s publication was influential and widely-cited, it was criticised on both 
methodological and theoretical grounds (Hansen, 1995 ). Questions were raised 50
regarding what constituted ‘the arts’, whether short-term and long-term impact was 
being accurately calculated, and indeed whether analysing the success of the arts in 
terms of a purpose (i.e. economic growth) not inherent in its creation was 
appropriate.  
Economic and social impact studies continued to proliferate during the 1990s, as 
attempts were made to refine methodologies and to link the economic potential of 
the arts to the agenda of tackling social exclusion. The McMaster Review made an 
attempt to return artistic quality to the foreground where, he argued, it could and 
must coexist with the social benefits posited by social impact studies. One of the 
tactics deployed by McMaster in his search for a viable consensus between intrinsic 
and instrumental systems of value began to take the form of placing attributes of both 
intrinsic and instrumental value under the term ‘excellence’, which tried to resolve 
the binary by eliding the two sides rather than unpicking them. The term has a long 
and complex history and is notoriously resistant to definition, having been present as 
a keyword in cultural policy (along with ‘access’) since the post-War years and 
having acquired further problematically elitist associations under Thatcherism and 
the enterprise culture of the 1980s. McMaster attempted to reclaim it by using it to 
signify art that united intrinsic value with specific social aims compatible with other 
areas of New Labour policy.   
Concurrently, critiques of New Labour cultural policy and ACE coming from those 
right-wing commentators and think tanks who were inclined to make a case for 
continuing arts subsidy focused on developing their own definitions of artistic 
autonomy and warning of the damaging effects of managerialism. The tendency in 
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this criticism was to express the extrinsic benefits of art in terms of national identity 
and the contribution of the creative industries to overall economic growth. These 
were the reasons why art, according to the Arts Task Force set up by David Cameron, 
'makes life better'.  One of the main planks of this argument was that art, and 51
artists, lose integrity and creative independence when tied rigidly to a political 
agenda, and that stipulating that all funded projects must demonstrate a social 
purpose would lead to aesthetically inferior and even disingenuous art produced 
simply to fulfil funding requirements. 
In this chapter I will examine the purposes ascribed to art by ACE and the DCMS 
under New Labour and by their critics and the difficulties that have been 
encountered in evaluating the success of state-subsidised projects in fulfilling these 
purposes, and I will begin to trace the links between McMaster’s attempts to 
construct a consensus on ‘excellence’ and the broader ideological climate. I will 
present some of the key arguments that came from cultural policy research and from 
the academy and look at how existing research methodology was developed and 
criticised. In so doing, I will firstly provide context for the plays I go on to read in 
Chapter 5 and secondly prepare the reader for my discussions in Chapters 3 and 4 
and for the theoretical thinking I bring to bear on this policy area. The political (and, 
in Chapters 3-5, potentially post-political) roles of theatre remain central to the 
conversation I invoke.  
Redefining terms: “Excellence” and the “cultural industry” 
In January 2008, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport published the 
McMaster Review. The Review, compiled by former Edinburgh Festival director Sir 
Brian McMaster with the assistance of a number of arts practitioners and freelance 
advisors, was commissioned by the DCMS and ran beneath a title which summed up 
the official mission of the department: 'Supporting excellence in the arts'. By 
examining the roles of artists, practitioners and public funding bodies in the running 
of arts organisations, the document set out a series of recommendations for an 
overhaul of the assessment criteria for the output of these organisations, moving, as 
McMaster termed it, 'from measurement to judgement'.  Heavily endorsed by the 
then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, James Purnell, the Review 
proclaimed the dawning of a new cultural Golden Age, or 'another Renaissance' (5) 
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in Britain.  
Taking as a central premise the Department’s slogan 'Improving quality of life for all', 
the Review attempted a reclaiming of the term 'excellence', redefining it by injecting 
it with a cultural relevance and urgency that McMaster claimed had been lost in 
recent decades. The stated aim here was to reclaim ‘excellence’ as an all-embracing 
term which held within it many of the ideals McMaster set out as being necessary to 
a rich national culture, such as 'diversity' and 'innovation', and McMaster attempted 
to imagine a framework for assessing its value that did not rely entirely on financial 
targets and box-ticking. The creative freedom of artists is, he argued, of paramount 
importance, and should not be impeded by the economic self-preservation instincts 
of impoverished arts organisations; instead, both public funding and internal 
management should be geared to the prioritisation of what is “excellent” – both 
artistically adventurous and politically relevant to a diverse audience. 
McMaster was not unaware of the problems inherent in the use of his chosen 
terminology: 
There is a fundamental mismatch between the way we talk about culture and 
the values we attach to it. The language we use has become tainted and the 
terms we use – ‘art for art’s sake’, ‘the right to fail’, ‘risk’, ‘innovation’, let 
alone ‘excellence’ – have all acquired accretions of meaning in recent years 
that have blunted or distorted what we want to say. Excellence itself is 
sometimes dismissed as an exclusive, canonical and ‘heritage’ approach to 
cultural activity. I refute this. (9) 
  
Cultural policy, according to McMaster, had been overtaken by terminology which 
had become resistant to definition, political classification and indeed understanding 
due to decades of contradictory use. This is a point of view that echoes Galloway 
and Dunlop’s article of the previous year (2007), which extends the discussion of 
overdetermined and opaque terminology back to the terms ‘culture’, ‘creativity’ and 
the ‘cultural/creative industries’.  Galloway and Dunlop’s historiography of these 52
terms (18-19) traces the subsuming of creative pursuits into the ‘culture industry’ 
back to the difficulties of the 1980s, when a rejection of the idealistic aesthetic 
arguments for state-supported art became necessary in the face of cutbacks in public 
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spending and the primacy of enterprise culture. This rejection was bolstered by the 
popularity of Myerscough’s research (as I mention at the opening of this chapter) into 
economic impact. In Galloway and Dunlop’s words, ‘representatives of the creative 
arts were effectively lobbying to be included as part of the cultural industries.’ (18) 
The earlier definition of ‘cultural industries’, that which underpinned 1980s cultural 
policy in France as well as the cultural policy initiatives of UNESCO (1978) and the 
Council of Europe (1980), was restricted to commercially-produced work and did 
not include the state-subsidised arts. Hesmondhalgh, writing in 2005,  presents a 53
similar narrative and traces its development into the mission embraced by the DCMS 
at its inception: ‘the fostering of the creative industries’.  To provide still further 54
confusion, the term ‘culture industry’ is one also used heavily by Adorno and 
Horkheimer, and their definition and usage has great traction within critical theory 
and cultural studies. Both Hesmondhalgh and Galloway & Dunlop foreground the 
early research of Nicholas Garnham, whose presentations to the Greater London 
Council (1983, republished 1990) acknowledged (but did not celebrate) the 
centrality of commercial production and sought to harness it in the service of an anti-
elitist democratisation of the arts and a stand against the deindustrialisation of 1980s 
Britain.  In Chapter 3, I will discuss the definition of ‘cultural industry’ in the work 55
of Adorno and Horkheimer and its relationship with the policy and academic 
research that we see in play in this current chapter.  
The well-documented history of the word 'excellence' in the area of cultural policy 
and arts funding dates back to the post-war establishment of the Council for the 
Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) under the leadership of John Maynard 
Keynes, who first began to use the term to signify intent to prioritise the funding of 
established arts organisations rather than regional and amateur companies or those 
still in their infancy. The Arts Council of Great Britain's initial Charter of 1946 
contained aesthetic and ideological tensions, most obviously between the prioritising 
of artistic standards and 'excellence' - as previously espoused by CEMA under John 
Maynard Keynes -  and the commitment to improving access to the arts. The Charter 
commits itself explicitly to ‘the fine arts exclusively' (although these remain 
resolutely undefined) and to ‘raising standards of execution’, a move that Robert 
Hutchison  reads as being designed to maintain distance between the Arts Council 56
and the amateur and community activities which, during the war, would have fallen 
under the remit of ENSA  rather than CEMA:  57
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'...like CEMA under Keynes the Arts Council directed its assistance almost 
exclusively to professional organisations; indeed there was almost total 
continuity between the work of CEMA and that of the Arts Council.' (47)  
'Excellence' was also a cultural policy buzzword during the 1980s, and many of the 
difficulties McMaster attempted to circumvent in the Review were due to this term’s 
associations with Thatcherism. During a period of great financial strictures for the 
Arts Council, when state subsidy had been intended to lead to financial 
independence and leading organisations were forced by necessity to pursue business 
sponsorship, the prevalent enterprise culture led once again to an emphasis on 
professionalism and the already established. 'Excellence' at this point was used to 
describe art that catered to a class that could support it financially and deemed it of 
sufficient quality to justify that support . For McMaster, however, 'excellence' was in 58
need of a redefinition that linked it with social impacts and the impetus towards 
changes in cultural perspective. It encompassed diversity, innovation, relevance, and 
a direct effect on the consciousness of audiences and participants: 
  
If culture is excellent it can help us make sense of our place in the world, 
ask questions we would not otherwise have asked, understand the answers 
in ways we couldn’t otherwise have understood and appreciate things we 
have never before experienced. The greater its power to do these things the 
more excellent the cultural experience. The best definition of excellence I 
have heard is that excellence in culture occurs when an experience affects 
and changes an individual. (9) 
The McMaster Review was embraced enthusiastically by Alan Davey in the 
introduction to the 2008 ACE Annual Review, his first as Chief Executive of ACE : 59
Governments and organisations in civil society have a duty to ensure welfare 
and opportunity for all citizens, and in the past this has been understood in 
terms of material welfare – improving wealth creation and ensuring poverty 
is reduced. But we must also pay attention to poverty of aspiration: an 
outlook on life and an ability to get on in the world (…) What is great about 
this review is that it highlights an essential debate for the arts: arts need to be 
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of the highest quality for people to engage with them, so how do we discuss 
and judge that in an appropriate way? (5) 
The phrase 'get on in the world' is particularly telling; for Davey, the arts are a means 
of inspiring people suffering from 'poverty of aspiration’ to improve their lives 
according to a set of standards that remain unspecified.  This unwillingness to 60
elaborate on what might constitute 'getting on in the world', and indeed how much 
of the relationship between any given individual and the rest of the world might be 
attributable to his or her experience of the arts, reiterates the difficulties encountered 
elsewhere by people attempting to substantiate ACE's instrumentalist claims. It can 
also be read as placing an extra burden on the term 'excellence', implying that for art 
to be 'excellent' it need not only speak to and for marginalised audiences but also 
facilitate their relationship with the mainstream.  
McMaster’s version of ‘excellence’ is, in short, a term that constructs a consensus by 
eliminating the ‘accretions of meaning’ acquired during a long and complex history 
and through developments in impact research and policy during the New Labour 
government. As identified by Galloway & Dunlop and Hesmondhalgh, the 
accumulation of different and sometimes conflicting meanings around key terms 
such as ‘culture’ and ‘excellence’ is something that needs to be recognised as a 
problematising factor in research, policy and analysis as it speaks to anxieties 
surrounding elitism and class. For this reason, the defining and reclaiming of resistant 
terminology and the difficulties this presents is an important strand of my own 
project. In the opening chapter I have already sketched three possible definitions of 
‘autonomy’, which I will develop further in Chapter 3 with recourse to Adorno, 
Horkheimer and Marcuse, and in Chapter 4 I will address the word ‘culture’ once 
again, this time in the context of Bourdieu’s ‘cultural capital’. Eliding the conflicting 
meanings that have collected around key terms as a way of constructing consensus, 
as McMaster has done here with ‘excellence', is a move I believe to be highly 
characteristic of Third Way social democracy and is one that I will discuss further 
both here and in Chapters 4 and 5 via Janet Newman’s work on New Labour 
governance. McMaster addresses the issue of assessment and evaluation in the final 
third of the Review, which raises questions as to how ‘excellence’ is to be quantified. 
Adhering closely to the initial mission statement of moving away from the ‘top-down’ 
nature of funding policy, McMaster recommends a coupling of a new system of self-
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assessment by practitioners and artists with one of peer review (one that would 
nevertheless be managed and led by the funding bodies). His ideal system of 
evaluation would move away from managerialism and offer artists greater 
independence from the state and, while ensuring that funded organisations remained 
accountable to their funders, this evaluation system would put less pressure on 
practitioners to quantify the unquantifiable. This begs the question of why a 
reimagining of the evaluation process was deemed necessary by McMaster, and in 
answer I shall now turn to impact assessment and its critics within the academy.  
Cultural Trends and beyond: Matarasso, advocacy and bias 
The publication Cultural Trends started life in 1989 as a successor to the double 
volume Facts About The Arts (of which Volume 1 appeared in 1983 and Volume 2 in 
1986) with the aim of contributing rigorous empirical research to the understanding 
of the cultural landscape and related policy areas by collating and rationalising a 
wide range of existing data. In the introduction to the first issue, Robert Hutchison 
and Andrew Feist  rehearse the linguistic difficulties traced subsequently by 61
Galloway, Dunlop et al, the importance of which I have just outlined above:  
the retitling of the series needs some explanation […] Raymond Williams 
explained that ‘culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in 
the English language.’ Despite this recognition of the complex multiple 
meanings of 'culture' the editors take the view that Cultural Trends is a more 
apt and accurate description of the contents of the new series than Facts 
About the Arts. (1) 
Feist and Hutchison are ready to engage with the many meanings of ‘culture' and the 
unease they perceive around those meanings, especially the divisions between ‘high 
art’ (1) and popular entertainment. The importance, indeed the necessity, of both and 
the role of each in sustaining the other is defined in their introductory remarks as 
being integral to the publication; according to Feist and Hutchison, the subsidised 
and commercial arts are interdependent.  
  
One scholar and analyst whose contribution to the Cultural Trends project was, and 
remains, particularly influential is the journal’s post-1996 editor Sara Selwood, to 
 59
whose work I will return frequently throughout this chapter. Under Selwood’s 
leadership, Cultural Trends was reshaped to look beyond the collation of statistics 
and to include analysis from beyond the remit of the Policy Studies Institute, to 
which the publication (like Facts About The Arts) had been affiliated during its first 
decade. The publication relaunched in 1998, and the following year Cultural Trends 
published an article by Paul Allin, then Chief Statistician at the DCMS, addressing 
methodological flaws in existing studies that sought to measure public participation 
in the arts.  Allin was responding here to an American survey published in the same 62
issue, The 1997 Survey of Public Participation in the Arts, which attempted to 
measure the level of participation in the arts among adults in the US.  The study 63
used household surveys as opposed to audience data, which Allin agreed was the 
only viable way to conduct a national survey, but Allin still expressed concerns 
regarding sample size, the length of the reference period and the likelihood of non-
response bias given the low response rate compared to other similar surveys of 
previous years. In the following issue, John O’Hagan published a response  to 64
Michael Quine’s comprehensive statistical review  of British theatre audiences 65
during the 1998 calendar year which highlighted a weighting of data collection 
towards London venues, an absence of socioeconomic profiling of audience 
members and a lack of engagement with the possible distinction between audiences 
of commercial and subsidised theatre. While Cultural Trends was continuing to 
publish data, Selwood’s editorial mission to set rigorous analyses and criticism 
alongside this data was gaining academic traction.  
According to cultural policy scholars active in Britain during the early 2000s the 
immediate impetus for the growth in the field of impact studies during the Blair 
government was pressure from funding bodies and from government departments to 
justify the money being spent on fostering the arts and to prove its worth as a social 
and economic investment. Selwood, in her contribution to the volume Culture 
Vultures  – a book edited by Munira Mirza, whose own critiques of New Labour 66
cultural policy have influenced Boris Johnson and David Cameron - comments on 
the dangers of 'bias being built into the research effort' (47), with reference to the 
work of prominent bodies such as the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council, 
ippr, ACE and the DCMS itself whose research is described as being prompted by the 
purposes of advocacy. This motivation may sometimes be due to a political 
affiliation, but more often prompted by the imperative to secure funding. All of these, 
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she writes, have a tendency to be 'unquestioning in (their) acceptance of the arts' 
contribution to education, mental health and offender rehabilitation outcomes' (46) 
without recourse to an interrogation of the commonly-used methodologies. This 
echoes the work of Clive Gray and his identification of ‘policy attachment’, which 
describes the attachment of a policy area perceived as low priority (in this case, 
culture and the arts) to one perceived as higher priority (education or health, for 
example) in order to boost the profile and funding prospects of the former.    67
Returning to Selwood and Culture Vultures, one of her major considerations here is 
the way in which the expectations and findings in the research she criticises map 
onto New Labour policy, a reading supported by the introduction to François 
Matarasso's 1997 study Use or Ornament? The social impact of participation in the 
arts , which is the first point of reference for most subsequent research into the 68
social impact of the arts. Matarasso explicitly ties the study to the incoming 
government's manifesto: 
The election of a Government committed to tackling problems like youth 
unemployment, fear of crime and social exclusion is the right moment to 
start talking about what the arts can do for society, rather than what society 
can do for the arts. Unfettered by ideology, the new pragmatism can extend 
its principle of inclusiveness to the arts by embracing their creative 
approaches to problem-solving. (v) 
Matarasso's presentation of this kind of agenda as 'unfettered by ideology' is at odds 
with Selwood's reading of a potentially problematic and overwhelming 
instrumentalism that is not as well supported by its accompanying evidence as its 
advocates suggest.  
Selwood also touches on what she sees as the more intractable problems of 
instrumentalism and particularly its unpopularity with those arts practitioners whose 
position prioritises intrinsic rather than instrumental value (although, as we have seen 
with Barker and Bond, these positions are not necessarily entirely congruent with ‘art 
for art’s sake’). For these professionals the potential social benefits of their work may 
not be the primary motivation, and attempts to measure a return in terms of hard 
impact can be met with hostility where artists feel that the degree of impact 
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evaluation to which their work is subjected is antithetical to its original purpose 
(Selwood, 45).  Coming from a different angle, both Matarasso and subsequently 
Helen Jermyn  agree that outcomes cannot be guaranteed, and that it is dangerous 69
to regard a planned impact as inevitable – or, by extension, to regard a cultural 
project as worthless if it does not deliver in terms of pre-decided indicators.  
Matarasso, writing in the first year of the New Labour government, identified fifty 
possible social impacts of arts participation, ranging from the pragmatic to the 
abstract, and places them into six categories: personal development, social cohesion, 
community empowerment and self determination, local image and identity, 
imagination and vision, and health and well being. The two major theatre-specific 
impact studies to emerge during the period under discussion were both heavily 
influenced by Matarasso in their methodologies. Bill McDonnell and Dominic 
Shellard, in their ACE-commissioned report Social impact study of UK theatre, 
identify ten common factors of a successful participatory arts project amongst their 
case studies, but carefully stipulate that not all of them need be present for a project 
to be successful (3-4):  70
- artistic excellence 
- cultural partnerships  
- accessibility 
- participatory creative processes 
- giving a public voice to marginalised experiences 
- ethical practices (eg duty of care towards vulnerable participants) 
- evaluation  
- training (both informal development work and pathways to paid 
employment) 
partner funding (notably from non-arts agencies) 
- good governance 
McDonnell and Shellard do not attempt to define what they mean by 'artistic 
excellence', but place it deliberately outside the sphere of measurable factors such as 
how the project is funded and whether it includes an element of education or 
training.  
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Their work is heavily influenced by Helen Jermyn's 2001 study, which was the initial 
literature review for her 2004 ACE report The Art of Inclusion, and examined the 
ways in which the arts could be used to combat social exclusion . Her eventual 71
definition of 'social exclusion', which she acknowledges as central to government 
policy, was as something 'complex and multidimensional in nature' (Art of Inclusion 
24) that could be experienced as a result of poverty, disability, geography, crime or 
any other factor which resulted in individuals or groups feeling unable to fully 
participate in society. Many of the organisations with which she worked had had 
difficulty in defining or assessing social exclusion, but her eventual findings did not 
differ greatly from those of Matarasso or from the projections previously advanced by 
ACE . The arts could benefit individuals by raising their confidence and teaching 72
them new skills and ideas, and could benefit society by creating more cohesive 
communities, promoting cross-cultural understanding and creating pathways to 
employment.  
As leading cultural policy scholar Eleonora Belfiore pointed out in her own 
contribution to Culture Vultures , many of Matarasso's impacts were difficult to 73
evaluate, if not 'positively vague’ (25), such as the claim that the arts can 'give 
people influence over how they are seen by others’ and 'have a positive impact on 
how people feel' (xi). These concerns were shared by Paola Merli in her critique of 
Matarasso’s survey, published in 2002 in International Journal of Cultural Policy.  74
Merli also states that Matarasso’s desire to produce research that would be relevant 
to (and have a direct impact on) policy-making had an adverse effect on the 
methodological rigour of his project and that, far from being ‘unfettered by ideology’, 
the survey was in fact flawed by several instances of ideological bias. Merli first 
attacks the survey’s internal validity, demonstrating that the data collected by 
Matarasso does not in fact support his conclusions. The wording of the survey’s 
questions, Merli argues, not only predisposes the respondent to answer positively but 
also casts doubt on whether Matarasso has in fact measured what he set out to 
measure or something else entirely: 
The wording of questions in Matarasso’s questionnaire may actually have led 
respondents to biased answers. For example, the question “Was being able 
to express your ideas important to you?” (Matarasso, 1997, p. 101) implicitly 
assumes that everybody had a chance and was able to express his or her 
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ideas. In addition, from the respondent’s point of view, answering “no” to 
this  question means either not having been able to express one’s ideas (this 
is bad in terms of personal development, thus some respondents may answer 
“yes” only in order not to look or feel undeveloped) or not appreciating the 
fact of having been able to express one’s ideas (this is socially undesirable, 
thus some participants may answer “yes” even if it is not necessarily what 
they think) […] Under these circumstances, it is by no means certain that 
Matarasso is really  measuring what he claims to measure. There is a distinct 
possibility that he is measuring something else, such as the social desirability 
of the abstract concepts of “happiness”, “empowerment” and “confidence” 
used in the questionnaire. (109) 
Another instance of built-in bias identified by Merli is the impossibility of the survey 
recording negative impact: 
For example: “Since being involved have you felt better or healthier?” (even 
by answering “no” the respondent cannot at any rate mean that he is feeling 
worse, but only that he has not experienced any change); and also: “Since 
being involved have you been happier?” (even by answering “no” the  
respondent cannot in any case mean that he is more unhappy or miserable, 
but, at most, that he is just as happy as before attendance). The consequence 
is that the author of the research can rule out possible negative impacts. 
(109) 
While Matarasso attempts to mitigate these inconsistencies by claiming the 
impossibility of assessing subjective or affective change according to predefined 
indicators, Merli points out that this should have directed him away from the use of a 
methodological tool that he has already dismissed as ineffective when addressing the 
arts. Moreover, she continues, the survey lacks external as well as internal validity 
due to the low response rate (25%) and the lack of justification given for the 
participatory projects selected for the survey; there is no evidence that these projects 
provide a representative sample of participatory projects either nationally or within 
specific geographical or socio-economic parameters.   
The difficulty in confirming or evaluating the success of arts projects in delivering on 
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Matarasso's criteria is not simply their abstract and subjective nature, but also the 
length of time these impacts might take to make themselves felt:  
The five-stage proposed evaluation model could never capture long-term 
transformation. The five steps of the suggested evaluation method are: 
planning/setting indicators, execution, assessment, and reporting. The report 
advises us that the assessment stage should take place 'on completion of the 
project', whereas the different stakeholders should all compile reports on the 
results of the projects 'shortly after completion' of the project. (Belfiore 
2006, 26) 
  
Clearly, this would not make the assessment of long-term impact feasible. This 
criticism is echoed, in a wider context, by Sara Selwood (2006, 49-50), who 
questions whether the short-term audience research carried out by arts organisations 
and agencies is meaningful. The type of research to which Selwood refers is carried 
out in sync with funding cycles and is often geared to providing evidence of the 
existence of 'new audiences' experiencing the transformative power of the arts; 
whether the lives and communities of these new audience members are indeed 
transformed in the long term cannot be established by immediate measurement of 
audience figures and feedback.   
Belfiore also states that another problem with Matarasso's report is the difficulty of 
establishing a direct causal link between a project and any positive changes that 
might be observed in individuals or a community as a result of participation in the 
arts. For example, one of the projects that particularly interests Matarasso, the V&A 
Mughal Tent Project, involved some women who suffered from clinical depression 
and were attending a psychiatric day centre, and he draws attention to a 
coordinators report which notes that the effect of the project on one woman in 
particular was strikingly positive:   75
‘She has come back to her own life,’ reported the co-ordinator. ‘She has 
started taking an interest in lots of things. Before she used to wear dark 
colours all the time. Now she comes in bright colours in her saris and puts 
jewellery on.’ (65) 
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While a change in dressing habits can be one indicator of an upturn in the mental 
health of a psychiatric patient, the statement would hold more validity within the 
survey if supported by other evidence of an improvement in her condition (for 
example, a statement from a medical professional who had continuing involvement 
in her care confirming the observations of the project coordinator). It is, in any case, 
impossible to prove that the improvement was a direct result of participation in the 
Mughal Tent Project. There is no reference to any other treatment the participant was 
receiving, or to other events in her life that may have had a positive impact on her 
health. In Belfiore's words: 
Noting that a change has occurred against a predefined indicator after 
participation in a cultural activity is not enough to argue that the 
transformation was caused by the arts activity itself. For the arts impact 
argument to hold, it is crucial to establish a causal relation between the 
transformation observed and the cultural project or activity being evaluated. 
(30) 
This, and the lack of financial content in the study, is at odds with Matarasso's 
assertion that: 
...participatory arts projects are effective and cost very little in the context of 
spending on social goals. They represent an insignificant financial risk to 
public services, but can produce impacts (social and economic) out of 
proportion to their cost. (76)  
As no long-term impacts were recorded, and Matarasso gives no indication of the 
implementation (and evaluation) costs involved, Belfiore's argument is that this claim 
– and others like it – cannot be substantiated and, therefore, cannot stand alone as 
evidence.  76
Returning to McDonnell and Shellard, it is straightforward to see how some of their 
key indicators of success, particularly training and cultural partnerships, could lead 
to the 'hard impacts' that they highlight elsewhere. 'Hard impact' is a term sourced 
from Jermyn's study, alongside 'personal impact', 'civic impact' and 'group impact', 
and refers to situations in which a cultural project gives a participant the impetus to 
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apply the lessons they have learned in other contexts that benefit the community, the 
economy or themselves. The problem, once again, is that of establishing a causal link 
between an individual's participation and their subsequent actions, and the 
McDonnell/Shellard study does not make such links clear. It is also frequently 
unclear in the study whether these impacts were effected or just planned. One 
project, the multi-media Yellow Brick Road in which Year 10 students were 
encouraged to explore the nature, value and relevance of the creative process 
through a series of encounters with artists, had 'improved attendance at school' listed 
as a potential 'hard impact', but it is never established whether or not this happened 
(18).  This emphasises the problem of short-term evaluations; school attendance is 77
typical of the kind of social impact that will be of tremendous and lasting benefit to 
both the participants and their community but which can only be tracked over a 
substantial period of time.   
The lack of a methodology that delivers internally and externally valid conclusions 
on impact despite the impossibility of establishing direct, measurable causal links 
between experience of the arts and social change becomes a thorn in the side of 
Belfiore,  Selwood and Merli; the simultaneous demand for and lack of reliable 78
quantitative and qualitative data acquired through sound methodologies complicates 
the case for an instrumentalist approach to arts funding, despite the seemingly 
obvious fact that people continue to experience and be affected by external factors 
while participating in arts projects. Selwood describes this as 'an intractable 
problem' (48); just as art itself is not amenable to measurement and statistics, its 
social role is slippery, difficult to determine and not easily substantiated by data the 
gathering of which has been affected by frequently unacknowledged cognitive or 
ideological bias. 
While these early critiques of arts impact evaluation methodology have been 
developed alongside newer ways of thinking about cultural value (and I will discuss 
these in Chapter 6), they remain interesting for two reasons. Firstly, they offer insights 
into the genesis of new currents in cultural policy scholarship that look at the the 
potential of qualitative evidence and the nature of the relationship between 
academic research and the policy-making process. Secondly, the existence of this 
work demonstrates the growth within academic circles of distrust of New Labour’s 
political framework. Despite the frequent statements of progressive, socially-
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responsible intent in cultural policy literature, academics were focusing increasingly 
on the realities and problems of New Labour’s managerialist policy-making and the 
need for a higher level of ideological scepticism to enable continued criticism of 
unsatisfactory advocacy-driven research that lacked either internal or external 
validity. Commentators as diverse as utopian scholar Ruth Levitas, members of the 
Chartist movement, and former City economist Chris Dillow have all identified New 
Labour's managerialism as being post-political; an ideology that elided equality and 
efficiency.  The disquisitions of managerialism presented problems such as social 
inequality, poverty and mass unemployment as the results of poor management 
rather than political issues, glitches which should be efficiently managed away by an 
elite rather than having to be the subject of political discussion or cultural 
commentary. Rather than simply agitating for the primacy of intrinsic value, 
academic critiques of the first nine years of New Labour cultural policy established a 
resistance to the post-political aporia created by the reliance on questionable 
methodologies and advocacy-driven research in establishing the social role of art, 
and an opposition to art’s use as a tool for managing social problems that have their 
roots in the political rather than in administrative weakness.  
Centre-Right perspectives 
In February 2010 Jonathan Holmes published a defence of state funding for the arts 
in The Guardian arts blog in which he outlined several major arguments for 
continuing subsidy; subsidy as financial investment, art as a catalyst for urban 
regeneration and as a way of enhancing Britain's international reputation, the 
importance of creativity in a mature democracy and the capacity of the arts for 
exploring personal and political identity.  While the article itself is an intelligent and 79
interesting piece of journalism, some of the below-the-line comments it provoked are 
equally instructive. For example:  
State subsidised art is state art. It's not necessarily bad, but it is necessarily 
controlled and influenced by the state. The fact that the Arts Council is at 
arms length from the currently elected government is irrelevant - because 
they are all the same kind of people with the same kind of desires about how 
they want to change society, and the same unshakeable belief that they are 
right. ('afinch')   
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This response makes interesting reading because it mirrors, intentionally or not, 
much of the discourse on arts funding coming from right-wing think tanks and other 
bodies. Following on from David Sawers' report for the Institute of Economic Affairs 
in 1993, Should the Taxpayer Support the Arts?  a number of arts funding 80
commentators from the right have continued to ask whether the arts in Britain could 
or should survive without the help of the state and whether the market alone should 
set the criteria for artistic worth, while others have accepted the need for state 
subsidy but question, like 'afinch', whether the ‘arm's length’ principle on which the 
Arts Council was founded is still workable or indeed desirable.  
Marc Sidwell, another critic from the centre-right, has given a thoroughly-researched 
account of the politicisation of the Arts Council under New Labour.  His 2009 81
report was commissioned and launched by the New Culture Forum, an organisation 
that lists among its aims 'to challenge the discredited Left/liberal cultural orthodoxy 
and change the terms of debate', 'to provide a strong basis for mutual support and 
association for centre-right and other dissenting voices who work in the broad 
cultural arena of the media' and 'to promote a new flowering of excellence in the 
arts, motivated by aesthetic honesty, not box-ticking or political indoctrination' , 82
and is accordingly dismissive of the use of instrumentalist arguments as a basis for 
cultural policy. Sidwell summarises his own understanding of the purpose of art as 
follows: 
Surely the capacity of the arts to transport individuals out of their everyday 
environment, rather than any imputed relevance, is a great part of their 
power. It breaks down boundaries of class, nation and (by celebrating the 
great artistic achievements of the past) even of time itself. (34)  
Sidwell’s report comes down in favour of the dismantling of ACE as it stands. One of 
his central arguments is that the Arts Council is no longer fit for purpose, having been 
devised in an entirely different cultural climate following a model which is no longer 
relevant or workable. Keynes' faith in an class of brilliant, discerning experts who 
would safeguard the nation's artistic values comes under attack for its naivety, as 
Sidwell claims that the original vision of an independent body, not subject to 
government interference, making frugal use of limited resources with reference only 
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to the highest standards of taste was not sufficiently robust or flexible to withstand 
the political changes of the latter half of the 20th century. For Sidwell, the 
appointment of Jennie Lee and the continuing increase of attention paid to culture by 
Westminster and Whitehall over the next three decades confused rather than 
clarified the relationship between the government and the arts, as it became unclear 
what level of intervention was desired or needed. His question is not what kind of 
arts policy is appropriate, but, whether it is appropriate to have one at all.  83
Government intervention and the arm's-length principle are explored by Sidwell in 
the light of public choice theory, which he defines thus: 
Public choice theory examines political behaviour in positive or realistic 
rather than ideal terms. It finds that the individuals working in government 
agencies pursue their own private interests, and that the behaviour of these 
agencies can best be explained on this basis; and it argues that if 
government must act, institutional designs should reflect this reality. (35)  
This theory, which as Sidwell points out did not exist when the Arts Council was 
founded, is the basis of his analysis of 'the expansion (…) of arts funding and the 
extreme dysfunction of the council in recent years' (35). In the light of public choice 
theory, Keynes' original intention that the Arts Council be a temporary measure to 
prime the pump of external support for the fine arts looks unworkable, because 
departments and the individuals within them will not work towards their own 
redundancy. By extension, Sidwell uses this claim to explain the growing closeness 
between the ACE and the DNH/DCMS: 
Designed to be operated by benign technocrats in the public interest, its 
purpose and goals inevitably become distorted, despite (or even because of) 
the political skills and high intelligence of those appointed. Even individuals 
with the best intentions must serve their immediate interests first: empires 
grow; special pleading is employed; pet projects get funds; politics intrude; 
no one ever gives up power and influence. (36)  
Once government has become explicitly involved, through the creation and growth 
of a department, in arts funding, the other implicated bodies will begin to play 
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whatever games are required to sustain their own growth. 
Andrew Brighton's contribution to Culture Vultures criticises the ACE for having 
allowed the creative independence of artists to become subservient to the demands 
of New Labour's political agenda.  In this climate, he argues, both the personal and 84
the universal aspects of art are disregarded in favour of an overriding emphasis on a 
social instrumentalism that suggests that 'art had been stolen by its practitioners and 
audience' (119). Brighton's critique is far more straightforward and less cynical than 
Sidwell's; firmly rooted in the 'art for art's sake' camp, he expresses nostalgia for the 
ideological independence the Arts Council had prior to the appointment of Jennie 
Lee and the commitment to aesthetic ideals that he sees the organisation as having 
upheld in its early years. He is particularly hostile to New Labour managerialism, 
and the way in which it is used to uphold an anti-elitist discourse that he sees as 
deeply disingenuous: 
A sea change will have begun only when the DCMS’s funding agreement 
with the Treasury has ceased to require increased arts attendance by ‘priority 
groups’, that is, C2DE and black and other ethnic minorities and the 
disabled. These are people defined directly by lack of education, social 
classes C2DE, or are people ‘underrepresented’ amongst the educated. The 
present funding agreement runs from 2005 until 2008. (...) Without 
endangering the current level of DCMS funding, Tessa Jowell cannot escape 
requiring of the arts institutions that attendance by these groups increase. 
(120) 
Brighton does not regard these priorities as belonging solely to the Left, but rather 
inscribes them (albeit implicitly) into post-Thatcherism, claiming that they are 'a tool 
for embourgeoisment, a means for abolishing the underclass' (124). At other points 
in the essay, he defends the Conservative cultural policies of the 1980s, claiming that 
enterprise culture caused the arts to flourish and offered them, most importantly, 
'more autonomy' (119), although it is unclear whether the autonomy he prizes is 
economic, aesthetic or social in character (this discussion will unfold in the next 
chapter). Both Brighton and Sidwell unwittingly demonstrate the possibility of 
approaching McMaster’s consensus from either Left or Right; as Brighton’s argument 
attacks a perceived elitist paternalism in New Labour cultural policy that smacks of 
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social engineering  Sidwell gestures towards the Leftist credentials of this position 85
by quoting Roy Shaw's The Arts and The People, stating that his argument is not the 
sole property of the centre-right and can claim credibility elsewhere on the political 
spectrum. As I have already mentioned in this chapter, with reference to McMaster’s 
use of a redefinition of the contested term ‘excellence’ to construct a rhetoric of 
consensus around the purpose of art, the problematics of an erosion of Left and Right 
have been rehearsed by theorists of radical democracy (most famously Mouffe & 
Laclau) and will be developed further by me in Chapter 4. 
Having devoted considerable space here to some of the research which supported 
theatre subsidy under the Blair government and to the ways in which it was 
interrogated and critiqued by academics, it is important before I move on to some 
theoretical perspectives on the above to reconsider the meaning of this body of work 
for political theatre and for the propositions laid out by Barker and Bond (Chapter 1). 
As I have already stated in Chapter 1, the process of attempting to demonstrate the 
social impact of theatre in order to attract state funding is part of a move towards 
reconciliation between stage and state that is far from unproblematic. As Bond 
would have it, the possibility of ‘radical innocence’ in performance is vulnerable to 
erosion in a climate that demands the appeasement of policy-makers and 
governmental departments by those attempting to make their political interventions 
or provocations through the medium of theatre. In Chapter 5 I will continue to 
address the difficulties of locating political resistance within a subsidised theatre that 
has to share discourse and doxa with the state in order to survive, but that discussion 
will focus on the plays themselves i.e. what takes place within the performance 
space. The research I have discussed here, and the opposition to it, is focused 
entirely on what happens outside the space of performance, to how the effect (and 
affect) of the theatrical experience is interpreted and described by participants and 
spectators. This is where Barker’s voice resonates again; if the primary relationship in 
the theatrical encounter (as set up by Matarasso, Jermyn and McDonnell & Shellard) 
is between the spectator and their community or demos, where does that leave the 
figure of the dramatist? For Barker, the spectator’s position in political theatre is that 
of a witness, and a potentially hostile and unreliable one at that, rather than a 
mediator who carries the cultural and emotional benefits of a trip to the theatre out 
into the world with an increased readiness to participate in and enhance their 
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community.  
My contention is that the academics who have taken impact research to task for its 
lack of rigour and validity provide an important site of resistance, as they disrupt the 
reconciliation between theatre and policy by questioning the grounds on which this 
reconciliation is constructed. According to their criticisms, if we are to accept that 
subsidised theatre operates as a public good, that it enhances education, health, 
well-being and social inclusion, then evidence must be stronger, data sets must be 
broader and/or more carefully considered, and conclusions must hold internal and 
external validity. The relationship between cultural policy and those who research 
and criticise it is a difficult one, as I will discuss in Chapter 6, but I would argue that 
the role of cultural policy scholars in resisting the prevailing doxa of the arts as a 
means to an ideological end has been and remains an important one for political 
theatre. I have stated in my opening chapter that this thesis seeks to locate ways of 
re-opening the discursive closure created by Third Way discourse, and I include the 
sociological criticisms of cultural policy scholars in that project. Even while their 
research discipline is predicated on a relationship between stage and state, the 
debates they have encouraged surrounding the validity of existing impact research 
and therefore its utility both the policy-making and theatre contributes to a disruption 
of that relationship. 
In the next chapter I will return to some of the perspectives presented here and their 
implications for how community, political participation and most importantly 
autonomy function in New Labour cultural policy. I will also, following the work of 
Ruth Levitas, look at the utopian strands that are present in the writings of both the 
policy-makers and their critics on Left and Right. Discussions and definitions of 
artistic autonomy, of the relevance of art to developing consciousness and pre-
figuring social change, and of the inarticulable elements in art's cultural worth are all 
echoed in the writings of Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Bloch and Jameson, and the 
intention in this next chapter is to use utopian thought to introduce the positions of 
these different perspectives on utopia, negativity and autonomy within the aesthetics 
debate and the relationship of those elements to contemporary cultural policy. This 
will pave the way for the intervention of Jill Dolan’s thoughts on the utopian 
performative that will dominate the latter half of the fifth chapter.   
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Chapter 3  
Community, autonomy, utopia: theoretical perspectives 
In the previous chapter I discussed the difficulties experienced by researchers in 
devising ways of assessing the positive social impact of the arts that were able to take 
account of qualitative, subjective experience while maintaining a sufficient level of 
empirical rigour. At this point, it is vital to devote some space to the nuances of what 
these researchers sought to assess - what theatre can do for society in terms of social 
inclusion and well-being, and how well it currently does it - and how the dissenting 
claims of Barker and Bond are relevant here. For this I will make a theoretical move 
towards the thinkers I have already mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter 1 - 
Adorno, Marcuse and Bloch - in order to address two central concepts in particular: 
‘community’ and ‘autonomy’.  
Following on from my discussion of Howard Barker and specifically of Karoline 
Gritzner’s use of Adorno in her reading, I will revisit the three possible types of 
autonomy I mention there and flesh out their definitions and how they map on to the 
autonomies laid out by Adorno. The word ‘autonomy’ has the potential to function in 
several different capacities - as part of the rhetoric of ‘art for art’s sake’, as a 
descriptor for art that is created independently of state ideology, as a euphemistic 
synonym for private funding etc, and the autonomy of Adorno is itself far from 
uncomplicated. 
Firstly, however, as many of the arguments present in cultural policy and advocacy-
based research contain (as I will explain below) appeals to the idea of community, I 
shall engage with the much-criticised communitarianism of Blair. In Chapter 4 I will 
go on to look more closely at the problematics of the social inclusion agenda; if the 
creation of cohesive communities to combat social exclusion are to be accepted as a 
goal of subsidised theatre, however, it is important first to consider how a cohesive 
community might be constituted in Blair’s Britain. I have already, in my opening 
chapter, introduced the work done by Jill Dolan in excavating the relations between 
theatrical performance, political participation and communitas, and these are strands 
of thought I will pick up once again in Chapter 5. In preparation for this, and for 
Dolan’s thoughts on the utopian potential of theatrical performance, I shall develop 
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my discussion of community and its position in cultural policy to make space for the 
emergence of utopian strands of thinking. I will examine the different types and 
definitions of the communitarian that were in play during the Blair and Brown 
governments with a view to asking, in Chapter 5, how theatre and its political 
potential might work within, outside or against them. 
New Labour communities - Blair and communitarian thought 
The idea of community is central to the purposes attributed to the subsidised arts in 
social impact studies influenced by Matarasso. As well as Alan Davey's nebulous 
idea of 'getting on in the world', which implies the overcoming of social exclusion in 
order to leave the margins behind and participate in what the mainstream has to 
offer, three out of Matarasso's six categories of social impact refer directly or 
indirectly to community (social cohesion, community empowerment, and local 
image and identity) and this is mirrored by McDonnell, Shellard and Jermyn. To lay 
the ground for later discussions of the pitfalls of Third Way social democracy and 
how they have made themselves felt in the field of theatrical performance, I begin 
here with the much-criticised ‘community’ of Blair.   
In 1997, Stephen Driver and Luke Martell attempted to map the communitarianism 
promised by Blair onto their own typology of communitarianisms.  The result was 86
surprising in view of the influence New Labour claimed to have drawn from 
communitarian thought. Driver and Martell’s typology is determined by three levels 
they identify in the communitarian: 
[...] there is a sociological strand in communitarianism which is descriptive 
and explanatory and about how humans become what they are-in a social 
context and not atomistically. Then there is an ethical communitarianism 
which is normative and says that community is a good thing. And finally 
there is a meta-ethical communitarianism which is about the philosophical 
bases for ethics and tends to say that it is not possible to find universal 
foundations for ethics and morals: these have to be relative to the 
communities in which they arise. (29)
From this, they work through six possible dimensions of communitarianism and 
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examine how those dimensions are reflected in Blair’s propositions: (i) conformist-
pluralist; (ii) less conditional- more conditional; (iii) progressive-conservative; (iv) 
prescriptive-voluntary; (v) moral-socioeconomic; and (vi) individual-corporate. Each 
of these dimensions is presented as a continuum rather than a binary. Driver and 
Martell find that Blair’s communitarianism encounters particular difficulty on the 
‘meta-ethical’ level, using as it does the rhetoric of universal morality and ‘strong 
values’. The implication is that a moral agenda exists which transcends the 
community to and for which it claims to speak. When examining their proposed six 
dimensions, Driver and Martell conclude that  
Labour increasingly advocates conditional, morally prescriptive, 
conservative and individual communitarianisms at the expense of less 
conditional and redistributional, socioeconomic, progressive and corporate 
communitarianisms. It is torn between conformist and pluralist 
communitarianisms and this shows in its policies (43) 
With recourse to their typology, Driver and Martell are still able to read Blair’s 
politics as communitarian, albeit communitarianism of a conservative, conditional 
and individualist nature.  
Sarah Hale responds to the dialogues and dissonances of Blair’s frequent appeals to 
‘community’ with an illuminating discussion of the fractures between New Labour 
and 20th century British and American communitarian thought, concluding that to 
refer to the ‘communitarianism’ of Blair and even to regard communitarianism as 
New Labour’s defining philosophy is a mistake.  Like Driver & Martell, she 87
acknowledges Blair’s debt to the political communitarianism of Amitai Etzioni 
without positing ‘a crude relationship of influence’ (Hale, 93), observing instead that 
despite a common assumption that Blair’s communitarianism derives largely from 
Etzioni’s writings, his claims to communitarianism rest more on co-opting of Etzioni’s 
terminology than a deep understanding and adoption of his political position. In her 
review of academic accounts of community and New Labour, however, Hale puts 
forward the view that even to claim Blair’s rhetoric alone as communitarian is not 
sustainable. It shares a number of terms with the work of thinkers like Etzioni who 
are heavily influenced by communitarian philosophy, but those terms are articulated 
very differently. One example Hale chooses, to which I will return in Chapter 3 
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when looking at Janet Newman’s work on Third Way governance, is the coupling of 
‘rights and responsibilities’. She outlines the New Labour position as follows: 
When New Labour talk about rights and responsibilities, although this is 
often couched in the language of community and/or civil society, the rights 
they refer to are usually welfare rights i.e. money, goods or services provided 
via the state, and the duties or responsibilities (the terms tend in this context 
to be used interchangeably) are those of individuals, frequently and most 
specifically individual beneficiaries of state action. (115)  
Rights, here, are neither considered to be absolute nor to be claimed by an 
individual or a group but are in the gift of the state, and awarded at the state’s 
discretion to those who are considered to have behaved responsibly according to 
that state’s particular set of ideological positions. ‘Communities’ created along these 
lines, for Hale, are not communitarian as they are top-down power structures that 
have at their heart ideologically coersive elements. Etzioni’s communitarianism, 
though explicitly Third Way, constructs responsibility in a more broadly reciprocal 
way which clashes with the realities of New Labour policy. Etzioni, quoted 
extensively by Hale, is more ready to accept some rights as absolute. These are 
primarily those associated with physical survival, although he also brings rights 
deriving from the social into play such as ‘a fair trial (and) free speech’ (quoted Hale, 
116). In Etzioni’s ‘good society’ it is the responsibility of the state to ensure access to 
those for rights for all citizens, not the responsibility of the individual citizens to earn 
them.  
Ruth Levitas, in her 2001 article ‘Community, Utopia and New Labour’  reads the 88
role of community and social inclusion in New Labour rhetoric  as an idiosyncratic 89
one, as it plays on ideas from both Old Labour and the New Right, attempting to 
create a consensus (much as I have argued in the previous chapter regarding 
McMaster and his use of the term ‘excellence’) while avoiding explicit dialogue 
between apparently antithetical constitutive elements. Rather than locating Blair’s 
communitarianism within a typology like Driver & Martell’s, which allows for 
intersections between different dimensions of the communitarian and seeks to 
pinpoint the position of policies on a sliding scale from conservative to progressive, 
prescriptive to voluntary etc., she depicts it as something deliberately nebulous, 
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created to identify and inhabit the spaces between Old Labour and conservatism. As 
she puts it: 
Blair sought to distance himself both from Thatcherism and Thatcher’s claim 
that there was no such thing as society, and from ‘old Labour’ (everything 
from social democracy leftwards including state intervention, public 
ownership, equality and redistribution). ‘Community’ is used as a deliberate 
alternative to ‘society’, in order to signal difference both from the neoliberal 
New Right and from forms of socialism dependent on intervention by the 
state. (‘Community’ 191) 
Community, ideology, utopia - Bloch and Jameson 
For Levitas, New Labour’s community is simultaneously ideological and utopian 
(188); the former in that it signifies a Third Way rejection of both the unrestrained 
free market of neoliberalism and the overbearing, interventionist state associated 
with Old Labour, and the latter in that it takes on the role of the 'something missing' 
of Bloch's utopian writings to which I will return during this chapter. While the 
notion of community in utopian socialism has historically been opposed to orthodox 
Marxism, in that utopian communities attempted to separate themselves from 
prevailing economic conditions and the class struggle (Levitas singles out Owen, 
Fourier and Saint-Simon in particular), they retain - for Levitas and other theorists of 
the utopian - a powerful presence because of the possibility they offer of an 
alternative to the alienated labour and distorted interpersonal relations of capitalism. 
She continues: 
Herein lies the essential ambiguity of appeals to community. They are 
perhaps always utopian in the sense of expressing what is missing. They are 
sometimes oppositional, laying claim to the need for a radically altered 
political economy and society. They are sometimes alternative, or defensive. 
When the economic dimension is missing, ignored or denied, the demand 
for community tends to become ideological in the strict sense of the word. 
That is, it masks the real economic relationships and conflicts that exist – or 
itself becomes the subject of conflict. (‘Community’ 190) 
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The community of New Labour, in Levitas' view, holds the rhetorical function of 
abstract collective in a discourse organised around 'community, opportunity, 
responsibility, employability, and inclusion' (191), and is used to designate 
geographic, ethnic, cultural or vocational commonality. She ties Blair’s 
communitarianism more closely to Etzioni than Hale does, and maps some of her 
criticisms of Etzioni (who ‘ignores economic inequalities’ (192) ) onto her problems 
with New Labour.  
  
Levitas' reading, more explicitly than Driver and Martell’s or Hale’s, maps on to the 
'community' of McDonnell and Shellard, and certainly that of Brian McMaster and 
Alan Davey, for whom 'excellent' art should provide the impetus to 'get on in the 
world' by rejecting the economic and social margins as lacking in aspirational riches. 
This can be seen as an example of 'a demand for community [that] masks the real 
economic relationships and conflicts that exist', in the sense that arts projects that 
attempt to foster community are, in fact, exacerbating false consciousness by making 
the culturally and economically marginalised feel or appear (at least for the duration 
of the project) less so. Following Levitas' line of argument, there is potential for 
regarding these projects as ideologically driven rather than utopian, as class divisions 
are papered over and the late capitalist status quo is reaffirmed rather than subverted.  
In referring to ‘what is missing’, Levitas borrows a turn of phrase used by Bloch in 
The Principle of Hope (1986) , and although she does not provide a detailed 90
reading here it is undoubtedly the presence of Bloch that enables her to locate a 
utopian dimension even in the ideological communitarianism of New Labour. By 
introducing this text Levitas demonstrates a reluctance to treat the ideological and 
the utopian as a binary, and this builds on her earlier work on Bloch in which she 
discusses the position of the ideological in the rehabilitation of utopian thinking. In 
her 1990 essay ‘Educated Hope: Ernst Bloch on Abstract and Concrete Utopia’ , 91
Levitas presents Bloch’s utopia as constituted by a range of dialectical relationships; 
the abstract and the concrete, memory and futurity, compensation and 
transformation. Bloch’s project in The Principle of Hope was not simply the 
reclaiming of utopia but its rehabilitation as a category of Marxian thinking, which is 
why he devotes such methodical thought to the construction of the utopian 
imaginary; if utopia is going to become useful to the Marxist project then it needs to 
 81
be brought in to service with great care. Not all types of utopian imagining are as 
efficacious as others. Where purely abstract utopian imagining is presented by Bloch 
as an immature form of imagining, purely fantastical and concerned only with a 
transformation in the well-being of the individual subject (1. 33), it requires a 
dialectical relationship with a more concrete form - the presence of anticipation of 
an alternative futurity and the will, as well as the wish, to effect it (1.145) - in order 
to move beyond pointless wishful thinking. It is only through this relation that 
abstract utopian imagining, the desire for some change in one’s own circumstances 
without the will to change the world such that the fulfilment of this desire may be 
practicable, can become useful to the Marxian project. In order to locate the utility 
of the utopian imagination, the concrete elements of hope must be found within 
their abstract context of wish and desire. This is particularly applicable when looking 
at what Marx might have considered to be merely ideological artefacts, as Bloch (as 
is corroborated by Levitas’ reading) is cautious of dismissing as pure ideology that 
which contains any element of futurity and unmet need. This is a caution I intend to 
exercise when looking at impact research and policy. For Bloch, the critique of 
ideology should also be an act of excavation of any elements of hope, of anticipation 
of a better world, of anything genuinely politically progressive (as distinct from 
elements which seek to convince us erroneously that the change we seek is already 
in progress (1.148)) from which a concrete element of potentially transformative 
utopian imagining might be extracted (1. 148-9). Even where it might be tempting to 
regard the published output of ACE, the DCMS and advocacy-based researchers as 
largely ideological, I intend to follow Bloch in engaging with these documents in 
search of any utopian residue that might remain once the manipulations, 
mystifications and dominations of ideology has been stripped away.  
On this note, I shall make a brief return to the participatory cultural practices that 
most impress McDonnell and Shellard, Matarasso, and particularly Jermyn (see 
Chapter 2). These often have a rehabilitative element which aims to help participants 
get into, or return to, work. Matarasso in particular writes movingly (50) about a 
small-scale regeneration project in Helsinki in which artist Ritva Harle worked with 
hard drinkers from a local pub to create public art; several of the men involved in the 
project used their new-found confidence and building skills to subsequently find 
paid work. The creation of 'community' and raised employment levels that includes 
these people may at first glance be read as a utopian aim that works against late 
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capitalism as it is described by Fredric Jameson:  'a society unable to accommodate 92
the productiveness of all its citizens' (38). Full employment, Jameson argues, is 
incompatible with late capitalism: 
As the economic apologists for the system today have tirelessly instructed us, 
capitalism cannot flourish under full employment; it requires a reserve army 
of the unemployed in order to function and to avoid inflation. That first 
monkey-wrench of full employment would then be compounded by the 
universality of the requirement, inasmuch as capitalism also requires a 
frontier, and perpetual expansion, in order to sustain its inner dynamic. But 
at this point the utopianism of the demand becomes circular, for it is also 
clear, not only that the establishment of full employment would transform 
the system, but also that the system would have to be already transformed, in 
advance, in order for full employment to be established.(38)  
For full employment to be reached in a society, and for the potential of all citizens 
within it to be realised (presumably, as Jameson invokes a utopian discourse, in the 
form of unalienated labour), radical changes to the existing system would already 
need to have taken place. Artistic projects defined as 'excellent' in the McMaster 
sense because of their contributions to 'community' in the form of employment 
opportunities for the previously marginalised could be seen as having a utopian 
dimension in that they help to create the conditions under which people can 
imagine such a society, and imagine themselves being productive within it (that said, 
Levitas, Driver & Martell would undoubtedly counter with the argument that New 
Labour communitarianism, like the Big Society, was dependent on a high level of 
voluntarism (Levitas 193-4) which does not necessarily always lead to higher 
employment figures).  
That notwithstanding, the perspective of practitioners and participants - as 
documented by Matarasso et al – who have found that their experiences of state-
funded projects has raised their level of civic engagement (despite the well-founded 
scholarly reservations of Paola Merli) is sufficient to suggest that there may be a 
utopian impulse, even where it may be buried in abstract utopian imaginings that are 
contextualised within Third Way ideology, in the vehemence with which subsidy is 
advocated.  
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Negative utopias - Marcuse and Adorno 
The choreographer Siobhan Davies is quoted in 'Achieving great art for everyone' as 
saying:  93
We all have the perception to play and work with our active imaginations. 
Artists help us to connect with ideas of making and destroying so that we 
may feel more confident about renewal rather than frightened of change. 
(27) 
For Siobhan Davies the subversive potential of art resides not in its power to directly 
alter the prevailing reality but in its ability to lead spectators (in a move that Howard 
Barker would consider problematically paternalistic) towards the possibility of 
breaking with it. Participants and audiences are encouraged, on a personal and 
subjective level, to engage with ideas of a destruction of the 'established reality 
principle' and to move beyond that. This is a distillation of what, for Marcuse in The 
Aesthetic Dimension (1978), constitutes the utopian purpose of art; while art's 
relationship with political praxis remains indirect (at times frustratingly so), it can 
have a radical effect on the relationship between individuals and and the alienating 
system within which they live.  This happens even, or especially, when that art 94
reflects that society's lack of freedom: 
The autonomy of art reflects the unfreedom of individuals in the 
unfree society [...] Art remains marked by unfreedom; in contradicting 
it, art achieves its autonomy. (72) 
As Davies implies, art does not in itself effect the destruction of prevailing 
conditions, but it does simultaneously express the lack of freedom in the society that 
makes it and create within itself a space in which feeling 'confident about renewal' 
becomes possible. This is a space to which I will return in Chapter 5, using Jill 
Dolan’s work in locating the utopian with specific reference to theatrical 
performance.  
  
 This assertion, along with Levitas’ invocation of Bloch, invites a closer examination 
 84
of the relationship between financial and aesthetic autonomy (which I will undertake 
in the next section) and calls to mind the dialectical relationship between aesthetic 
and material that forms the central question of much of Adorno’s writing.  
 As Adorno argues in Aesthetic Theory : 95
With the continuing organization of all cultural spheres the desire grows to 
assign art its place in society theoretically and indeed practically [...] Once 
art has been recognized as a social fact, the sociological definition of its 
context considers itself superior to it and disposes over it. Often the 
assumption is that the objectivity of value-free positivistic knowledge is 
superior to supposedly subjective aesthetic standpoints. Such endeavors 
themselves call for social criticism. They tacitly seek the primacy of 
administration, of the administered world even over what refuses to be 
grasped by total socialization or at any rate struggles against it (250) 
Adorno reacts strongly against the application of sociological methodology to the 
justification of art, arguing that it contributes to the inscription of art into systems of 
commodification and exchange-value. Matarasso's assertion that participatory arts 
projects provide an excellent return on financial investment in the form of social 
capital (13) would be as problematic for Adorno as it clearly is for Selwood, but for 
entirely different reasons. While the impact research discussed in Chapter 2 may be 
too sociological to be brought into an Adornian reading of the relationship between 
art and the social, it has been insufficiently sociological, too lacking in rigour, to 
satisfy Selwood and her fellow cultural analysts. The question of what art can achieve 
socially, of its worth in terms of social capital, is antithetical to what Adorno regards 
as its utopian dimension; that 'art stands as plenipotentiary for the in-itself that does 
not yet exist' (252). Adorno’s utopia, following the principle of negative dialectics, is 
entirely negatively constituted. The concrete utopian imaginings of Bloch have no 
place in Adorno’s formulations, where the utopian moment is precisely the moment 
of dissatisfaction and disaffection, of feeling that the world could and should be 
other than it is. Adorno’s utopian moment in art is affective, rather than planned or 
willed. That said, as ‘utopia’ for Adorno is a product of determinate negation, it 
follows that it stands in dialectical relation to the ‘administered world’ and thus the 
‘culture industry’. The utopian can only be located and unlocked through an 
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understanding of what is politically deleterious or unsatisfactory about these two 
constructions.  
I shall take a moment here to clarify what is meant by the ‘culture industry’ in this 
context; having visited the slippage and contestation of terms within cultural policy 
in Chapter 2 via Galloway and Dunlop it is clear from those debates that such 
matters cannot be left to the imagination. Within the remit of this chapter and its 
theoretical perspectives, the definition is that set out in relatively straightforward 
terms by Adorno in his essay ‘Culture Industry Reconsidered’ (1991, 98-106) where 
he revisits his and Horkheimer’s coining of the term in Dialectic of Enlightenment:  96
In our drafts we spoke of ‘mass culture’. We replaced that expression 
with ‘culture industry’ in order to exclude from the outset the 
interpretation agreeable to its advocates: that it is a matter of 
something like a culture that arises spontaneously from the masses 
themselves, the contemporary form of popular art. (98) 
The ‘culture industry’ in Adorno and Horkheimer is not, and never was, an elitist 
term intended to denigrate ‘popular art’; it is in fact the opposite of ‘popular art’. The 
‘culture industry’, Adorno goes on to explain (99-101), culture is a product made for, 
not by, the people, and its function is administrative in that it ‘intentionally integrates 
its consumers from above’ (98) through the use of industrial forms of organisation 
(even where nothing is produced) (101) and ideological domination. This conversion 
of individual subjects into an integrated, pacified whole is an impediment, according 
to Adorno and Horkheimer, to both emancipation and to aesthetic autonomy, which 
I will discuss in the next section of this chapter. 
Coming back to negatively determined utopian moments, a teleological approach to 
its creation or measurement damages the role of the artwork as expression of the 
'something missing'; as with Marcuse, art's relationship with social change has to be 
indirect because the authentic artwork (a term used by both thinkers) contains both 
indicators of the ideology surrounding its production and an undesignated space of 
what Jameson calls the 'free play' of the utopian imagination (44). The unique 
position of art in the utopian thought of Adorno and Marcuse comes from the fact 
that both art and utopia are inherently negative in that they identify and express a 
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lack: 
at the center of contemporary antinomies is that art must be and wants to be 
utopia, and the more utopia is blocked by the real functional order, the more 
this is true; yet at the same time art may not be utopia in order not to betray 
it by providing semblance and consolation. (32) 
Paolo A. Bolaños elucidates this well : 97
Art creates a dimension of imagined freedom. Such freedom is sensitive to 
the negative position of critique toward both nature and non-nature. The 
dimension of utopia that art creates is not a positive one, in fact, it is a 
moment when a “lack” is realized. In this sense, art is negative; as a critique 
of a society damaged by reification, art amounts to the exposure of the 
“untruthfulness” of the whole. (30) 
The factors that create the difficulties in evaluating the impact of art that so frustrate 
Selwood are exactly those that for Adorno give it its utopian potential. The value and 
impact of art, just like the precise workings of the utopian society, cannot be 
articulated in terms that are friendly to empirical research or managerialist policy-
making that demands a concrete confirmation of return on government investment. 
Locating autonomy 
As I have laid out from Chapter 1 onwards, the concept of autonomy is a complex 
and slippery one that requires some unpacking. In the service of this, I shall review 
the three strands of autonomy I set out in the first chapter and show how they are 
intertwined:  
i) Financial autonomy, whereby the artist is not constrained by the precarity of 
funding or revenue and may do as she likes. Complete financial autonomy is, 
admittedly, rare, but degrees of it may be located in the subsidised arts sector 
and specifically within RFOs (Regularly Funded Organisations) during the 
New Labour period.  
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ii) Ideological autonomy, where an artist or arts organisation can operate in a 
way that is not subject to state intervention and is thus free to provoke, 
criticise and resist the prevailing ideological climate. This may sometimes 
emerge in application as a euphemistic term for non-subsidised commercial 
art that supports itself entirely through its own revenue streams, but I would 
argue that this would type of art is in fact highly ideological and closer to 
Adorno’s ‘culture industry’. I would therefore define ideological autonomy as 
being more closely related to the autonomy I observe in Barker’s Theatre of 
Catastrophe (see Chapter 1), where the dramatist rejects conscience, morality 
and political normativity in favour of chaotic, open-ended dissent and 
confusion. I would also add, with reference to Adorno & Horkheimer’s 
formulation on the relationship between ideology and economic coercion 
(Dialectic of Enlightenment, 167 - see below), that ideological autonomy in a 
pure form would also require an element of financial autonomy.  
iii) Aesthetic autonomy, which is where Adorno must be invoked once again. 
The discussion of autonomy I have already undertaken in Chapter 1 with 
regard to Gritzner’s reading of Barker and the sublime has already gone some 
way toward a definition, but I shall make it more explicit here. Aesthetic 
autonomy has some common characteristics with ideological autonomy as 
defined above, as it involves a rejection of prevailing norms (moral, political 
etc) on the part of artist and spectator. However, as I am using this term in an 
Adornian sense, more nuanced dialectical relations are also in play. Firstly, 
there is a difference between ‘autonomous art’ and ‘an autonomous artwork’. 
The autonomy of art as a whole is always compromised, as it has always been 
tied to the bourgeois class and to heteronomous external developments in the 
social and political world. It is also, like Adorno’s utopia, negatively 
determined; where art fulfils needs and functions that are inaccessible to other 
institutions it is at once separate from them and negatively constituted by 
them. The ‘autonomous artwork’ is subject to a similar process of negative 
determination in that it simultaneously affirms and criticises the culture in 
which it has been produced, and this dialectical process is constitutive of both 
its autonomy and its social dimension. I have already discussed in Chapter 1, 
with the assistance of Gritzner and of Hamilton, the social character of art in 
Adorno’s writing and how the commodification of the artwork, which granting 
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it autonomy from its perceived direct function, simultaneously implicates it in 
the mechanisms of capitalism, but at that stage I left open the question of 
whether social and aesthetic autonomy are different forms of autonomy or not. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I shall follow Adorno’s definition closely and, 
where I use the term ‘aesthetic autonomy’, I shall presume an understanding 
on the part of the reader that the term bears the weight of the internal tension 
between the artwork in its pure, aesthetically-determined form and its position 
within the social - resulting from its designation as artwork - that implicates it 
in other ideologically-determined forms of value. 
As is clear from these three definitions, each of these forms of autonomy are in some 
sense constituted by the other two and they cannot exist discretely. Wherever 
possible, however, I shall clarify for the reader where I believe subsequent uses of the 
term to be situated within this precarious taxonomy.  
Both Andrew Brighton and Marc Sidwell, as discussed in Chapter 2, cite ‘autonomy’ 
as desirable for the arts, and their various forms of autonomy are what they suggest 
has been removed either by pure self-interest among bureaucrats or by the enforcing 
of principles that claim anti-elitism but are too ideologically weighed down to follow 
through. Sidwell’s deployment of public choice theory suggests a prioritisation of 
ideological autonomy, as his primary frustration is with the institutional design of 
ACE and the way in which it operates such as to ensure its continuing existence due 
to the growing involvement of the DCMS. The chain of command he perceives, with 
the DCMS initiating a top-down approach where the artist is at the very bottom, 
results in artists and arts organisations being subsumed into the discursive regime of 
the Third Way (which I shall describe in full in Chapter 4). For Sidwell, the resulting 
lack of ideological autonomy in art is what renders the ACE unfit for purpose. 
Brighton’s account moves closer to aesthetic autonomy, although it does implicate 
the ideological form as well, as he laments the way aesthetic ideals have gradually 
lost their importance to ACE (and thereby to funded organisations) since the 
appointment of Jennie Lee. Although Brighton does, as I say in Chapter 2, position 
himself in the ’art for art’s sake’ camp, it is also arguable - by engaging in a more 
disruptive reading of his text - that aesthetic autonomy is what he saw flourish under 
the enterprise culture of the 1980s. So long as artworks were of high quality the 
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artists and organisations were given free reign to disrupt and resist, and certainly in 
an Adornian reading disruption and resistance, being negatively constituted by or 
even directly oppositional to prevailing ideology, would embody the dialectical 
relationship between aesthetic and social autonomy.  
The frustration over the encroachment of government upon creativity was shared, in 
a very different political context, by Brecht, who wrote in Neues Deutschland in 
1953:  98
It was the Commissions, with their unfortunate measures, their policy of  
dictation-cum-argument, their unaesthetic administrative measures, that 
alienated the artists and stopped the Academy from taking up a sensible 
position in the aesthetic question [...] For administrative purposes, it may 
well be simpler to work out definite proformas for works of art. Then the 
artists have merely to fit their thoughts (or possibly those of the 
administration?) into the given form and all will go smoothly. But the living 
material so urgently demanded then becomes living material for coffins. 
(266-267) 
Finding parallels between centre-right criticisms of Blairite British politics and 
accounts of working in the GDR is surprising, but there is no doubt that the concerns 
come from a similar conviction that autonomy from governmental bodies is a sine 
qua non of good and authentic art. Similarly, Adorno and Horkheimer conclude the 
famous essay 'The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception'  with the 99
thought that: 
the culture industry has taken over the civilising inheritance of the 
entrepreneurial and frontier democracy – whose appreciation of 
intellectual deviations was never very finely attuned. All are free to 
dance and enjoy themselves […] But freedom to choose an ideology – 
since ideology always reflects economic coercion – everywhere 
proves to be freedom to choose what is always the same. (167) 
In the case of Sidwell and Brighton's arguments, the explicit 'economic coercion' 
would come from the governmental department (currently the DCMS) responsible for 
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allocating funds to the Arts Council. 
The major question posed by all of this is to what extent an ideologically non-
autonomous Arts Council necessarily means aesthetically non-autonomous art, or 
whether private funding genuinely leads to art which has greater integrity. The 
utopian strand of their argument is in the assertion that the purpose of art should not 
be to directly alter the structure of society by enforcing certain aesthetic experiences 
while withholding others, as this constitutes an ideological trap that is damaging to 
the aesthetic dimension of art. Sidwell is right to say that this kind of discourse is not 
sole property of the right, but it might have served his argument better to point out 
the prominence of Beethoven in Adorno's Aesthetic Theory, the importance of the 
canonical novel in the work of Marcuse and Lukacs, or Bloch's abiding interest in 
Mahler. The major flaw in Sidwell's argument is his assumption that an 'art for art's 
sake' position is a) directly related to ideological autonomy or b) necessarily 
predicated on the free market or privatisation. Marcuse's definition of ‘art for art’s 
sake’ in The Aesthetic Dimension keeps itself entirely separate from assumptions that 
state funding would make it any less problematic than support from any other part of 
the apparatus of late capitalism: 
Art is 'for art's sake' inasmuch as the aesthetic form reveals tabooed 
and repressed dimensions of reality: aspects of liberation […] which 
shatter everyday experience and anticipates a different reality 
principle. (19) 
Again, the creation of art for its own sake is about radicalism and the emancipatory 
potential of works of art that challenge the established reality and, consequently, 
those who establish it. 
Aesthetically autonomous art, according to Marcuse, would only be possible in a 
utopian society, as 'if people were free, then art would be the form and expression of 
their freedom'. (The Aesthetic Dimension, 72). In the 1969 essay 'Art as Form of 
Reality' , Marcuse finally attempts to articulate something of what this might be 100
like: 
[...] it would then be creativity, a creation in the material as well as 
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intellectual sense, a juncture of technique and the arts in the total 
reconstruction of the environment, a juncture of town and country, industry 
and nature after all have been freed from the horrors of commercial 
exploitation and beautification, so that Art can no longer serve as a stimulus 
of business. (147)  
This vision of 'Art as Form of Reality', or the way in which art and the rest of life 
would become interchangeable given an entirely free society in which there was no 
struggle against alienation to which 'Art' as such might give aesthetic form, works 
against both the neoliberal position of art as part of a free-market economy and the 
way in which regeneration through public art has been funded under New Labour. 
ACE accounts of regeneration of towns through the arts, such as that of Ulverston in 
Cumbria,  seem in the light of Marcuse's vision to be putting the cart before the 101
horse in an almost parodic manner. Cultural events and public art effect a change in 
the appearance of the environment, which then results in economic prosperity. The 
end result may look like what Marcuse imagined – a free society in which art is a 
part and even a by-product of living – but in fact it is the opposite; art being used 
deliberately to further the economic demands of late capitalism.  
In conclusion, I hope to articulate something that has been implicit in the 
juxtapositions set up between arts policy, its critics and Western Marxist utopian 
thought: that the dialogue between Left and Right in discussions of art has always 
been a complex one and that those complexities have acquired further convolutions 
since the election of the Blair government. Much of the mission of the DCMS and 
ACE can be read, through Bloch, as having a utopian dimension, in that through 
developing innovation, participatory projects and public art it seeks to challenge 
'poverty of aspiration' and stimulate the imaginations of disempowered individuals 
to work towards social change, but its utopianism is troubled by its ideological 
context and is hard to extract. Particularly when the importance of the aesthetic merit 
of the work is acknowledged, this utopian presence would seem to be in line with 
Marcuse and Adorno's claims regarding the emancipatory power of art and its effect 
on consciousness; and yet the emphasis placed on social capital and economic 
regeneration by these same policies are, as must only be expected, affirmative of the 
structures and hierarchies of late capitalism. Does this diminution of ideological 
autonomy, however, preclude aesthetic autonomy or might it even enhance it? As I 
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work through some plays of the New Labour period in Chapter 5, both possibilities 
are in play.  
At the same time, those who criticise New Labour arts policy from the right have at 
times made an accidental crossing into the territory of Western Marxism when 
asserting that government policy is depriving art of its ability to express thoughts and 
ideas which are outside the dominant ideology. Their emphasis on aesthetic merit, 
taste, and the validity of 'high art' as something capable of altering an individual's 
cultural perspective certainly finds some parallels with Adorno and Marcuse, but the 
parallel only goes just so far; the economic perspective of critics wanting to take the 
arts entirely into the arena of commercialism is firmly rooted in free-market 
capitalism. The difficulty of deconstructing the binary of Left and Right in the context 
of arts policy without succumbing to McMaster’s post-political consensus may turn 
out – in the words of Sara Selwood – to be 'an intractable problem', but nonetheless 
it is one I shall pick up in the next chapter as I begin my discussion of Third Way 
thinking and cultural policy in the context of Bourdieu and cultural capital. 
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Chapter 4:  
Culture, capital and cultural capital  
In the previous chapter, I have explored some theoretical interventions into my 
project of locating and developing possible disruptions to ways of thinking about 
New Labour and political theatre; as I have stated in Chapter 1, my contention is that 
Third Way discourse has closed down modes of political thinking, and in Chapter 5 
as I make another move back from state to stage I will discuss in full how this 
discursive closure has been created and how it operates within dramaturgy and 
performance, with particular reference to verbatim theatre. The potential site of 
disruption I excavate in this chapter is one previously examined in Cultural Trends 
and concerns the potential productivity of using Bourdieu, and specifically the 
concept of cultural capital, as a way of framing the contribution of New Labour 
cultural policy to the project of combatting social exclusion. My own contention is 
that the term ‘cultural capital’ has been subjected to different readings and uses 
within the rhetoric of cultural policy and has become, as a result, highly 
problematised, and that the shifts in definitions of the term complicate attempts to 
use it in readings of where political theatre of the New Labour period stands in 
relation to its Third Way context. These complications, however, are not without their 
own productivity, as they are useful in returning us at the end of the chapter to 
Barker and his claims for a Theatre of Catastrophe; how do the concepts of inclusion, 
social mobility and cultural capital play out with regard to political theatre and the 
ability of its audience to bear witness to it?   
As an example of the extremes to which redefinitions of ‘cultural capital’ have been 
taken, I refer to the publication 'Cultural Capital – A Manifesto for the Future’. This 
was a document distributed in accurate anticipation of an incoming Conservative 
government in 2010 in which the arts and heritage sector demonstrated its ability to 
embrace the rhetoric of the market. The document lays out the argument that 
'investing in culture will build Britain's social and economic recovery' (1). This 2010 
document, put together by a group of organisations  led by ACE, made the case for 102
continuing arts subsidy in terms of its wider economic impact; aside from direct 
revenue and community regeneration, the economic potential of the subsidised arts 
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is also expressed in terms of the influence of the arts on other, more directly 
lucrative, areas including those which would fall under the remit of Adorno’s ‘culture 
industry’:  
Creativity is the key to economic recovery. Public investment in the arts and 
heritage helps to generate the cultural capital that feeds the creative 
industries with knowledge, practical experience and inspiration. Every artist 
is an entrepreneur[...] (7) 
In one section, the document's authors argue that 'The arts and heritage provide the 
training and the space to experiment that develops the creative skills the business 
world is calling for' (7). Casting the state as investor was not a new formulation for 
ACE; previous projects, such as Dominic Shellard's ACE-commissioned economic 
impact study of 2004 and the 1998 Wyndham Report, focused on the necessity of 
arts subsidy for the economy and the capacity of theatre to 'pay for itself'. The 
Cultural Capital Manifesto differs from this in several ways. Firstly, and most 
obviously, it does not contain any attempts at statistical analysis. Figures are used for 
the purposes of advocacy rather than investigation, taken out of context to support 
rather than to interrogate (or even prove) assumptions such as 'Culture is in 
demand' (3). Despite the presence of these figures, the language of the document is 
abstract and makes ambiguous use of words like 'value' and 'growth', which are 
used sometimes in a purely financial sense and sometimes more broadly. Secondly, 
and following on from this, the Manifesto makes use of a lexis that distances it from 
financial analysis and places it firmly in the field of social science – the Bourdieusian 
language of cultural capital.  
In this chapter, I shall discuss the distance travelled between Bourdieu's original 
formulations regarding forms of capital and the meanings his terms acquired in late 
New Labour cultural policy parlance on their journey to this startling invocation in 
2010. I ask how Bourdieu's construction of cultural capital as an index of privilege 
and social exclusion tallies with its use within New Labour's communitarian 
discourse, and what is at stake for playwrights and theatre practitioners. Locating 
theatre within various definitions of cultural capital is, I argue here, pivotal to an 
understanding of how the political worth of the form was constructed during the 
New Labour years. Having already, in the previous chapter, examined some of the 
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limitations of the methodologies used to attempt to establish impact and value - as 
observed by scholars of policy-making - I now focus on key theatre policy 
documents produced by ACE between 2000 and 2011, as well as making some 
returns to the Cultural Capital Manifesto of 2010, in order to develop the discussion 
of the shift from 'subsidy' to 'investment' and the implications for the politics of 
theatre of the repositioning of Bourdieu's terms. 
Before applying Bourdieu’s work to the specificities of post-Blairite cultural policy, it 
is necessary to take note of (and situate this chapter within) the turn towards to 
Bourdieusian thinking amongst cultural policy scholars. In particular, the work of 
Jeremy Ahearne  and Vincent Dubois  in excavating Bourdieu’s turbulent 103 104
interactions with the Commission des Affaires Culturelles following the events of 
May 1968 reveals some productive parallels to be drawn between the political 
landscapes of 1970s France and New Labour Britain. Elsewhere, Tony Bennett  105
proposed a reappraisal of Bourdieu in 2005 that contested Bourdieu's status as an 
‘icon of relativism’ (142), asserting instead that a levelling form of relativism is 
antithetical to Bourdieu’s sociology of aesthetics and focusing on his account of ‘the 
autonomy of the aesthetic sphere’ (141). A discussion of the relationship between the 
growth of neoliberal orthodoxy and Bourdieu’s thought on culture and the state is 
vital to an appreciation of the ideological significance of the use - and, I will argue, 
the misappropriation - of Bourdieusian terminology within the cultural policy of a 
Third Way democracy.  Vincent Dubois observes in French cultural policy of the 106
last fifty years ‘the paradoxical situation of cultural capital theory [...]: it is often 
invoked, but to little practical effect’ (143); I argue that such invocations in Britain 
have had far-reaching implications, both practical and ideological.  
In 2004, Cultural Trends published a special issue  that set out to examine the 107
relationship between the Bourdieusian concept of cultural capital and the use of 
cultural policy to combat social exclusion, with particular reference to the findings of 
Policy Action Team 10  published in 1999  and the setting-up of the Social 108 109
Exclusion Unit  in 2001. In their editorial introduction  to this issue, Sara 110 111
Selwood and Paul Allin cite these two events as ‘the single most important statement 
about the arts and culture’s ability to deliver social policy objectives’ (2) and posit a 
possible reading of PAT10 as reviving interest in the benefits of the arts not only to 
communities but to individuals, and in the importance of the affective dimensions of 
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experiencing and participating in artistic and cultural projects. The legacy of PAT10, 
they postulate, can be productively read via the concept of cultural capital, and that 
this reading might contribute to a redefinition of cultural capital that takes it beyond 
its original applications to high art (a reading I embrace in this chapter). Tony Bennett 
and Mike Savage in their introductory article  remind the reader that although the 112
vocabularies of cultural capital and social exclusion have a long history in France, 
they has only been meaningfully in play in Britain since the start of the Blair 
government in 1997 (9) and that even then only discussion of social exclusion 
played a major part in cultural policy, with discussion of cultural capital remaining 
largely the province of education policy. Diane Reay’s contribution to the issue  113
centres on the position of cultural capital in an increasingly marketised education 
system and, while joining Selwood and Allin in encouraging a broader definition of 
cultural capital than the one then current in her field (Dumais, 2002; Sullivan, 2001), 
she uses the concept to show how class inequalities are played out and reproduced 
within said system.   
Introducing reified cultural capital 
For the sake of greater clarity later on I shall briefly revisit Bourdieu’s original 
concept of cultural capital  in order to distinguish it from different uses that follow. 114
Simply put, ‘cultural capital’ for Bourdieu is part of an extension of the concept of 
capital - the accumulation through labour of an investment and the security of a 
return on that investment - beyond the financial. In ‘The Forms of Capital’  115
Bourdieu sets cultural capital alongside both economic capital and social capital 
(which is accrued through membership of social networks) and lays out three states 
in which cultural capital may be assessed and studied: the embodied, the objectified 
and the institutionalised. The embodied state of cultural capital is that which is 
present and discernible in the mind and physicality of the individual and is accrued 
through familial input, education and socialisation. Objectified cultural capital exists 
as culturally significant objects that can be owned, such as paintings, books and 
records, and the accumulation of institutionalised cultural capital requires the 
recognition of an external institution i.e. an accreditation or qualification. Transfer of 
cultural capital in these forms, in Bourdieu’s theory, is a major contributor to the 
reproduction of class and its inequalities. As we have already heard from Reay (74) 
and Selwood and Allin (3), cultural capital has often been used in a narrow sense to 
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mean only the propensity for engagement with and participation in high-status 
cultural activities; when used more fully, however, it can unlock a nuanced 
understanding of social processes and their role in class reproduction. As I move 
through this section of the chapter, we will encounter deployments of the term that 
have limited validity within even the extremely broad definition I accept here, and 
this renders the coining of a new, Third-Way-specific term necessary.  
While most contributors to the 2004 special issue of Cultural Trends make incisive 
use of the concept of cultural capital to analyse class reproduction within their area 
of research,  the term is treated with some scepticism by Ruth Levitas.  In Levitas’ 116 117
account of the relationship between cultural capital and New Labour policy, the term 
has diverged from its Bourdieusian origins in response to Third Way politics. Its 
proliferation at that time in economic and social policy (along with that of similar 
terms like 'human capital' and 'social capital') is something of which Levitas is wary:  
[The terms] seem to me to reinforce the normalization and naturalization of 
capitalism itself, and thus to be part of a discourse that constructs ‘there is 
no alternative’ without even having to say it' (50).  
Levitas traces the shifts in meaning of 'cultural capital' via the vernacular of her own 
field, sociology, and in particular the sociology of education, to the rhetoric of 
inclusivity embraced by New Labour and the network of discursive relations which 
she terms 'moral underclass discourse' (MUD) and 'social integrationist 
discourse' (SID) (Levitas, 40). Her contention is that the ideological underpinnings of 
a new definition of 'cultural capital' were already in place within government policy 
before the term was appended to them. Indeed, her article displays a startling 
prescience in its use of the phrase, accurately prefiguring its use in 2010 in the 
Cultural Capital Manifesto by underlining its connections with New Labour 
constructions of social mobility, inclusion and community: 
The inclusion agenda of the DCMS also continues from a more long-
standing concern with broadening access and participation [...] 
Demonstrating increased participation and ‘inclusion’ is also essential to the 
Department’s bids for funding. [...] Clearly then there is a sense in which the 
cultural capital and social inclusion agendas map on to each other. (50) 
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 and also individual entrepreneurship: 
There has been a slippage towards treating formal, accredited knowledge as 
educational or cultural capital, and to treating cultural capital as something 
that intrinsically resides in individuals rather than in groups, and can be 
acquired by them through participation in or consumption of the cultural 
and heritage industries. Cultural capital, then, becomes something that is 
individualized, commodified, and used as a resource in a competitive 
system. (53) 
For Levitas, cultural capital in this context has a similar function to 'community' in 
New Labour policy: that of appearing to erase class divisions without interrogating 
them. Cultural capital, like 'community', had become a tool for papering over 
inequalities in the name of inclusivity, although Levitas is strongly aware of the 
original function of Bourdieu's idea as a useful heuristic for instigating an 
investigation of those inequalities and a society that produces and reproduces them. 
As Bourdieu writes in 'Forms of Capital', 'The notion of cultural capital initially 
presented itself to me, in the course of research, as a theoretical hypothesis that 
made it possible to explain the unequal scholastic achievement of children 
originating from the different social classes […]' (244). In other words, the 
formulation was initially a way of understanding and explaining the way in which 
the class system is reproduced, rather than a solution in itself. The use of the term in 
New Labour education policy, and the then possibility (subsequently realised) of its 
extension into cultural policy, to mean a necessary commodity the accretion of 
which should be encouraged is precisely what makes Levitas nervous. Using cultural 
capital as a signifier of the solution rather than the problem is, as she writes, to 
'normalise' capitalism rather than to subvert or interrogate it.  
As with 'community', ‘cultural capital’ becomes a term that succumbs to the 'double 
shuffle' of Stuart Hall's reading of New Labour; a simultaneous acknowledgement of 
the social problems caused by capitalism and proposition of capitalism as their 
solution.  Neoliberalism under New Labour, according to Hall's model, adapted to 118
oppositional demands to ensure its continued dominance. Following the General 
Election of 1997, which Stuart Hall (and many of the New Left) regarded as a 
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moment of immense political potential, the adaptive nature of neoliberalism enabled 
it to maintain its hegemony in the face of significant challenges and criticisms so that 
the potential for a turn away from neoliberalism remained unfulfilled. The way in 
which neoliberalism adapted was determined by the challenges and criticisms it 
faced, but in such a way as to defuse rather than respond cogently to those 
criticisms. This enabled it to absorb and assimilate disparate groups and their 
competing demands more easily than it could by claiming allegiance to the Left or 
Right, as it was able to justify concessions to contestations on both sides while the 
central ideology remained constant. New Labour maintained the primacy of the 
market while allowing a role for the state in addressing some of the most glaring 
inequalities created by market mechanisms: 
[W]hile free-market intellectuals criticize the Blair government on many 
grounds, they appear to acknowledge that the underlying commitment to a 
broadly liberalized economic management is a genuine one. (Peck and 
Tickell, 45).   119
Policies and practices designed to appease more traditionally Left-wing concerns 
were also put into place. While policies bore the language of these concerns, their 
focus was on using them to  efficiently quieten contestations rather than to address 
the concerns themselves. In this way, ideals and contestations traditionally associated 
with the Left, and corresponding political demands regarding equality and justice, 
came to be used as tools to meet economic goals. As society was reorganised and 
reshaped by the Third Way in order to further market efficiency, inequality was 
addressed by tackling pre- rather than post-market inequalities. Policy-making 
tended towards the creation of equality of opportunity to compete in a market-driven 
society, for example enhancing workplace skills and increasing training opportunities 
rather than bolstering the welfare state (Driver & Martell 1997).  As various 120
theorists of radical democracy (most notably Mouffe and Laclau) have postulated, the 
result of the dominance of Third Way ideology was a post-political landscape in 
which efficiency and good management have come to be viewed as more effective 
weapons against inequality than debate, political action or shifts in ethical 
paradigms. This is Ruth Levitas' objection to the spread of the term 'cultural capital' – 
that it has been hijacked, distanced from its original purpose as an index of privilege 
and pressed into service as another piece of Third Way rhetorical apparatus whereby 
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the morally destitute 'underclass' of MUD can be identified and altered by skilful 
social management. Rather than indicating, as it does in Bourdieu's writing, the 
'upper threshold' of privilege, the new incarnation of cultural capital now responds 
to the lower, thus losing its potency as an index of the preservation of cultural 
privilege and class reproduction.   
In view of Levitas’ reading and the theorising of the Third Way that supports it, for the 
purposes of this thesis I shall propose a term specific of this alternative reading of 
cultural capital and its context of Third Way discourse, and entirely discrete from 
Bourdieu; that of reified  cultural capital. To be absolutely clear, I am not 121
postulating reified cultural capital as a fourth state or related form of Bourdieu’s 
cultural capital, as it does not operate as a useful concept that can be deployed in 
the investigation and analysis of social processes. Rather, it operates as a ‘thing’ that 
must be acquired by an individual or community in order for social mobility to 
occur. Reified cultural capital, as identified by Levitas, comes into being as a by-
product of Third Way ‘underclass’ discourses rather than being produced 
unconsciously through social processes occurring with a class hierarchy. While 
functioning as a passport to a higher social class, reified cultural capital does not in 
fact disrupt the class system; the game continues, but the players change their 
positions.   
By early 2010, six years after the publication of Levitas' article (and in the closing 
months of New Labour's government, just before the Coalition came to power), the 
term had undergone further changes. On top of the perceived benefits of the 
acquisition of reified cultural capital for individuals (and subsequently their 
'communities'), it came to be portrayed as a transformative force in the marketplace. 
Cultural capital, as used in my opening quotation, can change the way business 
works and enhance Britain's power in the global market. A report by NESTA  in 122
2008, The Art of Innovation,  made a similar case for state 'investment' in the arts 123
but without resorting to the term: 'The way artistic labour is organised makes artists 
arguably a prototype not just for work organisation, but for innovation in the rest of 
the economy.' (5) 
This new development in government discourse demonstrates a new type of 
instrumentalism; moving on from the typically New Labour instrumentalism 
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criticised by Ruth Levitas, where policies aim to eliminate a perceived 'underclass' 
without addressing the underlying causes of inequality, the cultural capital (and 
related argument for government arts funding) of the 2010 Manifesto is a clear 
response to the economic crisis and likely change of government in that it is posited 
as the country's great hope for recovery. A later section states bluntly that 'cultural 
capital generates material wealth' (13) both for individuals and for the country as a 
whole, as business strategies receive a creativity injection from an increasingly 
healthy arts scene funded by combination of state subsidy and private philanthropy: 
Talent-enhancing, labour-intensive, export-earning, working nationwide, 
creative, stimulating, morale-lifting, and responding rapidly to investment, 
the cultural sector is ready to play its part in national recovery. (ibid.) 
The contention is not only that the arts are a good investment because they pay for 
themselves, as research such as Shellard's has demonstrated, but also that they 
present good business models. The NESTA report cites the attitude of artists to 
innovation as something which businesses would benefit from emulating, and the 
Cultural Capital Manifesto follows suit with 'The arts and heritage provide the 
training and the space to experiment that develops the creative skills the business 
world is calling for. Culture provides the foundation and stimulus for the creative 
industries that give Britain its reputation for ingenuity and innovation.' (7)  
This is another way in which the contemporary arts policy reading of cultural capital 
has distanced itself from its origins. In the Manifesto, cultural capital is presented as 
being readily convertible into economic capital, a claim that Bourdieu would 
certainly criticise. As he writes in 'Forms of Capital',  with regard to education: 124
Economists might seem to deserve credit for explicitly raising the question of 
the relationship between the rates of profit on educational investment and 
on economic investment (and its evolution). But their measurement of the 
yield from scholastic investment takes account only of monetary investments 
and profits, or those directly convertible into money (248) 
The relationship between cultural and economic capital, he maintains, is a complex 
and indirect one. While material wealth may be part of the production of the indices 
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of privilege to which Bourdieu's term originally referred, the process is not 
automatically reversed. The nuances of taste catalogued in Distinction as being 
indicative of a bourgeois rather than a working-class habitus are not, in themselves, 
able to generate financial advantage – nor, of course, is class division purely a 
financial phenomenon.  125
I would argue that the cultural capital of the Manifesto is not distinct from reified 
cultural capital, but that financial prosperity deriving from the culture industry 
constitutes a particular state in which reified cultural capital may exist. It is capable 
of having a direct effect on individual financial prosperity and on the British 
economy as a whole, and for the individual it has the same role as the one ascribed 
to the arts by Alan Davey in the introduction to the ACE Annual Review in 2008 – to 
address 'poverty of aspiration' and thus give Levitas' 'underclass' 'the ability to get on 
in the world' (5), a strain of ideology which has attracted much hostility from the Left 
as, its critics say, it seeks to remove the autonomy of the working class and thus its 
potential as a force for political change.  
Although Janet Newman, one of New Labour's foremost critics in the field of 
political theory, does not mention cultural capital by name in her influential 2001 
book Modernising Governance, her work is helpful in demonstrating how neatly the 
2010 incarnation of it maps on to Third Way politics.  As she addresses many of the 126
ideological inconsistencies in New Labour policy, she stresses throughout the book 
the way in which the government shaped discourse to remake the identities of its 
citizens through welfare reform and policies claiming to combat social exclusion. In 
a move away from old Labour, the citizen of New Labour rhetoric is constructed in 
terms of duty and responsibility rather than dependency; the relationship between 
citizen and state is, as Newman puts it, 'quasi-contractual' (150), with the 
opportunities and rights offered by the state being matched by the responsibilities of 
the citizen. One of the problems Newman identifies here is that: 
  
The 'modernisation' of welfare was structured around the norm of the active, 
working citizen, availing him or herself of the opportunities to become part 
of the new information-based economy and equipped with the skills and 
capacities to do so […] The norm of active, working citizen differed from 
previous Labourist conceptions of work in that women as well as men, and 
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those previously marginalised through disability, single parenthood or long-
term unemployment, were expected to become fully integrated members of 
the working population. (150) 
  
Not only is the New Labour vision of welfare and social inclusion normative, she 
argues, it is also moral.  The rhetoric of rights and responsibilities, in demanding 127
that everyone be a breadwinner and contribute to the economy, enabled what she 
calls a 'disciplinary' approach to social welfare; anyone resisting (for whatever 
reason) the training or 'welfare to work' schemes intended to get them off benefits 
and back into work would be guilty of a moral failing, that of refusing to recognise 
their civic responsibilities, which in turn justifies punitive measures such as the 
withdrawal of benefits. The duties of citizenship are defined here in terms of active 
economic responsibility, rather than simply (and more traditionally) obeying laws 
and paying taxes, and, according to Tony Blair himself, for this model of social 
inclusion to work those duties need to be enforced by the state:   128
Strong communities depend on shared values and recognition of the rights 
and duties of citizenship […] In the past we have tended to take such duties 
for granted. But where they are neglected, we should not hesitate to 
encourage and even enforce them. (quoted Newman 151) 
   
This is backed up by John Hills and Kitty Stewart,  who criticised Labour's 1997 129
General Election Manifesto for making only one mention of tackling social inequality 
(9): the pledge to get more people off benefits and into work. Rather than addressing 
inequalities created by the existing economic and social systems and relations, the 
Blair government looked to create easier access to those structures. Exclusion, 
poverty and inequality were not seen as a result of the economic or societal 
hierarchies inherent in neoliberalism but as due to the inability of marginalised 
individuals to resist these hierarchies; ‘Social democratic communitarianism has 
become more moral and oriented to obligations required of the individual and less 
socio-economic and geared to corporate obligations to the community.’ (Martell, 
1999 p.6). Welfare dependency, for example, was to be eradicated without any 
consideration given to how it was being produced by systems and relations, placing 
the responsibility on a lack of social capital - skills, education and opportunity - on 
the part of the individual. People were to be helped and encouraged to take part in 
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systems that had been, at least in part, responsible for that very lack of social capital, 
and not to participate in their own governance but to be complicit in the apparatus 
of their own exclusion. 
Reified cultural capital as read in the Manifesto and in the earlier New Labour 
documents discussed by Ruth Levitas, is inextricably linked with this approach to 
addressing exclusion and inequality. As discussed in the previous chapter, much of 
the advocacy-driven research into the subsidised arts which came out of the new 
Labour era centred on objectives such as improving school attendance and creating 
pathways to paid employment in areas of deprivation, with the goal of increasing 
social mobility and assimilating those previously living in poverty into a growing 
middle class , and even complementing healthcare, which in turn would enable 130
incapacitated people to return to work. Increasing one's 'cultural capital' in the New 
Labour sense thus becomes a moral obligation as it enhances the ability to carry out 
the civic obligations that are so central to Third Way politics and to New Labour in 
particular: serving your community, working for a living, providing for yourself and 
your family – or, as David Cameron famously put it in a debate leading up to the 
2010 General Election, 'doing the right thing'. This is an interesting twist on the old 
Hegelian or Aristotelian argument that the arts make us better humans; here, one of 
the central purposes of art is to make us better citizens of a Third Way democracy. 
The Cultural Capital Manifesto argues that 'The arts and heritage are on hand to help 
those who lost out in the recession: with jobs, training, skills, experience, hope' (1); 
opportunities of which, Janet Newman would tell us, we have a moral obligation to 
take advantage or we let down ourselves, our communities, and the British economy. 
In using this language, the organisations responsible for the publication of the 
Cultural Capital Manifesto appeal directly to the outgoing Labour government's 
construction of the citizen (as well as to the soon-to-be-governing Conservative 
party), on which all cases made for government arts funding had depended since 
1997. 'Cultural capital', when used in the sense of reified cultural capital sense, 
moves further away from its origins as an index of class difference and inequality and 
closer to the creation of a more homogeneous society in accord with Third Way 
ideology.   
It is also vital to mention, at this point, the inherent difficulties in aligning cultural 
capital with social mobility. In many ways, the two are antithetical; Bourdieu's thesis 
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of cultural capital centres on the reproduction of existing class structure (Bourdieu, 
2010) which, while it does not rule out social mobility, certainly complicates it . 131
Recent studies by sociologists following up John Goldthorpe's work on social 
mobility have confirmed that modern British society is characterised by high levels of 
social mobility, particularly upwards, and this has run in parallel with a re-
examination of Bourdieu and discussions of what the ideas of habitus and cultural 
capital have to offer.  In contrast to Bourdieu's findings in 1980s France, 132
contemporary British social mobility is not restricted to an inherently aspirational 
'petite bourgeoisie' but has also been accessed by the working class, particularly in 
terms of making the most of educational opportunities and developing what Reay, 
Crozier and Clayton  call a 'reflexive habitus' that can operate across different 133
fields. This has led to disputes in sociological circles about the validity of embodied 
cultural capital (the Bourdiesian theory that children from dominant social classes 
acquire the disposition of 'symbolic mastery' from their parents that is converted into 
more tangible forms of cultural capital in adulthood ). While some scholars have 134
theorised that cultural elites can now be identified by their 'omnivorous' tastes 
(Peterson & Kern, 1996,  Bennett et al, 2010) and capacity for consuming both 135
'high' and 'low' culture, others have questioned this theory on the basis that more 
subtle hierarchies of taste may be present in the consumption of 'low' as well as 
'high' culture and thus that the dominant classes may not be as indifferent to 
aesthetic hierarchies as omnivore theories would suggest (Atkinson, 2011). This has 
reorientated sociological debate back towards Bourdieu. The presence or absence of 
embodied cultural capital or symbolic mastery affects the way in which all art, high 
or low, is received by its audience; whether an individual judges the artwork 
according to emotional 'interest' or takes the more formalist, 'disinterested' approach 
Bourdieu associates with cultural elites depends on the individual, not on the culture 
they are consuming. Habitus may not dictate what culture people consume, but it 
will influence the way in which they do so.  
This being the case, using cultural capital as a measurement of social mobility is 
clearly problematic. The relationship between the two is a difficult one, and this 
difficulty has been acknowledged for some time, and this returns us to the 
reservations expressed by Levitas regarding the appropriation of the term. As I have 
noted earlier, the current use of 'cultural capital', in responding to the lower rather 
than the higher threshold of class privilege, is presented as being part of the 
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apparatus of social mobility as opposed to that of class reproduction. Although this 
could be read as a healthy development of Bourdieu's theory that enables it not 
merely to interpret the world but to change it, both Levitas and Newman's arguments 
would support the opposite contention; that the way in which 'cultural capital' is 
deployed now is symptomatic of its co-optation into those Third Way disquisitions on 
social inclusion which they criticise elsewhere as being managerialist, post-political 
and inadequate to the task of addressing the immense inequalities produced by 
global capitalism.     
Reified cultural capital, theatre policy and the Third Way 2000-2010 
The initial publication documenting ACE theatre policy in 2000 presents the main 
problems facing theatre as being financial, a result of underfunding during successive 
Conservative governments that resulted in a dearth of 'exceptional work' (Theatre 
Policy 2000, 1)  being produced away from the main London theatres during the 
1980s and 1990s. 'Transformation' is here deemed necessary in terms of reaching 
new audiences and fostering greater diversity within the industry itself to make 
possible the 'bold, relevant and exciting work' that will assure the future of British 
theatre. It also makes repeated reference to finding 'new ways of working', and to 
ACE making 'bold decisions' (2) as regards the withdrawal of funds. The 
announcement of this policy coincided with an uplift in funding for building-based 
regional theatres in response to the Boyden Report (an increase which was criticised 
at the time as being welcome, but insignificant in terms of impact ) and in line with 136
one of the published objectives of all ACE theatre policy since 2000, regional 
diversity.  
In terms of reified cultural capital, the most interesting objectives stated here are 
'Develop new ways of working' and 'Address diversity and inclusion'. The 'new ways 
of working' hinted at include the use of environments other than building-based 
theatres, partnerships between different theatres, and also looking outside the theatre 
world for partnership opportunities: 'Theatre needs to engage with a wider range of 
artists and other partners. Theatre should also connect more proactively with the 
other creative industries, seeing them as an opportunity not a threat.' (5) This in some 
ways looks forward to later policy, particularly policy regarding the relationship 
between the subsidised and commercial theatre, and to the 2010 Manifesto's 
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insistence on stronger links between the subsidised arts and commercial 'creative 
industries' such as advertising. The 'opportunity' here is, arguably, for developing the 
'cultural capital' of the Manifesto, which both derives from and can be converted 
back into economic capital. The language of the 2000 Theatre Policy is, 
unsurprisingly, that of investment rather than subsidy; if theatre is to be a sustainable 
investment, it has to take advantage of the opportunities offered by a mixed economy 
and, in turn, feed back into it by enhancing the country's prosperity and prestige (as 
exemplified, in later years, by the Olympic legacy). The money that connections with 
commercial partners outside theatre can offer to subsidised theatre companies, 
whether directly through co-productions, sponsorships or indirectly through 
influence on business practice, is used to purchase more 'cultural capital' for the 
country – and this 'cultural capital' feeds back into economic capital, and so on.  
The section on addressing inclusion and diversity is brief, but interestingly states that 
theatre 'must connect with people who have been excluded, including those living 
in rural communities' (5). This is an interesting stipulation, given that alternative 
theatre companies (a great many of which received at least some subsidy from the 
Arts Council) have an illustrious history of working in precisely those rural 
communities which the 2000 National Theatre Policy claim have been excluded 
from theatre in the past . The paragraph continues: 'We expect the theatre 137
community to develop work that speaks to the diverse audiences who make up this 
country today' (5) This is, without a doubt, a commendable intention, and one that 
has been the focus of a lot of commentary on British theatre and particularly New 
Writing . The importance of the diversity of the people who 'make up this country' 138
and the changing meaning of Britishness was acknowledged considerably earlier 
than 2000 by playwrights, critics and academics. There is no need to rehearse the 
roots of New Writing here, as it has been done exhaustively elsewhere, and Aleks 
Sierz devotes several pages of Rewriting the Nation to a recital of accounts going 
back as far as 1959 (17 onwards) of how accurately theatre has documented social 
history.  
In view of this, it is curious to see (alongside the policy on engaging rural 
communities) a policy written in 2000 making demands on British theatre that could 
be seen as redundant. While more can and should always be done to encourage 
diversity and a more powerful, engaging representation of national identity, the 
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British theatre portrayed by the 2000 ACE Theatre Policy is one that has not accepted 
this mission, or at least has not managed to deliver: 
Not surprisingly audiences for some kinds of theatre are falling. In many 
parts of the country theatre has failed to engage with a broad audience. It 
has certainly failed to engage adequately with young people and with multi-
cultural Britain. The Arts Council of England believes that theatre should be 
one of England’s most vital art forms. We want to see theatre develop and 
use its unique power and energy to reach a wider range of contemporary 
audiences. (1) 
This, unsurprisingly, jars with the accounts given by white male practitioners and 
critics like Sierz, Baz Kershaw, David Edgar and the many others who have written 
eloquently about their experiences of the determination of theatre over the last five 
decades to represent disenfranchised and excluded British people. It is true that the 
previous paragraph refers to the funding difficulties of the pre-Blair years, and a 
connection can be made between this and the perceived inadequacy of theatre as a 
social force, but the ACE document places the blame firmly at the doors of the 
theatres themselves:  
Many organisations have become inward looking and territorial and there 
has been a drain on talent and resources resulting in an environment in 
which it is much harder for artists and managers to take creative risks. Large 
parts of our theatre have been caught in a downward spiral with less 
exceptional work being produced. (1) 
It is difficult to map this depiction of British theatre as made up of paranoid, insular 
organisations that inhibit creativity onto the culture that produced companies like 
Graeae and Talawa, companies that struggled against financial difficulties to deliver 
highly-acclaimed theatre. The desire to engage with a changing national identity was 
certainly not absent from British theatre and, while the New Writing boom of the 
1990s may have produced debate about the nature of political theatre, new plays 
(and the theatres that staged them) continued to explore social problems and crises. 
Even if 'political theatre' in the sense of agit prop and state-of-the-nation plays was 
no longer a driving force, theatre was still willing to make a political statement.  
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The next Theatre Policy was published in 2007, and proclaimed a 'renaissance' of 
British theatre that followed the £25 million increase in theatre funding which came 
as a result of the previous policy and Theatre Review. Some of this is copied directly 
from the 2000 document, including the section on the territorial, insular tendencies 
of theatres and the commitment of ACE to reversing this trend and making theatre 
more accessible and inclusive. More than that, the document claims at least partial 
victory in this battle, and subtly shifts the blame from the theatres themselves to the 
Conservative government and lack of funding:  
In 2000, Arts Council England published a national policy for theatre and 
undertook a theatre review that, with the support of government, reversed 
two decades of underinvestment. By 2003 an additional £25 million a year 
had begun to revitalise the sector [...[ Theatre is an invigorated industry. The 
quality of work and morale in the sector has improved. Theatres are more 
financially secure and better able to plan ahead. More and better 
employment opportunities are available and employers are taking positive 
steps to diversify the workforce. The decline in audiences for subsidised 
theatre has slowed significantly and audiences are now increasing.  (4-5) 
The discussion of the role of theatre in tackling social exclusion has been developed 
(following Helen Jermyn's report in 2004), and here the move towards greater 
diversity is now tied explicitly to the uplift in funding rather than an ideological or 
ethical shift taking place under the new government. Newman and other theorists of 
democracy models (Driver & Martell, Leitner et al) have demonstrated and discussed 
the dedication of the Blair government to managerialism and efficient solutions in 
line with neoliberalism rather than changes in ethical paradigms, and this section of 
the 2007 Theatre Policy is an excellent example of that managerialism in context. 
Although theatres and their attitudes were initially held responsible for a lack of 
multicultural engagement (an ethical/political argument), it is the administrators, 
managers and funding bodies – or investors - who are given the credit for its growth 
(a managerialist, post-political argument). The impact of British theatre and the 
growth in reified cultural capital is, the 2007 Policy implies, a bureaucratic and 
financial success story rather than an artistic or a political one, the result of efficient 
management rather than engaged, committed practitioners building on the artistic 
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successes of the 1990s.  
Elsewhere in the 2007 Policy, developments show a growing commitment to a 
mixture of state and corporate funding and entrepreneurial spirit. The emphasis on 
'new ways of working' remains, but is more explicitly tied to the market and to the 
necessity of running theatres and theatre companies as businesses: 'We will continue 
to review the organisations we fund and prioritise those seeking to implement more 
sustainable business models and to develop partnerships' (10) 
This development was prefigured by a document that came out in 2003, at the 
beginning of the period that was to fall under the purview of the 2008 Theatre 
Assessment, regarding the relationship between commercial and subsidised theatre 
was published by ACE. Written by Robert Cogo-Fawcett,  the document is an 139
unusual blend of policy statement and user's guide, which combines information on 
finance and best practice for co-productions between subsidised and commercial 
theatre with material that makes the case for a closer and more amicable relationship 
between the two: 
  
A number of different motives underlie the creation and development of 
these mechanisms, but two main philosophical strands predominate. Whilst 
both are primarily inspired by the desire to provide art and entertainment, 
one is motivated by pecuniary motives and by the desire to create profit and 
falls under the description of what we term ‘the commercial theatre’. The 
other is founded more on the philanthropic principle that the primary 
purpose of art is to improve man’s understanding of himself and his fellows. 
(5) 
The Arts Council's principles on subsidised/commercial co-production, as stated 
here, are to encourage cooperation between the two sectors without compromising 
either. Firstly, the artistic integrity of subsidised theatre, Cogo-Fawcett writes, should 
not be compromised by association with commercial partners, and secondly the Arts 
Council will not 'penalise' a subsidised company that generates income in this way 
by reducing its funding. Thirdly, the financial relationship between co-producing 
partners should safeguard the interests of the subsidised partner, so that the non-
profit company is 'appropriately rewarded for the effort, cost and risk it took in 
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originating the work' (7). 
This is possibly the most interesting document regarding theatre to come out of the 
Arts Council/ACE during the period under consideration. Repeated references are 
made to the existing hostility between the subsidised and commercial sectors, 
playing on the stereotypes of the bold, idealistic not-for-profit theatre company and 
the exploitative, cynical, mercenary commercial producer in order to subvert and 
ultimately reconcile them. The binary between the two, this document suggests, is 
anachronistic; we have moved beyond the counterculture of the 1960s and 1970s 
and the enterprise culture of 1980s Thatcherism and reached a point at which there 
is no need for rivalry or hostility between those who make theatre in order to make 
money and those who require public money in order to make theatre. Indeed, the 
'philanthropic' motivation of theatre can be furthered by the inclusion of commercial 
partners whose financial investments and business acumen can help to bring 
productions to a wider audience – thus, it follows, raising the country's Cultural 
Capital and subsequently its material wealth.  
This recalls critical accounts of several elements of Third Way neoliberalism (Driver 
& Martell 1997), primarily the ways in which the roles of citizen and market are 
reshaped in order to render old political divisions obsolete. To quote Driver & 
Martell,  “‘The 'Third Way' is, in part, about the reunification, in the centre ground, 140
of old false divisions. It is very much aimed at overcoming conflict and building 
consensus.’ (Driver & Martell 1999 3). New Labour's neoliberalism combined 
market-friendly policies with those of social inclusion and as such was able to 
appeal to a variety of disparate groups, thus enabling the neutralization of potential 
threats to its dominance. The market, rather than a specific social class (as in 
Gramsci's 'passive revolution'), holds the dominant position, and as such is 
presented as being benevolent and better equipped to provide the solutions to social 
problems than any alternative. For example, if subsidised theatre is in danger from 
the precarity of its funding and a history (genuine or perceived) of lacking relevance, 
then the solution is to be found in an alliance with the commercial sector. What the 
harshest excesses of capitalism damaged in the 1980s its new incarnation would fix 
in the Blair years, and theatre can be strengthened rather than undermined by the 
financial stability afforded by a commercial co-producer.  
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The Theatre Assessment undertaken in 2009 was the first major examination of 
subsidised theatre on a national scale since the Theatre Review of 2001 , and 141
investigates the period from 2003 onwards during which an extra £25 million had 
been invested in theatre. Close attention is paid here to the relationships between 
theatres, ACE, and other funding partners, as is the relationship between the 
subsidised and commercial sectors to which ACE remains committed. Commercial 
theatres are included within the scope of the assessment, and an intention to 
'continue to champion collaborations between the subsidised and commercial 
theatre sectors and to increase our own understanding of and relationships with 
commercial theatre' is made clear along with a desire to encourage traffic of both 
productions and audiences between subsidised theatre and the West End: 'The 
majority of theatre performances in England take place without our subsidy and so 
we recognise the need to understand the context within which we make our funding 
decisions' (9). 
All of this mirrors the universalizing rhetoric that placed New Labour ‘in the middle’ 
of the political spectrum, enabling it to absorb and assimilate disparate groups and 
their competing demands more easily than it could by claiming allegiance to the Left 
or Right, as it was able to justify concessions to contestations on both sides. New 
Labour maintained the primacy of the market while allowing a role for the state to 
address some of the most glaring inequalities created by market mechanisms: 
‘[W]hile free-market intellectuals criticize the Blair government on many grounds, 
they appear to acknowledge that the underlying commitment to a broadly liberalized 
economic management is a genuine one.’ (Leitner et al 2007, 45). 
Political theatre, cultural capital and reified cultural capital  
As Leitner puts it: 'Much contestation has emerged as a direct response to 
neoliberalism, objecting to its imaginaries and practices and its deleterious impacts, 
particularly on disadvantaged groups and locations.’ (Leitner 2007, 5) ‘First, 
contestations might be directed to specific negative outcomes of neoliberal policies, 
seen as barriers to realizing a particular imaginary, rather than the working of 
neoliberalism in toto.’ (ibid, 13). This is where New Labour placed itself: in 
opposition to specific negative outcomes of neoliberal policies rather than to 
neoliberalism in toto. In addition, groups and individuals who engage in vocal 
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contestation of neoliberalism in toto appear to remain in the minority, and have 
become associated in both the discourses of the government and the mainstream 
media with anarchism and violent direct action; contestation within the mainstream 
centered around specific issues and concerns rather than overarching ideologies. 
This is born out in the policy I have discussed here, and there are several factors 
which make theatre particularly vulnerable to the difficulties theorists have identified 
in Third Way policy-making. Firstly, British theatre has a mixed heritage that sets up a 
binary within its identity. Despite the strides that have been made in developing 
alternative dramatic forms in recent decades, New Labour theatre policy reflected 
concerns that potential audience members might still perceive theatre as being 
irrevocably tied to a canonical, conservative past. At the same time, theatre has 
created formal and aesthetic innovations which have become as much a part of its 
past as the proscenium, with the tension between the two acting as a source of 
invention, homage and subversion. Secondly, theatre more than any other art form 
can be said to function as a microcosmic expression of the mixed economy in that it 
comprises two institutions (the commercial and the publicly-funded) that once ran in 
parallel but have become increasingly interdependent.  Many commentators have 142
made the case that the West End depends on the publicly-funded theatres to bring in 
new work and fresh talent, and current policy encourages publicly-funded theatres to 
seek alternative sources of income within the private sector. Capitalism is presented 
as being the new saviour of the arts, in pragmatic defiance of any hostility that artists 
and audiences might feel.  
There is something to be said here for the well-worn argument that creativity is 
fuelled by rebellion, which is in turn only produced by oppression. At first sight, it 
would appear that Blairite neoliberalism with its rhetoric of inclusion, diversity and 
fairness left little for a rebellious artist to get hold of, for exactly those reasons that 
Driver and Martell identify and that Mark Ravenhill alludes to in the speech I have 
discussed in the introduction. If the dominance of Third Way ideology is concretised 
by a consensus-driven view of society and democracy that claims moral and rational 
superiority, then the resulting post-political landscape produces an erosion of choice. 
Dissent becomes increasingly difficult when antagonism is cast as immoral or 
irrational rather than progressive or radical, and when choice is eroded then so are 
the decisions that can be made and, given that meaningful political participation is 
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about exercising decision-making powers, so is the potential for participation. Even 
as New Labour pulled away from both the New Right and the Old Left, the hijacking 
of terminology and minor concessions to both sides rendered criticism difficult. In 
the early years of the Blair government, while the possibility of a major change in 
political direction was still seen as a possibility (Hall 2004), the optimism of theatres, 
writers and scholars (Matarasso, 1997) did not seem unrealistic. The state seemed 
ready to give financial and ideological support to the arts on conditions that differed 
greatly from those imposed by successive Conservative governments, and the 
possibility of finally working under a government that might be on the side of the 
artists was bound to alter the tone of political theatre. Even now, the Blair years are 
still remembered by some as a 'Golden Age' of arts funding, although others - 
Ravenhill being a high-profile example - question whether it was 'ever really that 
shiny' (Burman 2012) and whether the effect of Third Way policies on the arts may 
be just as oppressive, if more subtly so, as the financial starvation of the Thatcher and 
Major governments .  143
Despite the decline in agit-prop theatre as New Writing rose, theatre had still been 
available to the  practitioners and audiences as a way of exploring and 
understanding the crises of British society and identity in a climate of globalisation 
and increasing market dominance. The plays of Martin Crimp, Sarah Kane and other 
exponents of 'In-Yer-Face Theatre', despite their frequent verbal and physical 
violence, also demand a certain level of subtlety and understanding from an 
audience seeking to read them as political texts, a subtlety which would be in line 
with Bourdieu's embodied cultural capital in terms of the ability and desire to 
decode artworks. Work that raises one kind of cultural capital – that of the Manifesto, 
which implies an enhancement of both prestige and economic opportunity for the 
individual theatre and the sector as a whole – has another kind of cultural capital as 
its precondition. The presence of Bourdieu's embodied cultural capital and symbolic 
mastery in audiences is arguably what makes complex, challenging plays viable, 
especially as political provocations.  
This is where cultural capital and reified cultural capital can create a political short-
circuit. The role of theatre in Third Way politics is to act as a point of reconciliation 
and consensus between private enterprise and state funding, the establishment and 
the excluded, the bureaucratic and the artistic – and this, as demonstrated earlier, is 
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where reified cultural capital comes into its own as a tool for eliminating sites of 
contestation. ACE theatre policy since 1997 has demanded bold, relevant work that 
expresses British identity in all its diversity but does not demand any particular level 
of cultural capital; as we have seen in Chapter 2 with McMaster, ’excellence' in 
performance can be asked to embrace the kind of universality which is central to 
Third Way thought. A piece of theatre should be regionally and culturally specific 
and speak to and about its 'community', but it should also meet more essential 
aesthetic ideals that give it universal appeal and make judgement of its artistic merits 
possible. While reified cultural capital (according to Levitas) obscures class divisions 
with Third Way universality and essentialism, the social processes legible through 
cultural capital according to Bourdieu are those that assure class reproduction; but it 
was only symbolic mastery that enabled the deployment of the political theatre of 
the 1990s. The power of 'In-Yer-Face Theatre' to shock and provoke is where critics 
located its potential to catalyse political change, but for an audience member to 
move beyond the purely emotional response of shock and reach a place of political 
realisation requires a level of cultural confidence and symbolic mastery that Third 
Way discourse locates firmly within the middle class. A Blairite argument would 
state that a national increase in reified cultural capital could break this deadlock, but 
this ignores the difficulty of creating within a Third Way society the kind of startling, 
dissenting art that the 1990s produced.  
Dennis Kelly, speaking at the opening of the Stückemarkt in 2012,  spoke in 144
humorous and often ironic terms of his changing attitudes to the writing of political 
plays between his 2004 play Osama the Hero and the end of the decade: 
I knew that once people saw my argument, things would change. People 
would listen. The war on terror was essentially over and I fully expected a 
withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan by the end of the year. So. I sat back 
and waited. This didn’t happen. I got some good reviews, I got some bad 
reviews, some people liked it, some didn’t and I was commissioned to write 
a new play. Something was wrong, very wrong. I decided to try again. I 
wrote a play called After the End, a play about two people trapped in a 
nuclear fallout shelter after an appalling terrorist attack, only the attack 
hadn’t really happened, and one character was using it as an excuse to 
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control the other. So pleased was I with the metaphor that I knew it was only 
a matter of time – Bush would be thrown out of the White House, Blair 
would be found dead hanging from a lamppost, a two state solution would 
be established between Israel and Palestine and the age of Aquarius would 
be ushered in. Again I waited. 
In this witty, forthright and often comically hyperbolic account, Kelly charts the shift 
in his attitude to what political theatre can, and should, achieve. Having begun his 
career hoping that his work would cause a political storm that would bring the Blair 
government to its knees and finding that all it did was attract the admiration of those 
who already shared the majority of his views, he adjusted his expectations and 
ideals:  
I really do genuinely believe that theatre can change the world. I think it 
does it on a small scale by changing the lives of people who come into 
contact with it. I know this from personal experience – even if I hadn’t 
become a playwright, theatre would have changed my life by being there for 
me. It opened my mind, it has led me on to knew ways of thinking and to 
enjoying thinking and the fact that I went on to get any education at all I 
owe to theatre. But I also believe it changes the world in a bigger sense, 
perhaps a more political sense. I just believe that it does it in conjunction 
with other things. That it is far more subtle than causing an audience to run 
out and man the barricades, and that to expect anything more than that is 
unfair to theatre. 
The next step, which will be taken in the next chapter, is that of examining some key 
political works staged during the Blair years (including those of Dennis Kelly) and 
how they do or do not respond to the Third Way ideology that was present in the 
cultural policies of the time, which I have discussed here. Do the political plays of 
Tanika Gupta or Dennis Kelly's early works, with their head-on approach to specific 
issues, offer the most effective criticism of the status quo, or is it more productive to 
look to the growth of verbatim theatre for work that will fulfil Dennis Kelly's later, 
more moderate ambitions of using theatre to mediate between the personal and the 
political? Having used cultural capital, both together with and discrete from its 
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reified form, to locate theatre and theatre policies within New Labour policy, I shall 
ask how some of the plays on the stage at the time responded to Kelly’s implicit 
challenge to continue the tradition of British political theatre.  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Chapter 4  
Staging the Third Way 
In Rewriting The Nation, Aleks Sierz engages in a lengthy discussion of the portrayal 
of class and racial divisions in the theatre of New Labour Britain. While (as discussed 
here in Chapters 3 and 4) New Labour disquisitions on ‘community’ and great art for 
all made rhetorical moves towards unity and cohesion, much of what was happening 
on British stages during this era told a different story, and Sierz’s commentary 
suggests a reconfiguration of the ‘state of the nation’ play as being ‘better at 
providing vivid images of social fissure [...] than at offering solutions’ (162), 
specifically in England. While Scottish, Northern Irish and Welsh theatre showed 
renewed confidence in national identity and a willingness to explore new 
independence, ‘England often felt as if it was immobile, stuck in a rut of old ideas of 
a split nation’ (ibid.). As Ruth Levitas and Janet Newman have both written, the 
language of inclusivity and community found in Blairite social and cultural policy 
obscured real, deep divisions in the society that New Labour ostensibly sought to 
heal, and this obfuscation (assisted by a culture of managerialism and efficiency) 
impeded political discussion.  
The question implicit in Sierz’s study is an important one: whether or not political 
discussion succeeded in making itself heard through theatre or whether, as Mark 
Ravenhill posited in his Edinburgh speech, the effects of Third Way politics damaged 
theatre’s political potential.  As discussed in the introduction, Ravenhill’s 145
contention is that theatres were seduced by abundant funding into seeking a closer, 
less antagonistic relationship with policy-makers, corporate sponsors and the market, 
and that this ideological shift compromised the potential of theatre to challenge and 
change the systems in which it was becoming enmeshed. Ravenhill’s Edinburgh 
speech, in fact, does not break new political ground but simply recontextualises an 
already familiar theme he had already developed elsewhere, both implicitly and 
explicitly. Peter Buse quotes Ravenhill thus: ‘David Hare and the rest knew in the 
Seventies what they were against. Now nobody knows and nobody cares,’ a succinct 
summation of his argument in the Edinburgh speech that the plasticity of Third Way 
doxa makes it difficult for theatre to locate and perform sites of resistance, especially 
when the theatres themselves are simultaneously seeking the friendship and speaking 
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the language of corporate sponsors and public funding bodies.  The hypothetical 146
artist of the Edinburgh speech is asked whose side she is on in the full understanding 
that it has become almost impossible to locate a side, let alone choose one.   
Some Explicit Polaroids,  the first of Ravenhill’s plays to venture into the territory of 147
conventional political playwriting, may not be sure what side it is on but draws the 
boundaries boldly in exploring the fault line between two paradigms of British 
culture; the tribal political culture of opposition to a clearly-defined adversary and 
the slippery post-political culture of neoliberalism. The strict Marxism of Nick, an 
activist released after a long prison sentence into a London that has become entirely 
unfamiliar, comes into conflict not only with the trash culture familiar from 
Ravenhill’s earlier work but also the more modest demands of reform personified by 
Nick’s formerly radical ex-girlfriend. While all of these come under satirical fire, the 
binary being set up here is not that of Left and Right but of political and post-
political, whether the post-political manifests as well-intentioned managerialism or 
as thrill-seeking nihilism. Resistance is possible, as it is in the unconscious rejection 
of the market economy performed in Shopping and F***ing  (34-39) where Robbie 148
gives away the best part of 500 ecstasy tabs, but this resistance is likely to be 
doomed when faced not only with the polymorphous character of the post-political 
but with the irrelevance of the political strategies that characterised the 1970s. Nick’s 
encounters with the brave new world of his young girlfriend and her friends, 
narcissistic compulsive consumers of drugs and ephemeral enjoyment, leave him 
floundering, and his eventual meeting with his old capitalist adversary finds him 
sapped of any desire for revenge and unable to counter the argument that capitalism 
is, after all, the only option: 
Nick: Wish I had the strength left to hate you. 
Jonathan: I think we both miss the struggle. It’s all been rather easy for me these 
last few years. And I start to feel guilty if things come too easily. But really 
money, capitalism if you like, is the closes we’ve come to the way that people 
actually live. And, sure, we can work out all sorts of other schemes, try and 
plan to make everything better. But ultimately the market is the only thing 
sensitive enough, flexible enough to actually respond to the way we tick. 
Nick: There’s nothing better? 
Jonathan: Maybe in a thousand years but for now... 
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Nick: It’s the best we’ve got. 
Jonathan: Exactly. So. You can spend your time like Helen. Rush around, 
regulate a bit. Soften the blow for a few of the losers. All very necessary. 
Important work. Absolutely [...] Or you can say hey-ho - this is the way things 
are. So let’s get in there and make the most of it. (311) 
In this climate there is no place not only for Nick’s particular brand of dogmatic 
unreconstructed Marxism but for political conviction in toto. Capitalism is not 
politicised; it is simply the only practical way forward, and those with ethical qualms 
must be restricted to mitigating the harshest consequences of the game rather than 
trying to change it.    
More than any other play I discuss in this chapter, Some Explicit Polaroids stages the 
challenge posed to political theatre by a Third Way neoliberal social democracy. It is 
a play that knows exactly what it is against but has no idea what to do about any of 
it, and makes no secret of this. What is the best way to stage a resistance to 
something so hard to locate and define which counters criticism not by opposing it 
but by rendering it irrelevant? The story being told is that of the negotiating of fault 
lines, of the conflicts taking places at the edges of post-political aporia. Returning to 
Barker and Bond’s dissenting voices and to the highly critical analyses of cultural 
policy that have formed the backbone of this thesis so far, the issue that emerges 
most forcefully has been that of an artificial, forced consensus that is perpetuated 
across various fields - policy, research, management, aesthetics, economics - and 
results in a deadening of dissent.  
Verbatim theatre’s political offer and its critics 
The most obviously productive starting point for a discussion of whether theatre 
during the Blair era had a discrete political character that fostered resistance is the 
genre that arguably rose most prominently to the challenges posed by contemporary 
politics during the New Labour years: verbatim theatre. Andrew Haydon, who 
argues  for ‘a qualified ‘golden age’ in the 2000s’ (40), makes a convincing case for 149
verbatim theatre in that decade as the form that ‘touched on almost every possible 
way of working in modern British theatre‘ (48), tying together the different ways of 
working that were explored during this time  and creating a coherent narrative of 150
 124
how theatre did what it did. My own contestation is different; that while the 
development of verbatim forms is indeed significant in constructing the story of 
theatre in the 2000s this significance is not purely formal but also ideological and/or 
discursive. It has a great deal to offer a discussion of how the intersection of theatre 
and the political was mediated by ideas of subjective reality and the relevance of this 
mediation to the Third Way and its critics in the field of political theory. As I move 
through key verbatim works of the period and the accounts given by the writers 
involved in their dramaturgy, my claim is that they share important characteristics 
with Third Way discourse in terms of their attempts to construct an objective reality 
for the spectator to believe and inhabit. I question the ability of the verbatim form to 
disrupt systems of power with which it has many discursive similarities, and whether 
it is politically problematic in ways that did not apply to earlier forms of 
documentary theatre that grew out of the tactics of activism and antagonism.  
The developments and changes within verbatim and other documentary forms has 
been studied extensively, beginning with Derek Paget’s  coining of the term 151
‘Verbatim Theatre’ in 1987 to describe the new manifestations of documentary 
theatre led by Rony Robinson and concentrating on the taped testimony of 
‘‘ordinary‘ people, done in the context of research into a particular region, subject 
area, issue, event, or combination of these things’ (Paget 317) and leading to Janelle 
Reinelt’s acclaimed 2006 examination of the growth of verbatim (and particularly 
tribunal) theatre in Britain. Paget’s 1987 evaluation is class-based, focusing on 
documentary theatre’s Marxist roots and the continuing relevance of Brecht and 
Piscator to British theatre - as well as the more recent influence of Joan Littlewood - 
to construct it as a specifically working-class form. Not only is it rooted in the oral 
history of the communities within which the performances take place and committed 
to the vernacular speech of those communities, it can also be read as Marxian in its 
construction:  
  
Through the systematic display in performance time of the source material 
(which becomes the true protagonist in the drama), the actor is freed not 
only from some of the burdens of conventional playwriting within the 
naturalistic mode, but also from some of those attendant upon the 
characteristic economic determinations of theatre production in this country. 
In common with other manifestations of documentary theatre, Verbatim 
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Theatre can thus offer to actors a greater share in the means of production, 
in the Marxist sense. (318)  
For practitioners like Robinson, Clive Barker and David Thacker, the participation of 
all the actors in the gathering of the material was ‘a fundamental precept’ (Paget 327) 
of their Verbatim Theatre, as it created links between all cast members, the 
community within which they were working and the oral history they were to narrate 
and ensured egalitarian relations between cast and characters; the source material, 
as Paget says, being the protagonist.  
Both Paget and, later, Reinelt  make the point that successful documentary theatre 152
presents the audience with a compelling narrative and theatricality rather than 
‘abstract opinion‘ (Paget 326). For Paget in particular, this means that the political 
potential of a documentary play is contingent upon the conditions of its production 
and the historical narrative it sets out, rather than the opinions and ethics of the 
practitioners who devised it.  Reinelt, in introducing her discussion of the rise of 
documentary forms (and particularly tribunal theatre) in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, fleshes out this key point by pointing to the theatricality of contemporary 
global society and of some of the events which made their way into the tribunal 
plays of the Tricycle: 
Everybody recognizes that we live in theatricalized times. The contemporary 
world, with the United States at the forefront, dramatizes its exploits and its 
romances, its wars and its diplomacy, its major crimes and misdemeanors, its 
sports and entertainment—these latter two, performances by definition [...] 
this time - our time - is aggressively theatrical. (70) 
Recent developments in media technology, she argues, have accelerated the 
spectacularisation of the social and the political . The growth of reality television 153
and the quasi-theatrical presentation of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent 
declarations of wars were symptomatic of a sensibility attuned to a ‘distinctly 
American theatricality’ (Kubiak 2002:2, quoted Reinelt 2006:70) and Britain echoed 
this theatricalisation of public life, as exemplified by the daily dramatic 
reconstructions of the Hutton Inquiry taking place on television the summer before 
the publication of Reinelt’s essay and performance studies-based analyses of the 
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death of Princess Diana appearing in academic journals.  This link between new 
media technology and new ways of theatricalising the public is unpacked further by 
Chris Megson  discussing the distance travelled between the original conventions 154
of Paget’s Verbatim Theatre and the newer form of the tribunal play, where the 
vernacular speech prioritised by Robinson, Thacker etc gives place to ‘the 
intensifying culture of sound bites and ‘spin’ at the exact point of encounter between 
politicians and the institutions and media that hold them to account.’ (204) The 
textual protagonist of the tribunal play, rather than mediating the voice of the 
‘ordinary’ person, replicates the language of contemporary politics in the act of not 
only representing but defending itself. At the same time, as tribunal plays such as The 
Colour of Justice, Half The Picture and Justifying War  are based on transcripts of 155
political proceedings edited by an individual the proximity of the actors to the means 
of production identified by Paget as potentially Marxist is dispersed.  
The growth of verbatim and documentary forms has attracted criticism, most notably 
from Stephen Bottoms  who takes issue with the truth-claim of documentary 156
theatre. Bottoms is highly critical of documentary theatre as a political form, using 
the example of David Hare’s play Stuff Happens and his short essay ‘...on factual 
theatre’ to illustrate a set of perceived political contradictions, and claims that ‘the 
current ‘verbatim theatre’ trend in London has tended to lionize plays that he reads 
as both manipulative and problematically unreflexive regarding the ‘realities’ they 
purport to discuss’ (67). Hare’s writing on verbatim theatre practice here and 
elsewhere provides plenty of ammunition for Bottoms’ critique; his contribution to 
the volume Verbatim Verbatim: Contemporary Documentary Theatre  makes 157
emphatic claims that the public has been let down by journalism in the search for 
the truth and that the role of documentary theatre is to do ‘what journalism fails to 
do’. For him, verbatim theatre is there to ‘fill the void’ left by the mendacity of 
contemporary politics and mainstream journalism and ‘let real life in the door’ (Hare 
118) to give a more honest account of the world. Bottoms finds this approach both 
disingenuous and problematic: 
His masculinist rhetoric casually obscures the fact that realism and reality 
are not the same thing, and that unmediated access to ‘the real’ is not 
something the theatre can ever honestly provide [...] the kind of theatrical 
self-referentiality Hare appears to decry is precisely what is required of 
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documentary plays if they are to acknowledge their dual and thus 
ambiguous status as both ‘document’ and ‘play’. (57)
Bottoms is also perturbed by the way in which Hare, unlike most makers and 
scholars of documentary theatre, neglects the issue of mediation and aligns the truth-
claim of the form with factual rather than dramatic or political truth even when 
interspersing fictional content with documentary material, as in Stuff Happens (a 
combination of interview and press conference transcripts and imagined scenes) 
where Hare’s authorial note claims that ‘what happened happened’ and that nothing 
untrue has knowingly been added to the text: 
There is nothing wrong, of course, with a writer presenting history as 
imaginative fiction, but the claim that “what happened happened,” that the 
events depicted are all “true”, is surely questionable when upwards of 80 
percent of Stuff Happens takes place [...] in a series of conventionally 
realistic scenes depicting reimagined meetings [...] it becomes impossible to 
tell with any reliability where factual reportage stops and political caricature 
starts (60)
Hare is not entirely alone in taking this position; there are hints of it in other 
contributions to Verbatim Verbatim, particularly Nicolas Kent and Richard Norton-
Taylor’s accounts of the creation of the Tricycle’s tribunal plays.  Richard Norton-158
Taylor, himself a highly-respected journalist as well as compiler and editor of many 
of the Tricycle’s tribunal plays, writes of Half The Picture that: ‘during our staging we 
exposed the truth about the Arms to Iraq scandal (...) Exposing the truth has been the 
goal of each of our tribunal plays’ (106). For Norton-Taylor and Kent, those involved 
in the staging of any verbatim play are taking on an ethical responsibility, and that in 
the case of a tribunal play they assume the burden of delivering justice to the people, 
speaking against the frequently mendacious mechanisms of power. Robin Soans,  159
too, writes in the same volume that  
[…] the audience for a verbatim play will enter the theatre with the 
understanding that they’re not going to be lied to. They may be unsettled by 
the unusual way the play is constructed, but they will be compensated for 
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the lack of convention by the assumption that what they are looking at and 
listening to is revelatory and truthful (19) 
Bottoms, once again, finds this stance problematic, as - like Janelle Reinelt - he 
locates the political importance of documentary theatre in its capacity for expressing, 
through dramatic narrative, an important and recognisable part of the audience’s 
experience of public life. As Reinelt says of The Colour Of Justice, the key to the 
dramatic credibility of the play lay in how the murder of Stephen Lawrence was 
‘perceived by the public as the symbolic staging of other, recognisable, features of 
their national or local lives—to embody a certain kind of analogical critique of their 
ways of living’ (74) and so the play could be experienced by the audience as a 
recognisable dramatisation of national, as well as individual, identity. Bottoms takes 
issue with the precise nature of Hare’s truth claim (and, by extension, the creators of 
other tribunal or verbatim plays who have made similar claims) rather than the 
integrity of the form as a whole, arguing that in their determination to lay the bare 
truth before the audience they disregard the political importance of interrogating the 
‘reality’ they present (67). It is in this sense that Bottoms sees Hare’s dramatic strategy 
as manipulative; it discourages any inclination on the part of the audience to be wary 
of the objectivity of the account they are receiving or to recognise the ‘editorialising 
hand’ at work (Megson, 198): ‘‘Like the politicians he satirises, Hare insists he is 
shedding light on hidden truths, but then fabricates his own evidence.’ (Bottoms, 14).  
Discourse and the construction of objectivity 
The parallel Stephen Bottoms locates between the verbatim theatre he criticises and 
the politics of the Blair era is less glib than it appears at first reading, as it can be 
pursued beyond the straightforward accusations of mendacity familiar from the 
political repercussions of, for example, the Iraq War. Bastow and Martin  touch on 160
this as they seek to construct an understanding of Third Way politics which moves 
beyond attempts at ideological classification, seeking rather to analyse it as 
discourse. As discussed in the previous chapter, Third Way politics has been 
constructed both as an alternative to the class politics of the Left and to the harsh 
excesses of unbridled neoliberalism on the right, and while it is often read as an 
ideology in itself, Bastow and Martin argue that it is better understood as ‘a mode of 
ideological reasoning’ (2) which, in moving towards a politics ‘beyond 
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antagonism’ (1), co-opts various discursive elements from existing, ideologically 
distinct areas of political thought. As such, it can be read most effectively as 
discourse, which allows for a deeper and more careful analysis of the way in which it 
is produced and constituted - and, most interestingly, how it is constitutive of its own 
conditions. Reading Third Way as an ideology assumes that it arises as a response to 
a set of external, objective conditions; to read it as discourse, however, is to 
comprehend it as also constructive of those conditions: 
[...] the way the doctrine helps constitute the very objectivity of the world it 
is supposed to represent. The Third Way automatically positions itself as a 
more objective account of social conditions than the (first and second) 
partial views it claims to transcend. The latter can then be dismissed as 
insufficiently objective, one-sided and therefore limited. Thus the Third Way 
rhetorically invokes a ‘clearing’ between these one-sided views in which the 
full objectivity of social conditions can come into view. [...] the Third Way 
itself is bound up with defining what the objective constraints of the social 
world are. (6) 
Bastow and Martin’s explanation of the difference between ideological and discourse 
analysis is based on that set up by Mouffe and Laclau in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy.  In the introduction to H&SS the genesis of their reading of ‘discourse’ is 161
laid out in terms of its roots in analytical philosophy, phenomenology and 
structuralism. In all three of these currents, Mouffe and Laclau trace a movement 
away from an illusion of unmediated, immediate relations between signs and that 
which they signify (to use the Structuralist terminology) and towards a recognition of 
discursive mediation. The central particularity of their account of discourse is the 
way the concept of political articulation  is situated within it; this concept 162
separates their formulations from those of Foucault in that it makes it possible to 
reject the idea that anything is ‘non-discursive’, situated outside discourse. For 
Mouffe and Laclau, articulation describes the process by which elements which have 
no intrinsic political or class position (Laclau’s earlier works take nationalism as an 
example) are brought into proximity within a discourse. It is the way in which those 
elements are combined, their relative positions in a discourse, that creates 
ideological significance; the articulation of elements is always political in that it 
demonstrates participation in one discursive field rather than another. While a 
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structuralist analysis would posit a closed discursive totality, in which each element 
is transmuted into a necessary ‘moment’ within a system of structural positions, 
Mouffe and Laclau’s account owes more to poststructuralism (particularly to Derrida 
and the concept of the undecideable), and constructs the discursive as a system 
which is never entirely closed and in which the transformation from ‘elements’ to 
‘moments’ remains incomplete, thus affirming the continuing possibility of 
articulation.  
This clarifies Bastow and Martin’s assertion that the efforts of New Labour’s Third 
Way politics to create a synthesis to which centre and Left can subscribe is best 
understood in terms of theory that can comprehend an assemblage of apparently 
disparate political elements which, being brought into discursive proximity, acquire a 
new ideological significance. Rather than reifying ideologies by casting them as sets 
of immutable core concepts, like some of the earlier critics they identify, Bastow and 
Martin read New Labour’s version of Third Way discourse as a configuration of 
dislocated elements which, as they are articulated, modify the previously existing 
principles as per Derrida’s ‘logic of supplementarity’ (60).  
Moreover, the discourse theory of H&SS operates independently from the 
philosophical debate around the existence of a objective external reality. If, as they 
theorise, all knowledge is constituted by discourse, then the means by which it is 
known is constitutive of its reality: 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing 
to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/
idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that 
certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of 
my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 
'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist 
externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could 
constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of 
emergence. (108) 
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Here and earlier in the same chapter Mouffe and Laclau establish their opposition to 
Foucault’s idea of the non-discursive, which is echoed by Bastow and Martin in the 
passage quoted above. Bastow and Martin’s view brings an extra theoretical nuance 
to Bottoms’ statement that verbatim writers who claim objective veracity are 
remarkably similar to the political systems they accuse. In setting up a true/false 
binary between their own accounts and those of government, or those present in 
mainstream news coverage, they make a move which is comparable to that theorised 
by Bastow and Martin between ideology and discourse in Third Way politics. To 
return to the point made by Chris Megson in his analysis of Half The Picture, the later 
Tricycle tribunal plays and David Hare’s verbatim work point to a perceived 
‘democratic deficit’ which they try to remedy by seeking an objective truth which, 
once revealed, will change the terms of any future debate on the matter. For an 
audience member of Stuff Happens or dramatisations of the Scott and Hutton 
Inquiries, discussions of the circumstances leading to and surrounding the Iraq War 
will always be inflected by those plays, as is the case with any memorable theatrical 
experience (documentary or fiction) pertaining to historical or current events - with 
the important difference that, as Robin Soans has said, the audience has been 
encouraged to bring to it a new set of expectations involving objectivity. As with 
Bastow and Martin’s critique of Third Way discourse, a ‘clearing’ is created which 
enables the dismissal of ‘insufficiently objective’ accounts and acts as a boundary to 
the audience’s perceptions, thus becoming constitutive of a reality which defines 
itself (and so comes to be defined by a hypothetical audience) as objectively true. So, 
while Bottoms’ argument that David Hare’s process in creating Stuff Happens mirrors 
that which it criticises by ‘inventing evidence’ is certainly sustainable, the line which 
he does not take is more interesting: that even where nothing is invented, Hare’s 
truth-claim creates a link with the political processes being attacked on the stage. 
The version of events presented by Hare, or Kent and Norton-Taylor may differ 
entirely from that presented by Blair and Bush, but it has been produced in the same 
way and to the same end, that of defining objective reality.  
Subverting the objective subject - Kelly and Crouch 
The most notable subversion of verbatim theatre to be staged during the period under 
discussion was one which, although it did not touch on the specific questions of 
tribunal plays, is still highly relevant to the issues set up by Bottom, Bastow and 
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Martin. Dennis Kelly’s deconstruction of the verbatim play, Taking Care of Baby  - 163
first co-produced by Birmingham Repertory Theatre and Hampstead Theatre in 2008 
in a production by Anthony Clark - presents itself initially as a verbatim play based 
on the case of a woman convicted and then acquitted of the murder of her two 
children and drawn from interviews with the accused, her family and her 
psychiatrist. In accordance with the playwright’s stipulations, none of the publicity 
material released prior to the opening of the play revealed the fictional nature of the 
characters and dialogue (although no direct claim was ever made to the contrary). At 
the opening of the play, an on-stage screen presents the audience with the following 
words: 
The following has been taken word for word from interviews and 
correspondence. Nothing has been added and everything is in the subjects’ 
own words, though some editing has taken place. Names have not been 
changed. (5) 
which by the beginning of the second act have become 
The following has been word from taken word for interviews and 
correspondence. Everything is in the subjects’ own words and place, nothing 
has been added though some has taken editing. All names have been 
changed. (31) 
and finally 
The taken word for following word has been correspondence from and 
interviews. Nothing has been everything and words added in the subjects’ is 
own, though taken editing has pomle sace. Chamed nanges heeve ban all. 
(61) 
Meanwhile, the characters’ versions of events collide with and subvert each other, 
luring the audience and the off-stage character of the author into a relentlessly 
disorientating kaleidoscope of reevaluations, recontextualisations and shifting 
perspectives. Subjected to revelation after contradictory revelation, both narrative 
and characters begin to collapse, often (especially in the confined, claustrophobic 
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space of Birmingham Rep’s studio theatre) causing extreme emotional discomfort in 
the audience. Much of the power of the performance resided in the feelings of 
complicity with one perspective or another that were repeatedly aroused in the 
audience only to be complicated or derailed by a new revelation which turned the 
audience’s loyalties on their heads and placed them abruptly ‘on the wrong side’. 
When the traumatised Donna McAuliffe (the accused) screams incoherent abuse at 
her mother Lynn, who in turn begs the ‘writer’ to stop recording (58-60), audience 
members at the first performance squirmed in their seats and even covered their 
faces, made deeply uncomfortable by their own sudden move from compassionate 
observers to unwelcome voyeurs.   164
Kelly uses the assumption posited by Robin Soans, that of objectivity on the part of 
the text,  to bring the audience to a deeper, more radical state of questioning. The 
elision of ‘revelatory’ and ‘truthful’ suggested in Kent and Norton-Taylor’s remarks on 
tribunal theatre is exploded by Kelly’s pseudo-verbatim technique; in the course of a 
narrative which, following Reinelt, the audience recognises as congruent with our 
social and political experience, the audience comes to the gradual realisation that 
the material is entirely fictional. Revelations, of which there are a great many in this 
play, are constructive. They shape the narrative and direct the audience’s perceptions, 
and are constitutive of what the audience perceives, from moment to moment, as the 
objective reality of the play. Truth, therefore, is constructed rather than constructing; 
from the disjunct revelations of Kelly’s text a discourse emerges which, dissonant 
though it is, the audience is invited to accept. In the first act of Taking Care Of Baby, 
the character of the psychiatrist - presented first as a source of unassailable 
rationalism and later as a discredited drunk - explains the (fictional) diagnosis he has 
reached, a mental illness which causes mothers to murder their children because 
they cannot simultaneously endure the raw emotional state motherhood produces in 
them and collude with the lies that have hitherto protected them from a full 
understanding of the horrors of the world. The treatment of this condition, he tells the 
imagined interviewer, consists of retraining these parents to understand that: ‘truth is 
relative... I mean it isn’t. But we have to think that to live, don’t we.’ (23)  
This way of constructing reality, now familiar from Bastow, Martin, Mouffe and 
Laclau, takes on an explicitly political significance as the play progresses. The same 
character, Dr Millard, produces an analysis of the gap between the effects of late 
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capitalism and the rhetoric of compassion that echoes Ruth Levitas and Janet 
Newman:  
You, me, politicians, newspapers, celebrities, we all care about the beggar, 
oh God, we really care about the beggar. But the beggar is still there. And, in 
fact, there are more and more beggars, and the more beggars there are the 
more we care, we really do, gosh, we care so much, yet the beggar is still 
there [...] It’s the contradiction. It’s the disparity between what society says it 
thinks and what its actions tell us it thinks [...] (22) 
and later explains the disorientating effect of the information saturation caused by 
new media technologies: 
we watch the famine, we are in Darfur, running from the militia, we see the 
polar bear drowning in the arctic, we are on the British street with the 
beggar, yet this is something our social, economic and political systems 
weren’t designed to cope with, they are rooted in a different time. They’re 
left floundering in the wake of all this information, gasping, dying, really. But 
they just carry on because we haven’t yet figured out another way. (22) 
Taking Care of Baby reads at the outset as an illustration of Reinelt’s Aristotelian 
breakdown of the necessary ingredients for a successful piece of documentary 
theatre. A serious yet colourful situation that will engage the public, a 
comprehensible narrative which maps onto the narrative of the society or community 
from which the audience will be drawn, clear unambiguous characters who play 
recognisable roles: the tormented victim of a miscarriage of justice, the supportive 
and selfless mother who campaigns tirelessly on her behalf, the expert who seeks to 
exonerate her. As the play continues, those characters and relations shift, subverting 
the conventions the audience expects from verbatim theatre, and - most revealingly - 
Lynn, the mother of the accused woman, moves from Old Labour idealist to Third 
Way archetype as she rejects her political roots to eventually seek office through an 
alliance with the Conservative Party, constructing her own political discourse from 
discrete elements in a way that recalls Laclau.  
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Kelly’s choice of the verbatim form at once supports and troubles Reinelt’s analysis of 
its recent success as a political genre. Documentary evidence provides a bulwark 
against the chronic uncertainties of a postmodernist world in which everything is 
understood to be a copy of a copy, and the rehearsing of factual evidence, of 
materiality, has political potency when set against a hypertheatricalised 
contemporary culture dominated by mimesis and fiction (Reinelt 81). At the same 
time, reading public events through performance analysis and linking them with 
narrative tropes can, paradoxically, make their reality more legible (83). While Taking 
Care Of Baby demonstrates an understanding of all of this and uses it to great effect, 
the play also disturbs the reassuring facticity of the document by using the imagined 
authority of its sources as elements of a discourse which is perpetually in flux, 
alternately building, reconstituting and eventually dismantling realities. Rather than 
accepting the faith of an audience in the promise of documentary, Kelly uses it to 
persuade the audience to reveal the constitutive discourses of the plays’ narratives 
and ideologies.   
Megson’s observation regarding the similarities between the later tribunal plays and 
modern journalism gains even more weight in the light of these subversions of other 
verbatim forms; the denial of the illusory element, which is rendered both 
increasingly powerful and increasingly well-hidden by the artistry involved in the 
tribunal plays he critiques, has acquired a post-political dimension highly 
characteristic of Third Way discourse. Even where the intent is to disrupt (as Hare 
assures us it is) a mendacious version of events which, coming from a position of 
power, has initially been constructed as truth, the tactics being used are drawn not 
from antagonism or activism, like those of the Living Newspaper projects of the 
1930s, but from Third Way discourse itself. What is presented to the audience is 
something which, despite being seamless and immaculately-crafted, still lays claim 
to objective truth. The politically vital ‘promise of radical presence’ (Megson, 207) is 
compromised from two directions - firstly by the visual aesthetic of ‘seamless 
coverage’ and, at a deeper level, by the post-political discourse produced by a 
performance that places itself, like Third Way politics, ‘beyond antagonism’. 
In a similar vein, Esther Leslie,  via Walter Benjamin’s The Work of Art in the Age of 165
its Reproducibility, writes that the political has been spectacularised to the point of 
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irrelevance by the slick, reifying constraints not of fascism but of the media under 
late capitalism: 
Walter Benjamin’s closing statements to his Artwork essay, on ‘the 
aestheticisation of politics’ and the ‘politicisation of art’, have taken on a 
new validity. It is easy to observe an aestheticisation of politics everywhere 
today. We live in a world of mediated political spectacle that enforces 
passivity and knee-jerk reactions. Politics is a show that we are compelled to 
watch and where the ‘sides’ on offer are simply divisions within the 
essentially identical.  
The later Tricycle tribunal plays, then, are vulnerable to criticism not only from 
theorists of democracy such as Bastow, Martin, Mouffe and Laclau but also from the 
perspective of Marxian aesthetics. Here, as Megson has theorised, the political 
spectacle is so carefully mediated that the mediation becomes invisible, rendering 
audience members passive and accepting and constructing them as consumers rather 
than citizens - and, as Benjamin predicted, the preferred viewing matter for 
consumption here is war. As Leslie explains:  
War has become the ultimate artistic event, because it satisfies the new 
needs of the human sensorium, which have been remoulded technologically. 
This was the completion of l’art pour l’art, or aestheticism, as seen in 1936, 
which means that everything is an aesthetic experience, even war. Humanity 
watches a techno-display of ‘shock and awe’ proportions, which amounts to 
its own torture. It revels in it.  
From Esther Leslie’s Benjaminian criticism, made in 2006, of the way in which war is 
covered and consumed by Western mainstream media, it is a small step to Chris 
Megson’s point regarding the reifying effect of the later tribunal plays not only on the 
media but on the subject matter itself. The truth-claim of tribunal theatre, verbatim 
theatre and other documentary forms is an important stage in this process as without 
it the audience might be prone to analyse and question the facts (rather than the 
dramatic validity) or what they hear, in the way that they are encouraged to do by 
Taking Care Of Baby. Instead, in consuming a constructed version of objective reality 
regarding the events and circumstances surrounding war, the audiences of the later 
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tribunal plays are invited to submit to a distortion of consciousness whereby 
subjective positions are seen as political weaknesses (rather than necessities) and 
objectivity is the only valid determinant. Where more overtly polemical 
documentary pieces like Half The Picture might, through unapologetic use of 
archetypes and composite characters, come closer to the criteria of Benjamin in 
providing an impetus towards activity and towards a melding of art with the 
everyday, a performance which presents a reified, post-political version of reality to a 
pacified audience begins to look less and less like a powerful political provocation. 
The idea of the pacified audience, already familiar from Barker’s Arguments 
discussed in the opening chapter, is explored and then exploded by Kelly by 
conflating (in what can be read as another nod to Barker) the real and the ‘false’. Tim 
Crouch, performing a similar conflation in The Author,  moves a step closer to 166
explicit examination of the anatomy of the pacified audience by mobilising 
playwright, actors and audience as characters as Crouch, playing a fictionalised 
version of himself, participates in a discussion of the writing and staging of a play 
which has led to him making a suicide attempt. Aside from the immersive nature of 
the piece, which calls for ‘two banks of seating, facing each other, comfortably 
spaced apart but with no ‘stage’ area in between’ with the actors (also using their 
real names) who speak the scripted dialogue sitting amongst the paying audience 
members, the staging directions encourage the audience to relax and to feel ‘cared 
for’ (18) despite the emotionally brutal content of the story they are hearing.  
Gruelling material, as one of Crouch’s characters makes clear, is no guarantee of a 
profound and disturbing theatrical experience. Chris, a caricature of a London 
theatre addict, enthuses to a fellow audience member:  167
I get here and I go flop! I go, phew! It feels like in here anything is possible 
and it’s safe. It’s all safe! I’ve seen everything imaginable here. I’ve seen bum 
sex and rimming and cock sucking and wankings and rapings and stabbings 
and shootings and bombings. Bombings and bummings!! […] And nobody 
knows […] we’re here, in here, safe in here, enjoying our Maltesers and our 
bum sex. (48) 
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As a serial audience member, Chris constructs his spectatorial role as one of cosy 
voyeurism. He consumes theatre much as he consumes his Maltesers, in a manner 
that does not threaten his personal or political perspectives, and while he speaks of 
theatre as ‘such an education’ (48) it is unclear what form this education has taken 
for him. The actors in Crouch’s fictional play, however, have found themselves and 
their lives altered by the deeper level of immersion demanded by the writer and 
director; for them the theatre has ceased to be a safe space for viewing atrocities in 
comfort. By immersing these ‘actors’ and the writer in the audience (rather than the 
other way round, as immersive theatre audiences have come to expect), The Author 
reconfigures the role of the spectator, rendering it more ambiguous. Not only can the 
spectator choose to become a participant, a participant may also spectate, and even 
while the company is soothed and nurtured by the beautiful lighting and musical 
interludes called for in the stage directions each individual audience member is free 
to choose between comfortable detachment and traumatic engagement.  
This is the choice that the fictional Tim Crouch relates in the play’s final reveal, 
where he describes masturbating to images of child pornography in the same room 
as his colleague Esther’s sleeping baby:  
Tim: I have the choice to continue. 
                    I have the choice to stop. 
His choice to continue and the discovery of that choice by the baby’s mother 
precipitates his suicide attempt (an attempt the success of which, as ‘Tim’ here is a 
fictional character, we cannot determine) and closes the circle of participation and 
spectatorship. He watches, but in watching he also acts and is in turn seen to watch/
act by Esther, who chooses to leave the performance space - refusing to watch or to 
act - immediately after these events are related. At this point the pacified audience 
personified by Chris ceases to be a viable option. The theatre of The Author is no 
longer a space for watching others but a space in which we make choices and bear 
witness to those choices. As Crouch writes in the introduction, ‘The request the play 
makes is for us to be okay about ourselves, to gently see ourselves and ourselves 
seeing.’ (18) The safety sought by Chris is not part of the play’s request or its offer; if 
safety is to be found it is through an acceptance of having chosen to continue or to 
stop, to be a part of a story of trauma, violence and abuse or to withdraw from it.  
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Here as in Taking Care of Baby there is no room for complacency or assumptions 
regarding objectivity, but Crouch brings this about by removing rather than 
heightening elements of spectacularisation. With no formal beginning or end to the 
play, minimal distinction between actor and spectator and all participants using their 
own names, the mediation of theatre itself becomes the focus of scrutiny and 
interrogation as an informal discussion of an imagined theatrical experience 
becomes itself the performance. The theatre of The Author is the lens through which 
it observes its own dissection, and every aspect of it invites questioning from the 
multiple perspectives invoked by its structure. Despite the binaristic language in 
which ‘Tim’ couches his own decision, the identities forming within the performance 
space are anything but binary; they are fluid and multiple. This plasticity of identity 
and perspective does not, however, invite an amorphous consensus in the manner of 
the Third Way. Instead, the necessity of choosing, from moment to moment, how to 
inhabit (to borrow a phrase from Deleuze and Guattari) a self that is several has the 
potential to produce a spectatorial and performing identity that is perpetually new, 
raw and radical in its pluralism. Where the subject implied by Third Way discourse is 
pacified, homogenous, mired in a consensus she consumes rather than creates, 
Crouch’s theatrical subject is heterogenous, agonistic, perpetually in the act of 
choosing.  
In this, perhaps, we can locate something of the ‘radical innocence’ posited by Bond 
as the only means by which theatre might rebuild its relationship with democracy, 
justice and the utopian.  To invoke Mouffe and Laclau’s distinction once again, the 168
subjectivity of The Author is an ethical rather than a moral one, existing as it does in 
the perpetual liminal space where one moment’s choice falls into the next and thus 
escaping the constraints of anything as absolute as morality. As Bond reminds us, 
morality and innocence are uneasy bedfellows; innocence must be corrupted for 
unjust societies to flourish as they require not only behavioural conformity but also 
conformity of belief, and this corruption takes place at the intersection of morality 
and power. The fugitive subject of The Author, running the fault lines between one 
moment of ethical potential and the next, performs the possibility of evading the 
moral through her constant reinvention in the space between innocence and 
corruption, continuing and stopping. ‘Where are you with hope?’ Chris asks his 
fellow audience members (22), and this continuous and undecideable instant, hinted 
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at by Bond as a source of utopian potentiality, is where Jill Dolan begins her search 
for hope at the theatre, for the eponymous Utopia in Performance.  169
Ideological policy, utopian performance 
I have already examined  some of the utopian strains present in New Labour 170
cultural policy, with its particular Third-Way-inflected approach to addressing the 
social divisions observed by Sierz, and the inadequacies of New Labour rhetoric to 
addressing the aesthetic dimension of politics in performance. I now turn back to the 
more complex and nuanced constructions of utopia adumbrated in Chapter 2 with 
recourse to Adorno, Marcuse and Bloch, and make another move back to the stage 
to investigate, via Jill Dolan and her concept of the utopian performative, whether 
forms of theatre other than the verbatim might be better placed to tell and politicise 
stories about national identity while opening up spaces where the utopian impulse 
might emerge more fully than it does in the compromised communitarianism of 
Blair.  
 Returning briefly to Howard Barker, it is pertinent to recall Michael Billington’s 
criticism of The Loud Boy’s Life: ‘Mr Barker offers us superior melodrama when we 
hunger for tangible fact’.  Billington needed answers, strategies, a concrete 171
proposal for a way forward in order to find the hope that Karoline Gritzner, content 
with more nuanced and less determinedly empirical encounters, finds in Barker’s 
manifestations of the sublime.  Dolan’s quest for the utopian performative (via J.L. 172
Austin) is, like Gritzner’s location of the sublime in Barker, not dependent on explicit 
stagings of what a utopian society might look like. In an earlier essay  she quotes 173
Dragan Klaic:  
Theater has trouble presenting utopia convincingly without making the 
spectator yawn [...] Utopia is, by its very nature, without conflict - a state of 
stasis, harmony, and balance. These are not ingredients for exciting theater, 
which is always based on conflict, opposition, and contradiction, or at least 
tension.  (Klaic, 61) 174
There is an important distinction for both Dolan and Klaic between the staging of 
utopia and utopia in performance, and it is a distinction that Klaic explores at length 
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by creating his own basic taxonomy of the intersections between utopia and theatre. 
In this taxonomy he includes the overtly dystopian (a genre particularly familiar to 
British theatre audiences) as well as the didactic, the mystical and the nostalgic. 
Dolan’s approach, by contrast, is unapologetically driven by the affective dimension 
of performance, one that can only frustrate the need of policymakers to categorise, 
concretise and quantify: 
I write about my experiences at performances as ones of both intellect and 
affect; at a performance, I watch performers and audiences think and feel, 
and do the same along with them. Part of my project is to describe the 
performance’s effect on the audience as a temporary community, perhaps 
inspired by communitas to feel themselves citizens of a no-place that’s a 
better place, citizens who might then take that feeling into other sites of 
public discourse. (14-15) 
In The Author we find a liminal quality common to many of the performances and 
moments explored by Dolan, as well as a final injunction to ‘look after each other 
[…] creating an imperfect act of love and hope’ (60). The audience is invited and 
encouraged, after an isolating and individuating experience that has turned each 
individual subject’s gaze upon herself, to come together in a communitas that has 
been renewed by its brush with separateness. The audience meets itself again at the 
close of the play in a different, more hopeful and loving configuration that is a 
powerful example of the utopian moments sought by Dolan, ‘moments of liminal 
clarity and communion, fleeting, briefly transcendent bits of profound human feeling 
and connection’ (168). Dolan is also in search of ways for the utopian performative 
to extend beyond the curtain call and make itself known to the social in other forms 
(34); The Author leaves that challenge in the hands of the audience by dispensing 
with the final curtain entirely. The audience’s affective response, its decision to 
cohere in communitas or remain estranged from itself, is the ending - and, as the 
published script often reminds its reader, the ending is free to be different each time. 
The audience, in unwitting support of Dolan’s contestation that the utopian 
performative may rehearse participatory democracy, decides how the performance 
will end by choosing whether or not to accept its invitation to the utopian moment.   
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Dolan, like Bloch and Benjamin before her, is preoccupied with the relationship 
between hope and temporality and the role that the Benjaminian simultaneous 
instant can play in allowing a glimpse of an alternative futurity. Her own relationship 
with events of recent American history and specifically 9/11 is comparable to 
Adorno’s with the Holocaust in that it demands a radical reevaluation of what art can 
mean in the aftermath of terror. Three of the performances Dolan chooses to explore, 
in a chapter entitled ‘Militant Optimism’ (139-166) 
[…] address life and death, transformations wrought publicly by history and 
privately by age; they evoke, in singular ways, a rather melancholic yearning 
for a different future, fueled by wistful but persistent hope, all three travel an 
axis of time in which the most powerful emotions become ephemeral, 
evanescent moments of feeling; all three performances trade in imagistic and 
semantic anachronisms (142) 
This is a description that for the British theatregoer immediately recalls one of the 
most critically and publicly acclaimed plays of recent years: Jez Butterworth’s 
Jerusalem.  The phenomenal success of Jerusalem coincided with a time of 175
turbulence for British theatre and its political context; as Jerusalem opened at the 
Royal Court Theatre in 2009, the arts world - and theatre in particular - was still raw 
from the previous year’s events in which the strained relationship between ACE and 
the theatre had come to a head.  As the play transferred to the West End, Britain 176
prepared for the General Election that would introduce a Conservative-led Coalition 
government. Throughout all of this Johnny ‘Rooster’ Byron’s reign of misrule 
continued to flourish on various stages, characteristically untrammelled by the 
vicissitudes of parliamentary politics. As Charlotte Higgins wrote, ‘I've been 
presented with a vision of Englishness that doesn't make me want to spew […] I 
began to think about the levellers, the diggers, the wonderful and outre sects thrown 
up by the English revolution’.   177
In answer to Aleks Sierz’s questions, reiterated at the opening of this chapter, the 
astounding popularity of Jerusalem with London audiences  resonates with 178
Higgins’ enthusiasm for a performance of English identity that is raucous, rebellious 
and rude. Dolan’s ‘axis of time’ is heavily and subversively present, dispelling 
sentimental ideas of ‘Olde England’ in favour of a carnivalesque temporal riot where 
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the mysteries of England’s past and present enjoy a boisterous, playful and sometimes 
dangerous meeting. The community evoked by Jerusalem is, as Higgins intimates, 
one of solidarity with England’s history of insurrection framed as a party in which the 
audience is forcefully invited to join, leaving ideological consensus at the door.   
A contrasting invocation of mythology and national identity was in play in Tanika 
Gupta’s 2002 play Sanctuary, in which a cross-section of multicultural Britain re-
enacts the Fall of Man in a London churchyard.  The peace of the garden, over 179
which benevolent vicar Jenny and her close friend and gardener Kabir preside, is 
gradually eroded by the intrusion of capitalism (in the form of redevelopment and 
gentrification) and eventually exploded by the aftershock of the Rwandan genocide. 
Here, hopes of coexistence without conflict are dashed as the proposed utopia of the 
garden is torn apart by the personal and political histories of its inhabitants which 
make it impossible for the violence of their pasts to recede into peaceable 
consensus. Klaic writes 
Following Manheim’s opposition of ideology and utopia, one must conclude 
that much of theater peddles ideological constructs in a utopian coating, that 
many of theater’s most blissful elements stem from pseudo-utopian 
constellations which, in fact, rationalize current modes of existence (67) 
Sanctuary strenously avoids falling into this trap, allowing the flaws in contemporary 
ideology to take centre stage. Multiculturalism and diversity, as in much of Gupta’s 
political work (particularly Gladiator Games and Sugar Mummies), are not 
comfortable and easy; committing to them means confronting elements of cultural, 
racial and economic difference which are deeply painful. These problematics recall 
Levitas’ scepticism regarding New Labour communities; the rhetoric of togetherness 
is ideological rather than utopian in character when it fails to take up the challenges 
implied by Sanctuary and ignores the real social divisions that are enacted in 
everyday life.  
Sanctuary’s garden performs national identity as a dystopian, disrupted Eden from 
which we are expelled when the violence between other, opposing constituents of 
our identities can no longer be suppressed. However, Klaic’s claim that ‘Even when 
theater portrays dystopian circumstances of utter bleakness and terror, utopian hope 
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looms in the background’ (61) holds true here, as does Dolan’s militant optimism. 
While Sanctuary acknowledges what humans have expressed through mythology, 
that there can be no Eden without a serpent, the horrors it enacts do not preclude an 
alternative future. The triumphant departure of school-leaver Ayesha, who ends the 
play in an effusive outpouring of enthusiasm for her own imagined future, can be 
heard as naivety but also as a radical innocence that contains utopian power: 
Ayesha: I’ve been institutionalized all these years. It’s like breaking free form 
prison. I’ve got the key in my hand and I’ve opened the door. Step out into 
the light and breathe the fresh air. My life begins today […] oh, and little 
banana tree, how small your leaves seem but one day you’ll be able to poke 
your head up higher than that wall. Then they’ll really notice you. (114) 
With her formal education over, Ayesha is ready not only to shed the constraints of 
her unsatisfactory home life but also to leave the illusory peace of an Eden which 
faces imminent physical as well as spiritual demolition. To an audience that has just 
witnessed the exposure of Michael as a man complicit in genocide, his subsequent 
murder by Kabir and the concealment of that murder by Jenny and her conservative, 
middle-England mother Margaret, Ayesha’s explosion of joyful futurity is jarring, but 
productively so. As in Dolan’s account of Fiona Shaw’s performance in Medea, the 
affective dissonance is what creates the space for the utopian performative to 
emerge. 
All the plays and modes of performance I have discussed here bring their own 
responses to Ravenhill’s provocation; the empirically confrontational, the cognitively 
dissonant, the humorous, the playful and the traumatised. All of them also, perhaps 
inevitably, hold open Dolan’s question of whether the utopian performative needs to 
have a concrete, observable follow-through outside the context of the performance 
in order to be judged as politically efficacious. This intervention by Dolan is vital 
firstly in that it returns us not only to Barker and the primacy of the dramatic 
encounter over any future development's in the spectator’s subjectivity, and secondly 
in that it disrupts the project discussed in Chapter 2 of measuring the political 
potential of theatre with recourse only to what happens outside the performance 
space. In my next, and final, chapter, I examine recent developments in how 
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academic research and policymaking is reevaluating this question and how existing 
scholarship on the history of British theatre can point towards a more agonistic 
theory of economic, intrinsic and social value.   
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Chapter 6: 
The Value of Theatre 
In this chapter, I return to the question of policy. Previous chapters have touched on 
the issue of autonomy and whether funders and philanthropists have 'purchased' 
cultural privilege and, by extension, political theatre, and looked at the plays 
themselves – here, I will look at some ways to align research with cultural policy-
making that have lately been explored and make use of some historical context 
regarding the economics of theatre, as well as developing some of the ideas set out 
by current cultural policy scholars - most particularly Belfiore & Bennett - and how 
they can be interrogated and refined with recourse to Adorno and Horkheimer. This 
will also involve a brief account of the existing debate within cultural policy studies 
as to the relationship between cultural studies and the study of cultural policy, 
invoking the different positions of Tony Bennett  and Jim McGuigan. Given that the 180
politicisation of theatre is particularly vulnerable to Third Way discourse (for reasons 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5), can the proposed new systems of assessing cultural 
value continue to support the financial prosperity of subsidised theatre in the face of 
government cuts to the arts while simultaneously helping its practitioners to resist 
ideological influences that reproduce Third Way discourse on stage?  
I also make use of the historiographical projects of Tracy C. Davis in giving some 
context to the economics of theatre, which requires some explanation. As with the 
presence of Barker and Bond at the opening of my thesis, it is necessary to bridge the 
chronological and disciplinary gap between Davis’ scholarship and the issues 
pertinent to political theatre under New Labour. As I shall discuss, Davis herself 
sketches parallels (although she does not develop them fully) between the 
relationship between market and social good in the 1800s and that between stage 
and state under the New Labour government. In both, considerable tension is 
observable between financial imperatives and the public good and the reconciliation 
between the two is problematic. Not only does Davis gives a compelling account of 
the shift from aristocratic patronage to state funding, she also makes a particularly 
useful intervention in theatre scholarship regarding the economics of theatre. The 
different strains of economic theory Davis brings to bear on the questions of theatre 
as ‘service’ or as ‘public good’ and of the various value systems in which theatre may 
participate provide a nuanced reading due to Davis’ interdisciplinary approach; she 
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reads the economic history of theatre as a political narrative in which ideology and 
discourse, as well as finance, play a part, and this is where I locate her particular 
utility in opening up the closed systems of discourse surrounding the nexus of stage, 
state and society in Third Way disquisition. Reviving her formulations and modes of 
thought here will supply a fresh perspective on how this nexus functions and remind 
us of the fluidity it has historically enjoyed (or endured).  
‘Testing times’ - economic impact and austerity 
On 24 April 2013, the then Culture Secretary Maria Miller delivered a keynote 
speech at the British Museum , her first major speech since her appointment to the 181
job. The title was ‘Testing times: Fighting culture’s corner in an age of austerity’, and 
it was reported widely in the national press as a defence of the commodification of 
the arts that demonstrated little commitment to fighting for culture. Peter Dominiczak 
in The Telegraph called the speech ‘a broadside bound to provoke anger in the arts 
world’ while Kiran Stacey of the Financial Times summarised the text as telling arts 
leaders to ‘stop moaning about government cuts and start making the case for how 
their organisations can boost economic growth’. Miller’s speech, coming before a 
public spending review in which 10% cuts for the arts were predicted, argued for 
arts funding taking a position at the centre of efforts to restore economic growth, 
claiming that it has economic potential over and above its direct impact: ‘British 
culture is perhaps the most powerful and most compelling product we have available 
to us’ and ‘culture should be seen as the standard bearer for our efforts to engage in 
cultural diplomacy, to develop soft power, and to compete, as a nation, in both trade 
and investment’. The central and somewhat paradoxical claim of the speech was 
that, although cuts to the arts are inevitable during a period of austerity, she would 
fight to convince the Treasury that government money spent on the arts remained a 
sound investment in Britain’s national identity and therefore in its economy. 
Commentators were quick to point out the inherent contradictions; arts organisations 
need to make a good economic case, but nothing would protect them from losing 
their funding. 
April 2013 had already been a busy month for cultural policy research, and if the 
speech was intended to galvanise arts professionals and the creative industries into 
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opening their work up to new evaluation criteria it was less than successful. Martin 
Bright of The Spectator noted that ‘she, or her advisers, clearly didn’t know that the 
evidence she seeks is already out there a hundred times over. She came to praise the 
arts and ended up sounding like a philistine’; economic impact research has, as 
Bright implies (and as I have already discussed), been at the forefront of cultural 
policy-making and the arts funding debate for decades. Most of the arguments for 
and against plentiful arts funding and the importance of its economic and social 
impact had already been given a public airing in the preceding three weeks, and 
were fresh in the mind of the British press. NESTA had just published the Manifesto 
for the Creative Economy  (hereafter ‘Manifesto’), in which it was mentioned that 182
‘funders in the UK’s arts sector have been dazzled by the blizzard of economic 
impact studies’ (72) before casting significant doubt on the rigour and consistency of 
the methodologies of these studies and thus the value of the data gathered. Fin 
Kennedy and Helen Campbell Pickford’s report on the effects of cuts on theatre, In 
Battalions,  had just been delivered to culture minister Ed Vaizey (who had 183
previously denied the existence of any of the deleterious effects discussed in the 
report) along with an open letter signed by 82 prominent figures of British theatre 
and calling for a detailed and considered response to this evidence of the damage 
that had already been done. 
The economic benefits of the subsidised arts were front and centre in pro-subsidy 
arguments during the New Labour years, and this preoccupation was reflected in 
research. As Dan Rebellato wrote in his response to Miller’s speech: ‘It's not a matter 
of choosing between funding the arts and funding schools and hospitals; the arts 
generate money that pays for schools and hospitals. Blah blah blah. We've said all 
this before; we've said all this for years.’  Far from being contentious or even 184
surprising, Miller’s speech was old news long before she delivered it and many of the 
theatre-makers who might have offered a public response had already effectively 
done so by supporting In Battalions. Jack Bradley’s introduction to the report states: 
In any other industry R and D is a given [...] You don’t know where the next 
Billy Elliott will come from, so occasionally you take risks. But with decent 
development and training the risks get smaller! I have seen a generation of 
writers – that being my specialism – evolve from pub theatre scribes to 
award-winning screenplay writers. They benefit, the exchequer benefits and 
we as a nation benefit. (4) 
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On one level, this familiar argument is identical to those used by Miller - subsidised 
theatre is necessary as a ‘research and development’ department for the commercial 
sector, for productions that enhance British theatre’s international reputation, and for 
lucrative, high-profile national events such as Danny Boyle’s widely-praised Olympic 
opening ceremony. Bradley’s point, however - and that of In Battalions as a whole - is 
that, while Miller and the Coalition government wait for economic impact statistics 
they judge to be credible, the damaging effects of the cuts are already demonstrable. 
The ‘key findings’ section of In Battalions (9-10) cites significant reductions in areas 
of new writing that relate directly to future economic impact: fewer new play 
commissions (14 out of 26 respondents), reductions in new writing Research and 
Development (11 out of 26 respondents), cutbacks to unsolicited play reading 
services (10 out of 26 respondents) and cancellations of productions (16 out of 26 
respondents). This understandably raises concerns about not only the immediate but 
also the long-term future of British theatre and its impact, as programmes to 
encourage young people into writing and acting also suffer (the closure of 
Hampstead Theatre’s immensely acclaimed youth theatre, Heat & Light, which in the 
last ten years has launched the careers of playwright Atiha Sen Gupta and actors 
Daniel Kaluuya and Selom Awadzi, is a prime example). As discussed in previous 
chapters, such programmes are cited as beneficial not only to the artistic future of 
theatre but also to social and economic impact, creating educational opportunities, 
pathways to employment and prosperity; helping people to ‘get on in the world’, as 
Alan Davey has it.  Miller’s implication that further evidence of economic impact 
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must be produced before the government will invest in the arts sets up a vicious 
circle; cuts mean reduced budgets for new writing and education initiatives, 
reductions in these initiatives mean decreased economic impact, decreased 
economic impact means less government investment in theatre. 
The growth of alternative value research 
Attempts to break out of this vicious cycle under the Coalition government have 
already led to new initiatives in theatre and cultural policy scholarship that look for 
new approaches to assessing the value of the arts. The AHRC-funded Cultural Value 
Project (hereafter CVP), led by Professor Geoffrey Crossick and Dr Patrycja 
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Kaszynska and supported by a team of researchers  from universities, arts 
186
organisations and NGOs, initiated dialogue between practitioners, academics and 
audiences to establish the value of the direct cultural experience: 
The starting premise of the Cultural Value Project is that we need to begin by 
looking at the actual experience of culture and the arts rather than the 
ancillary effects of this experience. The Project will take as its starting point 
the different forms of cultural experience, such as, for instance, the aesthetic 
and cognitive dimensions of our cultural encounters. This might be seen as 
analysing the phenomenology of cultural experiences in order to understand 
better the benefits uniquely associated with cultural activity. This significant 
approach will be conducted alongside exploration of the many other 
economic and social benefits conventionally associated with cultural 
activity. The ambition underpinning the second part of the framework is to 
articulate a set of evaluative approaches and methodologies suitable to 
assessing the different ways in which cultural value is manifested.  187
The CVP team, while clearly aware of the importance of social and financial impact, 
are prioritising a shift in focus from ‘ancillary effects’ to direct effects - what happens 
during the artistic experience rather than beyond it. The Project Advisory Group 
includes Eleonora Belfiore, whose critiques of the social and economic impact 
studies of the New Labour era are discussed in the first and second chapters of this 
thesis, Hasan Bakhshi, the Director of Creative Industries at NESTA and one of the 
authors of the aforementioned Manifesto for the Creative Economy which also 
criticises the inconsistent methodologies of those studies. Bakhshi also co-authored 
(with Alan Freeman and Graham Hitchen) the 2009 paper Measuring Intrinsic Value: 
how to stop worrying and love economics  that provided the theoretical grounding 188
for the launch of the CVP. Belfiore also curates a blog and online resource on 
cultural value research and is one of the lead researchers in the Understanding 
Everyday Participation (hereafter UEP) project led by Andrew Miles at the University 
of Manchester, which began in April 2012 and ‘proposes a radical re-evaluation of 
the relationship between participation and cultural value’ by looking qualitatively at 
the ways in which participation in quotidian cultural practices creates and underpins 
communities. UEP is also linked to doctoral research projects on cultural practices, 
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participation and well- being  and the construction of civic identity , as well as 
189
190
making use of participant groups in various regions.  191
NESTA’s Manifesto, unsurprisingly given its authorship, is immensely supportive of 
the CVP and its mission, seeing it as ‘a most welcome initiative’ (72) that will 
encourage interdisciplinary thinking and, presumably, fresh input for the 
development of new research methodologies. The closing recommendation of the 
chapter on arts and culture is that the DCMS and Treasury use the methodologies 
and findings that will emerge from the CVP as the basis for a new and thorough 
assessment of the value of the subsidised arts and cultural spending, and make future 
funding decisions accordingly. The Manifesto does not, however, sideline the 
financial side of cultural value, but situates it within an imagined whole the parts of 
which have not yet been assembled: 
After years of unproductive debates where cultural and economic values 
have been pitched against each other, it is time to accept that the arts do 
produce value that can be meaningfully assessed, and measured, by 
economists, but that they of course produce cultural value that cannot be 
expressed in monetary units. Funders need a much better understanding of 
the relationship between these economic and cultural values, not least 
because in some cases the former – which can be measured – may do a very 
poor job at signalling the latter. (77) 
In view of these new trends in cultural value research, it is unsurprising that the 
‘Testing Times’ speech drew some angry, disappointed and even bewildered 
responses. As academics, practitioners and administrators had so recently begun to 
work together on moving beyond purely monetary definitions of value and devising 
alternative systems for its assessment (financed by public funding from Research 
Councils UK), for the Culture Secretary to issue a high-profile demand for a return to 
economic impact research represented a startlingly retrograde step. 
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Indivisible links and invisible hands: Tracy C. Davis’ cultural economics and 
theatre 
In order to offer some historical context for the various contemporary preoccupations 
with the intrinsic, instrumental and economic value of British theatre, I now turn to 
the work of Tracy C. Davis and her extensive research into the relative positions of 
these elements in Victorian theatre. The existence and the extent of Davis’ research 
renders the assertions in the Manifesto that cultural economics has little traction in 
the cultural policy debate (71-73) even more frustrating, as it is highly pertinent to 
current discussions and in fact makes decisive moves towards assembling the parts of 
the whole towards which the Manifesto and Measuring Intrinsic Value gesture. As 
Bakhshi, Freeman & Hitchen write, having given a brief literature review of European 
cultural economics: ‘There is a rich tradition to be called on. The problem is that it is 
not.’ (6). Rather than duplicate their work, I shall focus on Davis’ writing (which is 
not included in Measuring Intrinsic Value’s review), as she concentrates specifically 
on theatre and also follows a line of argument regarding the reconciliation of 
different research disciplines that resonates well with the material I will introduce 
subsequently. 
In the introduction to her 2000 book The Economics of the British Stage 1800-1914, 
(hereafter EBS)  Davis refers to the writings of 18th century theatre manager John 192
Philip Kemble (qtd. in Davis 3) as ‘an apt reminder of the theatre industry’s 
indivisible link between economics and aesthetics, and the complete subsuming of 
art to successful commerce’ (4). The book goes on to provide a thorough historical 
background to 20th century debates on the roles of the state and the market in 
theatre. As the society that first gave voice to classical and neoclassical economics, 
Davis argues, an understanding of Victorian Britain’s culture of philanthropy and 
entrepreneurship is essential to the narrative of contemporary British theatre. She 
follows Jacques Barzun’s claim that it was during this time that the era of aristocratic 
patronage of the arts began to shift towards that of public funding; the debates which 
eventually gave rise to the end of British government’s laissez-faire tradition 
regarding art and ultimately to the formation of the Arts Council in 1945 are 
grounded in this period of theatre history, and the Theatre Regulation Act of 1843 
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provokes the possibility that ‘centralized cultural policy is born under Victoria’ (155). 
Davis refers to 20th century examples on both sides of the Atlantic, in the form of 
Bill Clinton’s State of the Union address at the start of his second term and Tony 
Blair’s 1997 pre- election communitarian promises, of how the economic theories 
that governed Victorian theatre still have considerable power in contemporary 
cultural policy debate: 
Clinton and Blair’s premise - to put the support of the state behind the arts 
and humanities in order to better service the state’s ideology - is a Marxian 
take on utility that has its origins in classical economic thought. How the 
theatre is to be utilized in the interest of the state as a choice between state 
intervention and free enterprise was precisely the dilemma perplexing 
nineteenth-century Britons contemplating both market regulation and the 
social good. (5) 
It is clear that for Davis the history of theatre (and by extension its present and future) 
is inseparable from that of economics, but also that this is not restricted to the purely 
monetary. She also brings into play other areas of economic theory, discussing the 
precarious position theatre takes up between the concepts of ‘service’ and ‘good’, 
how its utility was constructed, and its role in disrupting the then-current British 
tradition of laissez-faire. Davis addresses the perennial question of whether theatre 
produces surplus value, starting from John Stuart Mill’s theory that theatre is pure 
waste as nothing material is produced by or gained from the worker’s labour. This 
contrasts with Davis’ own observations regarding theatre’s position within economies 
of desire, and ‘the delight experienced in consumption’ (155). 
Following the 1843 Theatre Regulation Act, the conditions of the production of 
Victorian theatre revolved around the potential oppositions of the desires of the 
spectator to the desires of the state. Davis devotes a full chapter of EBS (‘Marginal 
economics, national interest and the half-naked woman’, 115-155) to illustrating this 
point through the examples of sexism and racism in theatre of the time; while tropes 
of sexualisation and female semi-nudity that might have seemed to be at odds with 
Victorian morality were tolerated by the censors, many shows were deemed to be 
performing race in a manner that was diplomatically ill-advised. Offering pleasure to 
audiences in the form of sexual titillation did not threaten national interests; offering 
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it in a form that might prove detrimental to diplomatic relations certainly did. Davis, 
in the same chapter, links this to the emergence of marginalist economics circa 
1870, demonstrating a move beyond classical constructions of value that 
comprehends marginal utility, one to which monetary quantification is not essential. 
It is worth recalling at this stage that Davis’ earlier work on the economics of theatre 
establishes an approach to cultural economics that refuses to fixate on the monetary. 
In ‘Reading for Economic History’ (hereafter ‘Economic History’) she writes about a 
growing rapprochement between economics and the humanities, particularly from 
the side of economists such as Donald McCloskey who began to use deconstruction 
and discourse to decode the rhetoric of their own discipline. She reads this turn as 
having a particular potential for theatre scholarship, as follows: 
accessing the economy of a play (...) is in harmony with the verstehen 
doctrine in the social sciences, which rejects the primacy of ‘scientific’ 
knowledge derived from laboratory experiments in favor of first person 
knowledge confirmed by human experience. Economists' objection to the 
verstehen doctrine is reminiscent of the  traditional schism between 
the historical and literary disciplines: the first strives to describe something 
that supposedly happened; the other studies what is immutably an assertion 
or product of the imagination. In the literary denotation of economics as an 
aspect of human organization, the verstehen doctrine can be extended to a 
personal-as-political/ political-as-personal approach to ground abstract 
economics in human activity, including its dramatic renderings. (487-488) 
For Davis, then, the study of theatre’s past and present can be understood as a valid 
approach to economics and even as an index of its development. While this thesis 
may at first seem familiar to us from Frankfurt School thought - that the work of art 
cannot be separated from the conditions of its production - Davis is in fact following 
a different theoretical trajectory in directing her critique at the fallacy of the 
‘traditional schism’. Her emphasis is on resisting the breach between the disciplines 
of economics and the humanities that obscures the ‘indivisible link’ between the 
dramatic work and the conditions of its production. The definition of economics she 
embraces is highly specific in that it pre-dates the classical economists she quotes so 
widely throughout her work: ‘One denotation of economics - the sense used by 
Milton and Dryden - involves the structure, arrangement, or proportion of parts of 
any product of human design, including poetry or drama’ (‘Economic History’, 487), 
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and in this she includes the economies of desire that play such a large part in the 
marginal utility of theatre. 
In the context of Victorian theatre, Davis argues, it was this marginal utility that 
mediated between the interests and desires of the audience, those of the state, and 
those of the theatre managers, and also caused the laissez-faire tradition to be 
disrupted from all sides. The invisible hand theory went just so far, in that the self-
interest of theatre managers ensured that the paying public was provided with the 
spectacle it desired, but the desires of the state to maintain both the market and the 
public good provoked intervention on matters of morality, diplomacy and safety (to 
which Davis devotes an earlier chapter, ‘Industrial regulation and safety, [EBS 
70-114] ). At the same time, the most prominent managers themselves in their 
capacity as entrepreneurs disrupted perfect competition by becoming identifiable 
economic actors and directing the market. Economic concerns, whether they were 
those of accruing revenue, directing the entertainment market, ensuring the public 
good or seeking satisfaction of desire, are what shapes Davis’ account of the 
evolution of British theatre, rather than the more sublime considerations of 
aesthetics. 
This account is worth reviving in that it troubles current approaches to economic 
impact, and provides a counterpoint to the CVP project. It is interesting to compare 
Davis’ use of the verstehen doctrine to the previously-cited passage from the 
Manifesto where the economic and the monetary are elided and are kept separate 
from the ‘cultural’. The economic forces invoked by Davis as constitutive of theatre’s 
history are not mathematical (except in the most abstract sense), and indeed in 
‘Economic History’ she is critical of economists’ frequent recourse to mathematical 
formulas, saying that ‘Most economic writing - including economic history - is 
punctuated with mathematical formulas in an effort to convince readers of its 
scientific validity in divining the future from the past’ despite being as determined by 
ideology and discourse as any other form of political narrative. In fact, the elision of 
‘economic’ and ‘monetary’ is a common one in 20th and 21st century discussions of 
cultural value and impact, with Dominic Shellard’s thorough and highly-praised 
study of the ‘economic impact’ of British theatre being a surprisingly strong example. 
Shellard focuses entirely on the monetary worth of theatre to the economy, with 
‘social impact’ being located within a separate survey of its own. The mission of the 
CVP, by contrast, determinedly avoids the financial and seeks ways of defining value 
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as sited within the immediate cultural or artistic experience. When placed in the 
context of Davis’ analysis, this can be read as an example of the imagined schism 
she points out in ‘Economic History’ between the factual and the imaginary. 
Schisms and the Enlightenment legacy  
This schism is what concerns Belfiore and Oliver Bennett in their 2010 article 
‘Beyond the “Toolkit Approach”: Arts Impact Evaluation Research and the Realities of 
Cultural Policy-Making’.  Unpacking the often fraught relationship between 193
‘research, advocacy and the actual realities of policy-making’ (121), Belfiore & 
Bennett point out a similar schism to that indicated by Davis and Bakhshi, Freeman 
& Hitchen between a mathematical and a humanities-led approach to the economics 
of culture, one being constructed as the realm of hard empirical proof and the other 
as that of theorisation and rhetoric. With evidence-based policy-making (hereafter 
EBP ) so central to the New Labour agenda, the same emphasis on wrenching the 194
required conclusions from inconclusive data by any means necessary that led to 
much of the advocacy-based research that Belfiore and many others criticise 
elsewhere (as I discuss in Chapter 2) has also become constitutive of the linear 
discourse prevalent in discussions of policy-making. The assumed narrative in this 
discourse, Belfiore & Bennett argue, is that there is a direct, mono-directional, linear 
relationship between ‘the identification of a problem, research into its nature, causes 
and possible solutions and policy formulation’ (131), and moreover that this 
relationship is apolitical. Until this narrative is questioned rigorously the expectation 
of a linear progression from research to empirical proof to policy development 
remains, and that expectation impedes understanding of how policy- making really 
functions as a political and ideologically-mediated process. 
As discussed in preceding chapters the depoliticisation of policy is a recognised 
trope of Third Way rhetoric, and both Belfiore & Bennett and Davis gesture towards 
this (Belfiore & Bennett 128-9, Davis 5-6). Belfiore & Bennett, however, move this 
critique forward in a provocative direction by linking it to a discussion of the legacy 
of the Enlightenment, via the work of Stephen Toulmin. While Davis roots her 
reading of this schism in classical economics, Belfiore & Bennett (via Toulmin) take it 
back to the mid-seventeenth century when, Toulmin posits, ‘that tension between 
different methods of enquiry — that of the natural or exact sciences on the one hand, 
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and that of the humanities on the other (...) first began to develop’ (Belfiore & 
Bennett, 132). They link the embedding of EBP into the dominant social democratic 
discourse (especially in New Labour Britain) to this tension. The marginalisation of 
the humanities in the development of EBP is read by Belfiore & Bennett as a 
symptom of the post-Enlightenment reification of the schism between these methods 
of enquiry and the data they yield. Just as Davis writes in ‘Economic History’ that 
‘drama's rendering of human behavior is no less "quality data" subject to validity 
tests based on comparative quantitative verification’ (488) than economists’ 
mathematically-derived projections, Belfiore & Bennett argue for an 
...arts impact research agenda which is not confined to the demands of an 
instrumental rationality: a critical approach that aims at an open enquiry of 
the problems, both theoretical and methodological, which are inherent in 
the project of understanding the response of individuals to the arts and trying 
to investigate empirically the extent and nature of the effects of the aesthetic 
experience. In this kind of scenario, the humanities would certainly have a 
role to play in the production of knowledge [...] This would go some way, we 
think, towards the reinstatement of that complementariness of logic and 
rhetoric, of the exact sciences and the humanities, which characterized the 
human pursuit of knowledge before the intellectual and scientific revolution 
of the 1600s (139) 
Belfiore & Bennett’s contention, much like that of Janet Newman or even Mouffe & 
Laclau (see Chapter 3 and 4’s discussions of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy), is that 
to construct the results of one particular type of research as facts that are then 
transmuted into ‘common sense’ (to borrow Newman’s terminology) is to inoculate 
them against political reading. The ultimate legacy of the Enlightenment in policy-
making, for Belfiore & Bennett, is the prioritisation of research methods that can be 
prevented from comprehending the political and the marginalisation of those 
methods that cannot. EBP, in the Enlightenment- driven narrative, is derived 
apolitically from factual data which feeds directly into a policy that is also, by 
extension, ideologically unmediated. 
Belfiore & Bennett’s critique of the policy-making narrative in terms of Enlightenment 
legacy raises some questions regarding my earlier discussions of instrumentalism in 
cultural policy and the challenges that post-Marxism and Western Marxism can bring 
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to Third Way thinking about art and theatre. Firstly, if resisting the separation of 
scientific and humanities-led policy research is a means of resisting depoliticisation, 
then could the creation of a new and more integrated approach as advocated by 
Belfiore & Bennett and by the CVP lead to cultural policy that would be a site of 
genuine political potential? and, looking at Davis’ points regarding the history of the 
form, what specific effects would this have on theatre? 
In addressing these points, I will first return to a paper I have touched on briefly in 
the previous chapter: Esther Leslie’s Add Value to Contents: The Valorisation of 
Culture Today, before working through the issues raised by Davis, Belfiore & Bennett 
(with reference to the cultural policy debate between T. Bennett and McGuigan) and 
with recourse to Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of the Enlightenment. 
Co-operation or co-optation? 
 
Leslie’s article presents a scathing Frankfurt-School-based critique of cultural policy 
and of the academic research that informs it. For Leslie, the rapprochement between 
the world of Cultural Studies with that of cultural policy (which she sites in the early 
1990s) constituted an ideological pollution of the former. She gives examples of 
people who have moved between the two: 
Numerous cultural theorists reinvent themselves as wannabe policy makers 
in the ‘cultural industries’. Still echoing terms from the cultural theory they 
absorbed, they marshal the language of market research and niche 
marketing, capitalism’s tools for product placement in competitive industries. 
The (re)integration of different academic disciplines in service of cultural policy 
reform, put forward by Belfiore & Bennett as a possible way back from 
depoliticisation, is the opposite for Leslie. What current cultural policy scholars put 
forward as politically urgent and radical, she attacks as being part of the apparatus of 
‘the aestheticisation of the political’, and she accuses those cultural theorists who 
collaborate with policy-makers (she names T. Bennett in particular) of being 
complicit in the industrialisation of culture in the service of capitalism and turning 
art into ‘the universal grease relied upon to make the cogs of business turn better.’ 
She, like Belfiore & Bennett, is highly critical of entirely monetary and mathematical 
systems of determining cultural value, but for different reasons. Leslie’s argument is 
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that when the term ‘value’ has lost any meaning beyond the ideological constraints 
of late capitalism. She goes considerably further than Davis, whose critique is 
compatible with Leslie’s up to a point in that it is concerned with sites of power as 
determinants of value; for Leslie, late capitalism holds no alternatives for artistic 
value beyond commodification: 
Culture is quantified – witness the graphs on the UNESCO site of world 
imports and exports of cultural goods. This point is banal. Of course an 
industry, in a capitalist world, produces commodities. This particular industry 
produces art as commodity variously. Art-buying is commodified for broader 
layers by the encouragement of well sponsored and marketed ‘affordable art’ 
fairs, which generalise ownership of small art objects. Art experience is 
commodified through exhibition sponsorship by corporations and in policy- 
makers’ quantification of social benefits derived from exposure to culture. 
And the art institution markets itself as commodity. 
This leads to Leslie’s ultimate point, which she makes via Adorno’s discussion in 
Aesthetic Theory of art and utopia:  that it is futile to attempt to redefine cultural 
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value when the structures that are constitutive of value (those of capitalism) remain 
unquestioned, and Cultural Studies debases itself when it apes Third Way ideology 
by involving itself with policy-making in an attempt to ameliorate the harshest 
excesses and inequalities of neoliberalism.  
Before going any further, I shall explain the long-standing debate within cultural 
policy studies surrounding this issue to which Leslie is referring, to which T. Bennett’s 
defence of the engagement between cultural studies and cultural policy is central. A 
thinker who had already created an important body of work on Marxian aesthetics 
and on Gramsci, T. Bennett made a move away from Gramsci and towards Foucault 
in the early 1990s arguing that Gramsci’s concept of hegemony had (somewhat 
ironically) gained such dominance in the field of cultural studies that it had obscured 
more potentially productive modes of thinking. T. Bennett’s contention was that 
cultural studies had become too rarified, too divorced from the mechanisms of the 
cultures it sought to analyse, and needed to develop strategies for engaging with 
those mechanisms whereby cultural engagement altered public consciousness (his 
term for them being ‘cultural technologies’ (T. Bennett 1992, 31)).  A new 196
relationship between cultural studies and policy was needed, according to T. 
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Bennett, one in which the discipline of cultural studies would take a greater role in 
the formation of ‘cultural technologies’ and the policies that guided them. This, he 
argued, was the way in which cultural policy could be imagined and shaped so as to 
foster and maximise its potential as an agent of social change. Students of cultural 
studies should be involving themselves in the administration of culture with a view 
to reforming it, rather than criticising it from the ivory tower of academia.  
This provocative stance met with criticism from many in the field of cultural studies, 
most significantly Jim McGuigan. McGuigan regarded his political position as being 
to the left of T. Bennett, but more importantly he was critical of T. Bennett’s claims 
that Foucault provided the most useful theoretical framework for disrupting the 
policy arena. McGuigan instead found the formulations of Habermas to be most 
productive, specifically the concept of the ‘public sphere’ in which individuals come 
together as a public to create rational debate and political opinion. Although 
Habermas’ original concept was specific to 18th-century bourgeois society, 
McGuigan is one of the many contemporary theorists who have argued for its 
continuing relevance, specifically with regard to the criticism of cultural policy. 
While acknowledging that Habermas’ ‘public sphere’ was a theoretical norm for 
democracy rather than an observable current phenomenon, McGuigan still argued 
for its deployment as a ‘critical ideal’ (McGuigan 1996, 28) which would supply a 
much-needed counterpoint and resistance to the top-down structures of government 
from the outside.  Trying to change the system from within, McGuigan argued, was 197
less likely to result in true reform than in the co-opting of cultural studies, which 
would risk being subsumed into the mechanisms of the administration it sought to 
disrupt. Leslie’s answer to my earlier question regarding the imagining of a cultural 
policy that would act as a site of genuine political potential might, although her 
theoretical framework is entirely different, work along similar lines to those of 
McGuigan and his fellow Habermasians; that a reconstitution of cultural economics 
along Belfiore & Bennett’s lines would be more likely to depoliticise the research in 
question than repoliticise arts policy and that, for this reason, the project would be of 
limited political worth.  
T. Bennett invokes Adorno in an argument in a 2000 paper  in a manner that tallies 198
with Davis’ assertion that an integrated approach to cultural economics does have 
political potential. Citing the essay ‘Culture and Administration’ (1991), he reads 
Adorno as letting cultural policy off the hook (by contrast with Leslie’s more 
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uncompromising reading): 
This tension suffuses the essay: culture cannot but be administered, but it 
cannot help but suffer as a consequence. But what Adorno does not do [...] 
is seek to extricate the intellectual from the contradictions this generates; to 
the contrary, he thrusts the intellectual into their centre in the demand for an 
administrative praxis that will exhibit a Kantian self-consciousness of these 
contradictions by lodging that self- consciousness in the processes through 
which culture is administered in the form of the expert – the enlightened 
aesthete - who serves as the only force capable of protecting cultural matters 
from the market (...) 
In T. Bennett’s reading, what ‘Culture and Administration’ advocates is the use of 
artists and thinkers as buffers between art and the market, softening the clashes 
which capitalism creates between them. This way of understanding Adorno is far 
from invulnerable to criticism. T. Bennett is referring to a passage towards the end of 
the essay, which states 
The relation between administration and expert is not only a matter of 
necessity but it is a virtue as well. It opens a perspective for the protection of 
cultural matters from the realm of control by the market, which today 
unhesitatingly mutilates culture. (129) 
The terms that give trouble here are ‘relation’ and ‘necessity’. T. Bennett’s reading 
implies the kind of relation that Leslie criticises, a definition of ‘relation’ which is 
worryingly close to co-optation, in which ‘experts’ (which Adorno points out are 
hard to define, let alone locate) become part of the apparatus of policy-making and 
government. An earlier passage from ‘Culture and Administration’ runs as follows: 
The major factor [...] is the dismissal of such concepts as autonomy, 
spontaneity and criticism: autonomy, because the subject, rather than 
making conscious decisions, both has and wishes to subjugate itself to 
whatever has been pre-ordained [...]  criticism is dying out because the 
critical spirit is as disturbing as sand in a machine to that smoothly-running 
operation which is becoming more and more the model of the cultural. This 
critical spirit now seems antiquated, irresponsible and unworthy, much like 
‘armchair’ thinking. (123) 
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The denigration of the critical spirit, here, takes place because it troubles the 
mechanisms of power but cannot gain sufficient momentum to destroy them, and 
autonomy is damaged by the relentless running of those ideological mechanisms that 
give ‘the freedom to choose what is always the same’. (‘Enlightenment as Mass 
Deception’ 167) The virtuous ‘relation’ Adorno posits between experts and 
administrators of the culture industry, therefore, makes more sense if read as an 
antagonistic one rather than one of meek collaboration, as the latter (as the cited 
passage from T. Bennett implies) would be designed to oil the cogs of administration 
rather than damage them. Leslie’s critique of T. Bennett performs the site of resistance 
that an intellectual intervention can create in the cultural policy debate. Her 
contention is not that nothing should be done unless it effects radical and complete 
social change - for, as Adorno writes about such uncompromisingly radical impulses, 
‘Excessive demand is a sublime form of sabotage’ (126) - but rather that academic 
interventions into cultural policy should be less cosy and more combative than those 
currently taking place under the remit of the AHRC and NESTA. 
T. Bennett’s reading also presupposes that in using the term ‘necessary’ Adorno is 
positing this tension as inevitable and inherent in any culture that produces art, 
which - certainly in ‘Culture and Administration’ - is not entirely the case. The 
tension he explores here is peculiar to capitalism and derives from those specific 
conditions of cultural production which, to borrow briefly from Gramsci, has such 
hegemonic dominance that even a theorist (and former Gramscian) such as T. 
Bennett may not find any immediate utility in looking outside it. For T. Bennett, 
writing in 2000 when not only capitalism but its neoliberal incarnation is the only 
game in town, it is difficult not to universalise its rules. 
The aesthetic experience and Enlightenment critiques 
 
Arguably, this difficulty is largely constitutive of Leslie’s extreme wariness of 
interaction between scholars and policy-makers. Given the current ideological 
climate, which makes political integrity notoriously hard to maintain,  Leslie fears 
199
that the hegemonic domination of neoliberalism will inevitably trump the 
honourable intentions and thorough theoretical formulations of those scholars of 
cultural studies like T. Bennett who advocate the development of a closer 
relationship between their own research and the making of policy. 
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As I have just laid out (with reference to T. Bennett and to ‘Culture and 
Administration’, it is not the fact of a relation between the two that is in question, but 
the nature of that relation. In order to look briefly at the current, practical 
possibilities of that relation, I return to Belfiore & Bennett’s discussion of the legacy 
of the Enlightenment and how it could interact with that of Adorno & Horkheimer. 
Although Belfiore & Bennett do not explicitly reference Dialectic of Enlightenment in 
their paper, the two texts have some common ground that can be developed 
productively in order to elucidate how the relation between scholarship and policy 
can avoid a Third Way post-political aporia and, returning to Davis, how this might 
be beneficial to theatre policy and practice. 
In the opening essay of Dialectic of Enlightenment, ‘The Concept of 
Enlightenment’  (hereafter ‘Concept’), Adorno & Horkheimer write: 
200
[...] enlightenment is as totalitarian as any system. Its untruth does not 
consist in what its romantic critics have always reproached it for: analytical 
method, return to elements, dissolution through reflective thought; but 
instead in the fact that for enlightenment the process is always decided from 
the start. When in mathematical procedure the unknown becomes the 
unknown quantity of an equation, this marks it as the well-known even 
before any value is inserted. (24) 
The rigidly formulaic character of the post-Enlightenment construction of knowledge 
not only places constraints on how things can be known, but also on what can be 
known. This is something that is echoed by Belfiore & Bennett’s paper, where it is 
argued that these paradigms create problems for researchers in devising the kind of 
‘complex, exploratory and genuinely open-ended questions’ (136) that would 
produce new perspectives on the old cultural policy debates and new forms of 
knowledge, and that as universities are also tied to market forces, funding 
requirements and contemporary economic thought they may not be able to produce 
the autonomous, rigorous policy research this requires. The cited passage from 
‘Concept’ provides a different but not antithetical angle on this by using algebraic 
formulae as a point of comparison; once a discourse (or equation) has been set up, 
the position and context of its solution determined, that solution is already 
constructed as inevitable and in some sense transcendent. The methods of enquiry 
Adorno & Horkheimer (and Belfiore & Bennett) criticise are constitutive of an 
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unknown that is external and immutable, and towards which the terms that surround 
it ineluctably lead. 
One of the major contentions of ‘Concept’, and of Dialectic of Enlightenment as a 
whole, is that in attempting to destroy mythological modes of thinking in order to 
create liberation, the Enlightenment fell into the trap of neglecting to interrogate its 
own doxa and thus reproducing it as a new strain of mythology, and so continued to 
put in place a system of domination over the natural world and over individual 
human uniqueness. The mythologising of knowledge is what I have described in the 
preceding paragraph; in seeking to demolish humanity’s fear of the unknown or 
unknowable, the Enlightenment as narrated by Adorno & Horkheimer constituted all 
things as potentially knowable within a unified semiotic system in order to achieve 
dominance. Adorno & Horkheimer give this a political dimension by theorising that 
it demands conformity in that it ‘excises the incommensurable’ (12). As post-
Enlightenment thought is suspicious of that which cannot be enumerated, it seeks to 
subject everything to the unifying principles of a single rational system of knowledge 
construction - ‘the calculability of the world’ (7) - and, they argue, the way in which 
social relations came to be couched in mathematical terms (they refer particularly to 
justice here) has been constitutive of the reduction of social relations to commodity 
exchange. Anything that falls outside this unified system of positivist knowledge is 
dismissed. 
Belfiore & Bennett and T. Bennett are in accord regarding the difficulty of measuring 
the aesthetic experience, and the necessity of developing more rigorous methods of 
doing so (for example, T. Bennett, as an established Bourdieusian, deploys his 
knowledge and experience of the methodologies of Distinction). What they do not 
address, and Adorno & Horkheimer do, is how the legacy of the Enlightenment might 
have a direct effect on that aesthetic experience and the ability of the artist or the 
audience to create or participate in that experience: 
With the clean separation of science and poetry, the division of labor it had 
already helped to effect was extended to language. For science the word is a 
sign: as sound, image, and word proper it is distributed among the different 
arts, and is not permitted to reconstitute itself by their addition [ ... ] As a 
system of signs, language is required to resign itself to calculation in order to 
know nature, and must discard the claim to be like her [ ... ] only authentic 
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works of art were able to avoid the mere imitation of  that which already is. 
(18) 
By deploying structuralist terms, Adorno & Horkheimer make the case that the 
aesthetic has been fractured by a scientific, mechanistic approach to language and 
semiotics that makes it difficult for any art outside the avant garde to avoid mimesis 
or even cliche. Once language has been divided from itself, and subjectivity has 
been compromised by the conformity demanded by the Enlightenment’s false 
opposition to mythology, the conditions of artistic production are similarly 
compromised and culture - particularly, in this context, mass culture - becomes 
aesthetically and politically void. This effect is noted not only with regard to art’s 
production but also to its consumption. As workers are dominated by this enforced 
conformity and the erosion of subjectivity which is necessary to their self-
preservation as a work force, so their self-alienation damages their ability to 
participate in the aesthetic: 
The regression of the masses today is their inability to hear the unheard-of 
with their own ears, to touch the unapprehended with their own hands [ ... ] 
Through the mediation of the total society which embraces all relations and 
emotions, men are once again made to be that against which the 
evolutionary law of society, the principle of self, had turned: mere species 
beings, exactly like one another through isolation in the forcibly united 
collectivity. (36) 
This strengthens Leslie’s implied argument that the relation between research and 
policy needs to be an antagonistic one that creates a site of resistance if policy is to 
reflect the criticisms offered by the CVP. If, as Adorno & Horkheimer argued in 1944, 
the legacy of the Enlightenment has a critical impact on artistic production and the 
capacity of people to experience that art, this is something that needs to be 
comprehended by fresh approaches to the measurement of cultural value. It is not 
only the tools of measurement that suffer the effects of the primacy of the sciences 
over the humanities, but also the materials being measured, and attempts to resist the 
depoliticisation of cultural policy by undermining its Enlightenment roots will find 
greater power and coherence if this is recognised and challenged. 
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Theatre policy, interdependence and the interdisciplinary 
As Davis has demonstrated, British theatre creates for itself a peculiar and potentially 
problematic position within this debate. Its history simultaneously mirrors that of the 
discipline of economics and that of numerous other sites of contestation: the 
relationship of the state with the arts, the interdependence of subsidised and 
commercial entertainment, the conflict between aesthetic and financial imperatives. 
This interdependence is also something picked up on by Dragan Klaic in his final 
book Resetting the Stage: Public Theatre Between the Market and Social 
Democracy,  in which he articulates a theory of the complex network of 201
interdependent forces at work in subsidised theatre (funders, policy-makers, 
competitors, the commercial sector, audiences and so on) being constitutive of those 
theatres’ autonomy. For Klaic, autonomy is ‘not a given status and not to be confused 
with independence’ (163) but something fragile, relational and always in flux 
because it depends on the constant negotiation of the position of subsidised theatres 
within this network. Rather than being granted by external forces, it must be claimed 
by the theatres themselves. Throughout this book, Klaic argues fiercely for ‘a firm 
demarcation’ (ix) between subsidised and commercial theatre, and for subsidised 
theatre to sustain its position and its social and aesthetic remit without allowing itself 
to be appropriated by commercialism requires it to continually stake out its shifting 
territories through constant deliberation and negotiation. 
The way in which Klaic and Davis address the difficulties of cultural policy-making is 
inflected by their status as scholars of theatre, rather than of cultural policy or 
sociology. Firstly, both have a clearly-defined interest in the survival of the form and 
in the political significance not only of its content but of its existence. For both Klaic 
and Davis, the position of theatre in the context of its economic and political 
determinants is what sets it apart from other art forms; both scholars scrutinise the 
past and present of theatre in these terms. Klaic provides a broad political context for 
the development of subsidised theatre in post-WW2 Europe, locating its political 
potential in Western Europe as ‘a legitimate beneficiary of the welfare state and an 
instrument of cultural democratisation’ (16), as well as discussing its contemporary 
position at the fulcrum of debates on the public worth of the arts. Davis charts its 
development from Victorian England and emphasises the fact that it has always been 
a contentious form with the capacity - both in its institutional structures and in its 
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performances - to highlight inconsistencies in political and economic thinking. 
Secondly, theatre scholarship is for both of them a field that not only invites but 
demands some degree of interdisciplinarity. In arguing for a rereading of cultural 
economics that can comprehend drama, Davis explicitly recognises the ways in 
which theatre has historically disturbed, altered and directed economic 
developments in a way that is hard to quantify in monetary terms but which is open 
to readings from other theoretical perspectives such as marginalism. 
In Battalions provides a recent and pertinent demonstration not only of theatre’s 
extreme vulnerability to funding cuts and the deleterious effect these have already 
had, but of the necessity of developing approaches to evaluation that can lay out the 
highly specific narrative of contemporary British theatre rather than that of the arts in 
general. As I have demonstrated, Belfiore & Bennett’s approach and that of the CVP 
has the potential to develop a productive relationship between artists, researchers, 
audiences and policy-makers in which outdated research paradigms can be reformed 
and the depoliticisation of cultural policy can be resisted, but as Klaic, Davis and 
now Kennedy have shown, theatre provides a particularly complex case especially 
where new writing is concerned. As is argued by the many contributors to In 
Battalions, the position of theatre in Britain’s cultural infrastructure means that a 
threat to subsidised theatre and new writing constitutes a more generalised threat to 
the cultural landscape. 
Klaic’s argument that subsidised theatre organisations need to claim autonomy  202
through their interdependence with other parts of the cultural infrastructure resonates 
both with In Battalions and with Belfiore & Bennett’s work. In Battalions draws on the 
commercial sector as well as the subsidised for testimonials on the necessity of 
government funding and the damage that will be sustained as a result of its 
withdrawal, but it is always clear that while the two are interdependent their artistic 
and financial territories are clearly demarcated. In Chapter 3 I examined allegations 
made in ACE’s National Theatre Policy and subsequent documents that theatres 
became paranoid and insular during the Blair government during the 1990s and 
needed to engage more with commercial theatre and the creative industries. There is 
both a discursive and and ideological difference between the engagement 
encouraged by the ACE documents I have examined and that discussed by Klaic. The 
first is constructed as apolitical and non-antagonistic, an appeal to the post-
Enlightenment self-preservation mentality Adorno & Horkheimer explain in 
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‘Concept’. It is in the interests of subsidised theatres to participate in the mixed 
economy and reach a consensus with it, and so they have a moral obligation to do 
so. The second recalls Rancière’s concept of dissensus in that it requires that 
subsidised theatres engage with and participate in the rest of the infrastructure in 
order to claim autonomy and challenge, rather than seek, consensus so that 
subsidised theatre may maintain its clearly-demarcated aesthetic and political roles. 
This leads back to Belfiore & Bennett’s claim that the relation between research and 
policy-making has been misconstrued as linear when it is in fact complex and often 
chaotic. In the light of Klaic’s work, it is arguable that this is even more true of 
theatre policy given the intricacy of the relations that already govern theatre. If the 
new approaches developed by the CVP are to represent subsidised theatre and help 
to ensure its survival (and thus, as In Battalions lays out, that of a number of other 
cultural institutions) then they need to reflect the multiplicity of economic, political 
and aesthetic relations that constitute it, and this renders the argument set out by 
Belfiore & Bennett that linear, Enlightenment-driven logic has some limitations in the 
making of cultural policy even more important. What is needed is not only, as they 
and Davis assert, an open-ended and humanities-led approach to studying the 
economics of theatre that can comprehend its status as a political and economic 
force in itself, but a relationship between that research and the policy-making 
process in which theatre can give a more radical and agonistic account of itself. 
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Conclusion: In the Republic of Happiness?  
 there’s no place for politics in this or in any other work of art 
 DON’T GIVE ME THAT SHIT (53)  203
A year and a half after the departure of New Labour from government, Martin 
Crimp’s In the Republic of Happiness received its premier at the Royal Court. The 
play opened to mixed reviews, some of them openly baffled; The Telegraph’s Tim 
Walker called it ‘impenetrable [...] an utter mess’  while Michael Billington, writing 204
a more positive review for The Guardian, confessed:  
his play left me puzzled [...] while we know what Crimp is against, it is hard 
to say what he is for. [...] Crimp, after depicting a morally bankrupt world 
where even the sanctuary of personal relationships is insufficient, offers no 
clue as to how we are going to survive.  205
 
Crimp’s harshly satirical, abstract depiction of contemporary Britain as a society 
driven by isolating technologies and an obsession with self-actualisation leaves 
Billington perplexed by its lack of moral or political resolution, exactly as he was left 
perplexed by Howard Barker thirty-three years earlier.  While the sheer 206
stubbornness of Billington’s incomprehension, producing identical responses of 
frustrated bemusement a third of a century apart, is initially amusing, it also begs the 
question of what else, while appearing on the surface to age or alter, has also 
remained in a state of intransigent, dogmatic empiricism. Have expectations of the 
power of theatre shifted, or is there still an assumption that political performance, if 
done correctly, will produce a hitherto-unforeseen solution to society’s ills? Did 
Blair’s ‘Golden Age’ change the relationship between playwriting and politics, and if 
so was the change productive or detrimental? The answer to the second question is 
contingent on the answer to the first: whether we believe political theatre is doing its 
job any better depends entirely on what we understand its job to be. In the terms set 
out by Ravenhill, whose side is it on? or is it, like Nick and Helen in Some Explicit 
Polaroids, bound to cut its losses, accept its post-political fate and limit its efforts?  
The mythology of the ‘Golden Age’, so prevalent after the change of government, has 
certainly shown itself to be open to contestation from the perspective of cultural 
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policy research, and I have demonstrated the ways in which advocacy and assertions 
of social utility fell short of the rigorous standards of their readers and critics. In the 
first half of the 2000s it was by no means clear that, as Rebellato was able to assert 
by 2013, the theatres had all the necessary numbers and they all added up.  207
Attacks on a methodology that had failed to move beyond the seminal stages of 
Matarasso’s work were certainly justified, as were the resulting concerns for the 
future of theatre subsidy. If all that mattered were the numbers, and the numbers did 
not bear the scrutiny of the DCMS or of critics within the academy, the future looked 
bleak. This being the case, the challenges of those on the Right who advocated the 
abolition of ACE could be seen as valuable in encouraging the defenders of theatre 
subsidy to reassess existing methodologies and consider changing the terms of the 
debate. It is apparent from the developments in discussions of cultural value that I lay 
out in Chapter 5 that many in the field of cultural policy research are indeed ready to 
accept this challenge. In addition to the initiatives already mentioned, the Warwick 
Commission on Cultural Value has lately worked alongside many prominent figures 
of the arts establishment to re-examine the ways in which value can and should be 
assessed.  
From the point of view of challenging the hegemony of the forced consensus on 
‘excellence’ exemplified by the McMaster Review,  this is an encouraging 208
development in the relationship between research and policy. The research of the 
early 2000s fell into the Ravenhill trap of allowing contemporary ideology and 
neoliberal rhetoric to dictate the terms, to accept that social transformation and 
cultural economics (and therefore theatre) had first and foremost to make their case 
to the market. The work of  the Cultural Value Project and the Warwick Commission 
represents a step forward in changing definitions of value and, potentially, in reviving 
neglected approaches to cultural economics that move, as I discuss in Chapter 5, 
beyond the purely monetary and work towards the more holistic approach examined 
by Tracy C. Davis. It is important, too, in challenging the existing power dynamic 
between research and policy which previously followed a top-down model; earlier 
researchers made the case for arts funding by playing by the rules made in Whitehall 
and Westminster. Newer initiatives are seeking to build a different and more 
agonistic, robust interaction between policy-making and the academy, an approach 
that, while fostering collaboration, ensures that the deliberative process continues to 
question ideology and that accountability goes both ways.  
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Throughout this project I have kept in play ideas of autonomy that frequently 
demand an elision which, despite the inevitability with which it occurs, is neither 
simple nor unproblematic. The importance of returning at intervals to Adorno, 
Horkheimer, Marcuse, and through them implicitly to Kant has been to prevent this 
elision becoming too simplistic and beholden to any specific doxa or dogma. The 
idea of financial autonomy and artistic freedom from governmental control can 
easily collapse into that of aesthetic autonomy, in that both refuse to speak to 
questions of value and thus, as Chapter 2 illustrates, can be claimed by advocates of 
‘art for art’s sake’ who are then able to let the primacy of the free market in through 
the back door. By keeping the Frankfurt School and its various readings of aesthetic 
autonomy, readings that are able to comprehend the complex relations between the 
material and the aesthetic, in view, it remains possible to imagine a future for the 
idea of value that is not compelled to denigrate the aesthetic as being without use. 
While purely financial autonomy and its ‘art for art’s sake’ connotations is easily 
claimed by the post-political aporia of Third Way doxa (as is so adeptly satirised in 
my opening quote from In The Republic of Happiness), the recurring presence of 
Adorno’s aesthetic autonomy continues to challenge that claim by restating the 
importance of the material and the constant tensions at work between art, individual 
artwork and the conditions of its production. As Dragan Klaic intimates in Resetting 
the Stage, this leaves room for a progressive definition of autonomy that is distinct 
from independence and recognises the problems of making theatre in the 
increasingly liminal and highly-contested space between the state and the market.   209
Maintaining a dialogue throughout this project between different theories of class 
production, from Western Marxism to the discursive formulations of Mouffe and 
Laclau, from Bourdieu via Levitas to more recent ideas of the cultural omnivore, has 
kept in view the centrality of class not only to cultural policy but to the past and 
present of British theatre. As the certainties posited by Ravenhill  have given 210
ground to frustrating uncertainty and disillusionment with the British Left, cultural 
policy has mirrored this uncertainty in its approach to issues of class and social 
mobility. In terms of contemporary ideology the importance of theatre to addressing 
social inequality seems (in the typical manner of Third Way doxa) to be accepted as 
a fact, but the political ramifications of this are still open to contestation from both 
the academy and the stage. Similarly, ideas of ‘community’ are constitutive of said 
doxa but also of many of its contestations, and a community that comprehends class 
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differs radically from one that rejects it. If theatre fosters community, whether in the 
form of a participatory project for young offenders or a performance of The Author, it 
is vital to remain aware of how that community is constituted. As Levitas reminds us, 
appeals to community are not as unequivocally benign as they appear if they invoke 
post-political communities that ignore the material and inhibit difference and 
dissent.  
Herein lies the importance of the discussions I undertake in Chapter 4 of various 
moments from the British stage under and immediately after the New Labour 
government. All of them create forms of community and attempt forms of resistance. 
Some choose to stage the democratic process explicitly, while others take a more 
oblique approach to the ethics of participation. The latter, in my reading, are the 
more successful in terms of political efficacy because of the space they allow for the 
development of the individual subject within the emerging community. These 
communities resist the Blairite communitarianism criticised by Martell, Hale and 
Levitas in a manner particular to live performance by insisting on the affective and 
the personal as constitutive elements. The community of these plays is more 
congruent with participatory models of democracy because of the centrality of 
difference and plurality, and this is at the heart of their resistance to the post-political 
insistence on an objective truth and reality that is universal, self-constituting and 
immune to individual subjectivity.  
These performances, along with the illuminating meditations of Jill Dolan on the 
utopian performative and the work of academics who are currently re-examining the 
relationship between culture, value, research and policy, are what permit me to 
conclude a piece of research that begun in a spirit of disillusionment on a note of 
hope. The ‘Golden Age’ and the ideology it reflected may have been flawed, and 
living and attending the theatre in its aftermath we are reminded by Crimp that we 
are not ‘the happiest that human beings have ever so far been’, nor are we 
necessarily inclined to ‘Hum hum hum hum the happy song.’ (89). The abundance of 
theatre funding under the New Labour government may not have had a seismic 
effect on the production of class, the understanding of national identity or the 
devastation caused to many by economic and social inequality. In spite of this, and 
in spite of the reservations voiced by Ravenhill in Edinburgh in 2013, British political 
theatre has continued to produce performances that resist, challenge and provoke, to 
examine precisely those lacunae that New Labour sought to paper over or conceal. 
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To return to my earlier question of whether political theatre in Britain has continued 
to work effectively, its role has undoubtedly changed. That which it seeks to diagnose 
and resist has become more plastic, less certain and clearly-defined, but its strategies 
have shifted in response allowing audiences and theatre scholars to perceive a 
legitimate future for its various forms. While we may not live in the Republic of 
Happiness, British theatre can still provide elements of political performance that, as 
Dolan would no doubt agree, grant a glimpse of it to its audiences.   
 Crimp, Martin. In The Republic of Happiness. London: Faber. 2012203
 Walker, Tim. Telegraph. 20 December 2012 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/theatre/9759387/204
In-the-Republic-of-Happiness-at-Royal-Court-review.html>
 Billington, Michael. Guardian. 13 December 2012 <http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2012/dec/205
13/republic-of-happiness-review>
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